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Introductory Summary 
The dissertation "Essays on Bond and Commodity Markets" deals with determinants of 
investment decisions in bond markets and with speculation and information content of trading 
activity in commodity futures markets. The two essays on bond markets contribute to the 
explanation of the home bias phenomenon by studying two aspects of the financial decision 
making that have not been explored in the context of home bias in bond portfolios yet:  
(i) How do culture and patriotism impact domestic and foreign debt portfolio allocation 
decisions?  
(ii) What is the role of domestic creditor protection in foreign debt portfolio allocation 
decisions? 
The essays on commodity markets deal with financial activity and its information content in 
agricultural and precious metals futures markets. The most important contributions to the 
existing literature are as follows:  
(i) examination of Granger-causal effects of trading activity of speculators and index 
traders at different quantiles of the return distribution, which explicitly introduces non-
linearity in the relationship between returns and trader positions in agricultural futures 
markets;  
(i) in-depth analysis of the role of speculative activity in precious metals futures markets, 
in which hedging pressure is explicitly included in Granger causality tests;  
(ii) exploration of the forecasting power of trading activity and its information content in 
precious metals futures markets based on a regime-dependent approach that allows 
identifying informational and non-informational trades in bull and bear market states.  
The essay "Impact of Domestic Creditor Protection on Foreign Bond Bias" analyzes the 
relationship between domestic creditor protection and foreign investment in bond markets. The 
role of domestic investor protection in the cross-border investment decisions in debt markets has 
been neglected in the empirical and theoretical research on home bias in bond markets: The 
existing studies that strive to explain the cross-border bond investment focus on creditor 
protection in destination countries (e.g. Fidora et al., 2007; Ferreira and Miguel, 2011; Giofré, 
2013). By contrast, for equity markets, several concepts have evolved that relate domestic 
shareholder protection to foreign investment. The "good country bias" theory of Giannetti and 
Koskinen (2010) predicts that shareholders who benefit from a high level of investor protection 
at home have less incentives to diversify their portfolios internationally than shareholders from 
countries where their rights are only insufficiently protected. To put it differently, shareholders 
implicitly compare foreign and domestic creditor protections when determining portfolio shares 
allocated to foreign stocks (Giannetti and Koskinen, 2010). Similarly, the "comparative 
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corporate governance" theory of Giofré (2014b) implies that domestic shareholder protection 
plays the role of a benchmark against which the foreign shareholder protection is evaluated. 
Empirically, a twofold effect of domestic corporate governance on foreign investment decisions 
is documented (Giofré, 2014a). On the one hand, efficient domestic corporate governance 
increases foreign equity investment (positive direct effect). On the other hand, it reduces the 
sensitivity of foreign equity investment to the shareholder protection in the destination country 
(negative indirect effect). 
My study shows that the theoretical concepts and empirical findings for equity markets cannot 
be applied to the bond markets unrestrictedly. The empirical results for bond markets lend little 
support to the "good country bias" and the "comparative corporate governance" theories. 
Domestic creditor protection does not appear to be a benchmark against which the creditor 
protection in the destination country is evaluated. On the contrary, the effect of domestic legal 
environment is more decisive compared to the host’s one: The positive effect of domestic 
creditor protection on foreign investment is so strong that it dominates the positive effect of the 
foreign creditor protection. However, the difference between domestic and foreign creditor 
protections impacts the cross-border bond investment in the sense that it affects the sensitivity of 
foreign investment to creditor protections in home and host countries. If domestic creditor 
protection is more efficient than foreign creditor protection, the sensitivity of foreign investment 
to foreign (domestic) creditor protection decreases (increases). These findings are closely 
related to the negative indirect effect of domestic shareholder protection as documented by 
Giofré (2014b) for equity markets.  
When the methodology of Giofré (2014b) is applied to bond markets, the reduced 
responsiveness to the creditor protection in destination countries is documented for the total 
sample and for investing countries where the protection of creditor rights is relatively high, i.e. 
above the world average. The ascertained negative effect of domestic creditor protection on the 
sensitivity of foreign investment to the creditor protection in destination countries indicates that 
domestic creditor protection may impede the foreign investment: An efficient domestic creditor 
protection reduces incentives to pay attention to the level of creditor protection in a destination 
country. This effect is, however, alleviated by the positive direct effect of domestic creditor 
protection on foreign investment. In spite of its negative impact on the sensitivity of foreign 
investment to the creditor protection in the destination country, a high level of domestic creditor 
protection is associated with a higher international diversification in bond portfolios. 
However, in countries with a comparatively low protection of creditor rights, domestic creditor 
protection does not affect the foreign investment’s sensitivity to creditor protection in 
destination countries. Furthermore, a high level of domestic creditor protection makes foreign 
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investment less attractive. In this case, the negative direct effect of domestic creditor protection 
on foreign investment challenges the typical explanation of home bias in terms of diversification 
costs that investors face vis-à-vis foreign assets. It seems that not only host country-specific 
characteristics such as an inefficient protection of creditor rights and a low quality of legal 
environment deter the foreign investment, but also that the perception of domestic legal 
environment may implicitly increase diversification costs and become a barrier to the foreign 
investment. 
These findings have important economic and political implications. The real effects of 
government measures aiming at attracting foreign capital flows may turn out lower than 
expected. For instance, trying to improve creditor protection in the hope of increasing foreign 
investment in domestic bonds may not achieve the desired outcome if investors from countries 
where their rights are well protected do not pay much attention to the creditor protection in the 
destination country.  
In the existing studies that deal with the determinants of home bias in bond markets, a lot of 
attention is paid to neoclassical explanations. By contrast, the essay "Impact of Culture and 
Patriotism on Home Bias in Bond Portfolios" enlarges the empirical literature on home bias 
of bond investors by analyzing the impact of patriotism, individualism, uncertainty avoidance 
and cultural distance on domestic and foreign bias in bond markets. Domestic bias reflects the 
overinvestment in domestic debt securities, whereas foreign bias captures the bilateral under- or 
overinvestment.  
Portfolio allocation decisions may be governed not only by objective decision criteria such as 
risk and return considerations, but also by investors’ subjective beliefs that are closely linked to 
cultural inheritance. Patriotism, individualism, uncertainty avoidance and cultural distance are 
related to psychological and behavioral characteristics that influence human behavior and may 
also affect investment decisions. For instance, investment in domestic securities may yield 
additional utility to patriotic investors (Morse and Shive, 2011). Familiarity bias may manifest 
itself more strongly in the presence of cultural similarities between home and host countries 
resulting in a higher preference for those foreign securities that are issued in countries that are 
culturally similar to the home country. Uncertainty avoidance is closely related to intolerance of 
ambiguity (Hofstede et al., 2010; House et al., 2004) that results in a reluctance to invest in the 
less familiar foreign assets. By contrast, overconfidence as a behavioral underpinning of 
individualism is supposed to induce investors to take higher risks (Chui et al., 2010) and, thus, 
to boost the foreign investment.  
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The impact of culture and patriotism on investment decisions in equity markets has been well 
documented (Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010; Anderson et al., 2011; Morse and Shive, 2011). 
However, these results cannot be a priori extended to bond markets that are characterized by a 
limited participation of individual investors who constitute the investor group that is perceived 
as being most sensitive to behavioral heuristics (e.g. Chuang and Susmel, 2011). Indeed, as 
opposed to the studies on equity home bias (Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010; Anderson et al., 
2011), I do not find any robust evidence of a significant impact of cultural distance on 
investment decisions in bond markets. Cultural distance does not increase either overinvestment 
in domestic debt securities or underinvestment in foreign debt securities. One potential 
explanation may be the lower importance of information asymmetries in debt compared to 
equity markets. By contrast, patriotism and uncertainty avoidance of the home country play an 
important role in the explanation of home bias in bonds. Patriotism fosters overinvestment in 
domestic debt securities and increases underinvestment in foreign debt markets. Societies 
characterized by higher uncertainty avoidance display a lower preference for foreign debt 
securities.  
The obtained results corroborate the importance of behavioral and cultural effects in the 
explanation of investment decisions. Patriotism and uncertainty avoidance appear to be asset-
invariant determinants of the financial decision making. The perceived mean-variance 
characteristics of a security are affected by subjective beliefs that, given the persistence of 
deeply rooted cultural values, cannot be easily changed. Thus, policy measures aimed at 
increasing liberalization of financial markets may turn out less effective than expected. In this 
case, legislators and government officials may have to address behavioral and cultural biases 
that, however, cannot be easily manipulated. 
The essays "Financialization of Agricultural Futures Markets: Evidence from Quantile 
Regressions" and "Impact of Speculation on Precious Metals Futures Markets" deal with 
financial activity in commodity futures markets. The role of speculators and index traders in the 
price bubbles over the 2005-2008 and 2010-2011 periods has been heavily discussed in the 
existing literature. Several theoretical concepts elaborate on how speculators may influence the 
price mechanism. Private information may result in a price impact (Gilbert and Pfuderer, 2014). 
Alternatively, even in the absence of private information, heterogeneous beliefs about publicly 
available information may induce a price impact in the "differences of opinion" equilibrium 
(Singleton, 2014; Fische et al., 2014).  
The empirical evidence regarding the impact of speculative activity on the price mechanism in 
commodity markets remains vague. In spite of the controversial empirical evidence, calls for 
tighter regulation and closer supervision of financial activity in futures markets have become 
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more urgent (e.g. Masters, 2008). As a consequence, the US Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) has initiated a public roundtable for the Aggregation and Position Limits 
Proposals that aim to re-consider and establish limits on speculative positions in 28 physical 
commodity futures and option contracts (CFTC, 2013). The discussion on the scope of and the 
exemption from the position limits is not over yet.   
The essay "Financialization of Agricultural Futures Markets: Evidence from Quantile 
Regressions" analyzes the relationship between financial activity and returns in twelve 
agricultural futures markets. To my knowledge, this study is the first to explicitly account for 
the non-linearity in the Granger-causal relationship between returns and trader positions in 
commodity futures markets based on quantile regressions. Most existing empirical studies rely 
on the Granger causality in mean and fail to document any evidence of a significant Granger-
causal relationship between financial activity and returns in agricultural futures markets (e.g. 
Irwin et al., 2009; Brunetti et al., 2011; Irwin, 2013; Grosche, 2014). In addition to traditional 
Granger causality in mean, I explore the Granger-causal effects from the perspective of 
conditional quantiles of the return distribution.  
Quantile regressions are an important complement to the "Granger causality in mean" approach. 
The underlying intuition is that the failure to detect any significant Granger causality in mean 
may be the consequence of non-linearity of the causal relationship in different parts of the 
distribution of the dependent variable. If the impact of positions on subsequent returns is 
positive at some quantiles and negative at other quantiles, the positive and negative causal 
effects may cancel each other out in the least squares estimations such that no Granger causality 
in mean is detected – as has been shown by Chuang et al. (2009) for the trading volume-return 
relationship in stock markets. Theoretical research (e.g. Campbell et al., 1993; Llorente et al., 
2002) corroborates the idea of non-linearity in the trading activity-return relationship. Non-
informational trades that are recognized and corrected by market participants should be 
associated with negative causality from past changes in net long positions of traders to returns. 
Positive causality may arise in case of trades that trigger positive feedback trading of other 
market participants and, thus, result in price effects that persist for a week or longer. Moreover, 
observing Granger-causal relationships at individual quantiles allows insight as to the part of the 
distribution in which Granger causality manifests itself: Does it take place during the times of 
rising or falling prices, i.e. at high or low quantiles of the return distribution?  
Three different trader categories that are commonly associated with financial activity in futures 
markets are considered. Money managers are typically professional speculators who trade either 
on their own or on their clients’ behalf (CFTC, 2009). In general, other reportables are not 
professional speculators. This trader category includes individual speculative traders, market 
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makers and firms managing their own assets (Irwin and Sanders, 2012). Index traders cannot be 
considered as typical speculators who bet on the future direction of price movements and 
respond to fundamental and/or technical factors that may influence prices (CFTC, 2006). Index 
investors typically enter futures markets in order to gain a long-side exposure to a broad index 
of commodities as an asset class (CFTC, 2006). 
Quantile regressions reveal that there are significant Granger-causal effects from trader 
positions to returns that would not have been unveiled while using the traditional "Granger 
causality in mean" approach: for index traders in the corn market, for money managers in the 
cocoa, feeder cattle, sugar and SRW wheat markets and for other reportables in coffee and SRW 
wheat markets. Albeit Granger causality cannot be interpreted as direct evidence of a price 
impact, my results imply that Granger causality in mean may underestimate the role of 
speculators and index traders in the information efficiency of agricultural futures markets. 
Evidence of non-linearity in the relationship between trader positions and returns can be found, 
but it does not hold for all twelve agricultural futures markets under consideration.  
The essay "Impact of Speculation on Precious Metals Futures Markets", co-authored with 
David Bosch, analyzes long- and short-term effects of speculative activity on the price 
mechanism in precious metals markets. As opposed to the existing studies on speculation in 
precious metals markets that focus on spot markets (Mutafoglu et al., 2012; Fassas, 2012), this 
study examines the relationship between speculative activity and futures prices based on the 
standard "Granger causality in mean" approach. Two different trader categories that are 
commonly associated with speculative activity are considered: non-commercial traders, i.e. 
traders whose activity is not related to hedging a physical commodity exposure, and money 
managers, i.e. professional speculators that constitute a subgroup of the non-commercial trader 
category. The major innovative contribution of this study is the methodology that allows 
accounting for the simultaneous impact of hedging pressure and speculative activity on futures 
returns and volatility. Thus, we eliminate the possibility that our results may be contaminated by 
the omitted variable bias that arises due to a high correlation between positions of hedgers and 
speculators. This procedure ensures that a significant coefficient estimate on positions of 
speculators does not simply reflect the significance of hedgers’ positions.  
When weekly horizons are considered, we do not detect any predictive power of speculative 
positions for futures returns. Similarly, there is no evidence that speculative activity destabilizes 
the price formation by inflating conditional return volatilities in the period after 2006. However, 
prior to June 2006, we find a statistically significant destabilizing effect of positions of non-
commercial traders on conditional volatility in gold, silver and palladium futures markets. In 
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gold and silver markets, the economic significance is rather low, whereas the destabilizing 
effect manifests itself in the less liquid and smaller palladium futures market. 
Long-horizon regressions indicate that net long positions of speculators accumulated over a 
monthly period have the potential to inflate prices in the four precious metals futures markets. 
This effect is especially robust for gold and silver. The economic significance of this potentially 
destabilizing effect is substantially higher in the period after 2006 compared to the 2000-2006 
period. However, there is little evidence that speculators have the potential to inflate prices over 
longer (e.g. quarterly) time horizons. 
The essays "Financialization of Agricultural Futures Markets: Evidence from Quantile 
Regressions" and "Impact of Speculation on Precious Metals Futures Markets" show that 
standard Granger causality tests cannot capture all aspects of the relationship between financial 
activity and returns in commodity futures markets. Significant Granger-causal effects from 
positions to returns either arise at individual quantiles of the return distribution or manifest 
themselves only when the effect of cumulated positions is considered. Albeit significant 
Granger-causal effects from trader positions to subsequent futures returns cannot be interpreted 
as evidence of a contemporaneous price impact, the fact that trader positions have the potential 
to forecast futures returns in agricultural and precious metals markets may be useful to 
regulators in the discussion on the purpose of the position limits for speculators. 
The essay "Information Content of Trading Activity in Precious Metals Futures Markets" 
focuses on information efficiency in precious metals futures markets. The objective of the study 
is to explore whether trading activity has any informational role in predicting returns as 
suggested by various theoretical frameworks such as the "sequential information arrival" models 
of Copeland (1976) and Jennings et al. (1980), the rational expectations equilibrium of 
Schneider (2009), the "demand discovery" model of Gallmeyer et al. (2005) etc. To the best of 
my knowledge, this study is the first to apply a regime-dependent approach in order to address 
potential non-linearities and asymmetries in the predictive power of trading volume and open 
interest in the context of futures markets. In addition, I explore whether the forecasting power of 
positions of different trader types (speculators and hedgers) and of their sentiment differs across 
market regimes that are distinguished based on a Markov switching model. The bull markets are 
characterized by rising prices and a low return volatility, whereas the bear markets are 
associated with negative mean returns and a high return variability. Importantly, the 
differentiation between bull and bear markets is an alternative approach to quantile regressions 
for dealing with non-linearity: Whereas quantile regressions permit only to distinguish between 
states characterized by positive and negative returns, Markov switching allows incorporating the 
second moments of the return distribution. 
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The consideration of different market states allows for the possibility that the direction of 
Granger causality from trading activity to returns may be asymmetric across bull and bear 
markets. In this case, the absence of a significant Granger causality in models without regime 
switching would not rule out the forecasting power of trading activity for returns in bull and 
bear market regimes. The idea that the dynamic volume-return causality may not be constant 
over time is deeply rooted in the theoretical research. For instance, the frameworks of Campbell 
et al. (1993), Wang (1994) and Llorente et al. (2002) suggest that different volume-return 
dynamics may arise as a consequence of informational and non-informational trades. In 
addition, the "learning to be overconfident" hypothesis of Gervais and Odean (2001) predicts 
that investment gains make investors overconfident such that their trades contain a non-
informational component. Hence, distinguishing between bull and bear market regimes may 
capture the differences in the behavior of market participants in different phases of market 
sentiment: Under the assumption that gains are easier to realize in market periods associated 
with an upward price trend and a low return volatility, the bull markets are more likely to be 
dominated by overconfident investors than the bear market states. If overconfidence induces an 
overestimation of returns, it may result in price changes that are not justified by fundamentals 
and prices revert back to their fundamental values on the next day. During the bear markets, i.e. 
periods of falling prices with a high return volatility, when it is more difficult to make profits, 
overconfidence is less likely to arise. As a consequence, investors may be less prone to the 
overestimation of the precision of their information such that informational trades prevail in the 
bear markets. If private information is not immediately absorbed by the market, we should 
expect price continuations following increases in trading activity in bear market states.  
Empirical results confirm the main hypothesis that the dynamic relationship between trading 
activity and subsequent returns is asymmetric across bull and bear markets. The analysis also 
shows that models without regime switching may underestimate the predictability of returns by 
trading activity. A model without regime switching detects significant Granger-causal effects 
from trading volume (open interest) to returns only in the silver (platinum) market. 
Differentiating between different regimes unearths additional forecasting power of trading 
volume in bull and bear markets for gold and platinum and significant Granger-causal effects 
from past changes in open interest to returns in all but the palladium bear market. These results 
are robust to different rollover procedures and regression specifications. 
Silver is the only market where the direction of the volume-return causality is constant across 
the two market states. By contrast, an asymmetric (or non-linear) direction of the dynamic 
volume-return relation can be observed for gold, platinum and palladium: The direction of 
Granger causality from trading volume to returns is negative in bull and predominantly positive 
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in bear markets. The same pattern can be observed for the open interest-return dynamics in 
platinum and palladium markets. Both the sign of the serial return correlation and the direction 
of the trading activity-return relation allow differentiating between informational and non-
informational buying and selling pressure. With the exception of silver bear and palladium bull 
markets, there is strong evidence that non-informational trades prevail in bull markets, whereas 
bear markets are dominated by trades that are based on private information. 
The documented asymmetric relationship between trading activity and returns has important 
implications for investment and hedging strategies. There is solid evidence of the information 
content of both trading volume and open interest that forecast returns not only in the less liquid 
markets such as palladium, but also in highly liquid gold and silver futures markets. However, 
investment strategies that seek to profit from return predictability by trading activity should 
account for the fact that the direction of the dynamic trading activity-return causality may differ 
across different market states and that it may manifest itself only in one market state. Moreover, 
market participants who are closely watching the trading activity in futures markets should be 
aware of the fact that the direction of Granger-causal effects from trading activity to returns may 
depend on the proxy used to measure the trading activity, i.e. trading volume or open interest.  
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Abstract 
This study contributes to the existing literature on home bias by exploring the relationship 
between domestic creditor protection and foreign investment decisions in bond markets. It also 
investigates how the difference between domestic and foreign creditor protections affects the 
foreign investment. The impact of domestic creditor protection on cross-border investment in 
bonds is twofold. A high level of domestic creditor protection increases international 
diversification. At the same time, an efficient protection of creditor rights at home reduces the 
sensitivity of foreign investment to foreign creditor protection. These results hold most strongly 
for investing countries with high levels of domestic creditor protection. In addition, this study 
shows that the difference between domestic and foreign creditor protections matters for 
investment decisions: If domestic creditor protection is more efficient than foreign creditor 
protection, the sensitivity of foreign investment to foreign (domestic) creditor protection 
decreases (increases). 
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1 Introduction 
Under the assumption of perfectly efficient capital markets, all investors should hold the same 
value-weighted portfolio where the weight of each asset corresponds to its weight in the world 
market portfolio, independently of the nationality and relative risk aversion of individual 
investors (Sercu, 1980). However, if diversification costs exceed diversification benefits, home 
bias arises: Investors assign disproportionately high shares of their portfolios to domestic assets 
and underweight foreign assets (Lewis, 1999). Existing literature distinguishes two aspects of 
the home bias phenomenon: the domestic bias (overinvestment in domestic bonds) and the 
foreign bias (bilateral over- or underinvestment in bonds issued in different destination 
countries). Inefficient protection of investor rights may become an important barrier to foreign 
investment if the level of investor protection is not fully incorporated in asset prices.1  
Whereas the existing studies on foreign bond bias explore the importance of investor protection 
in destination countries (Fidora et al., 2007; Ferreira and Miguel, 2009; Giofré, 2013), the focus 
of this study is the way in which domestic creditor protection impacts foreign investment 
decisions in debt markets. This paper is closely linked to the evidence of Giofré (2014a) who 
shows that domestic corporate governance exerts a twofold effect on cross-border investment in 
equity markets. A high level of domestic investor protection does not only directly increase the 
bilateral equity investment, but also indirectly impacts the foreign equity bias in the sense that a 
high shareholder protection at home reduces the investors’ responsiveness to the shareholder 
protection in destination countries (Giofré, 2014a).  
The interaction effects between domestic and foreign investor protections have received 
comparatively little attention in the existing research. The "good country bias" theory of 
Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) implies that portfolio investors from countries with weak 
shareholder protection invest more in foreign stocks than portfolio investors from countries with 
a more efficient protection of their rights. The "comparative corporate governance" theory of 
Giofré (2014b) is based on the assumption that the driver of cross-border investment decisions 
in equity markets is the foreign relative to the domestic investor protection. 
The results for equity markets cannot trivially be extended to bond markets. Information costs 
faced by foreign investors are closely related to investor protection and legal environment 
(Gehrig, 1993; Leuz et al., 2009). Given that information asymmetries are less relevant for the 
                                                          
1 Given the investor heterogeneity (e.g. foreign versus domestic investors as well as familiarity-biased 
versus rational market participants), equilibrium asset prices do not necessarily fully reflect the level of 
investor protection (Giannetti and Koskinen, 2010; Leuz et al., 2009; Cao et al., 2009). If the discount for 
bonds issued in countries that offer only a poor protection of creditor rights is not sufficient to 
compensate the bondholders, laws protecting the rights of bondholders and the confidence in the efficient 
and impartial enforcement of these laws may impact investment decisions. 
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payoff of a fixed claim compared to a residual claim,2 domestic investor protection may not 
impact the cross-border investment in bonds in the same way as the cross-border investment in 
equities.3  
This study makes two contributions to the existing literature. First, it examines whether the 
twofold effect of domestic investor protection, as documented by Giofré (2014a) for equity 
markets, is an asset-invariant phenomenon, i.e. whether it also holds in bond markets. Second, 
this study investigates how the difference between domestic and foreign creditor protections 
affects the foreign investment’s sensitivity to domestic and foreign creditor protection levels. In 
this respect, it is an extension of the "good corporate governance theory" of Giannetti and 
Koskinen (2010) and the "comparative corporate governance theory" of Giofré (2014b) that 
focus only on the direct effect of the difference between domestic and foreign investor 
protections on foreign investment.   
An analysis of cross-border debt holdings of 36 countries over the 2004-2012 period reveals that 
the twofold effect of domestic investor protection that has been documented for equity markets 
seems to hold in bond markets as well. A high level of domestic creditor protection increases 
foreign investment, but decreases the foreign investment’s sensitivity to the creditor protection 
in destination countries. These results are valid not only for traditional measures for the 
protection of the secured creditors’ rights by collateral and bankruptcy laws, but also with 
regard to the quality of legal environment, in particular the efficiency and impartiality of the 
judicial system.  
However, this study also documents important differences between investing countries with 
creditor protections above and below the world average. The twofold effect of domestic creditor 
protection on international diversification manifests itself for the total sample and for investors 
from countries with relatively high levels of creditor protection. By contrast, the results are 
different for investors from countries with creditor protection below the world average. In this 
case, a high level of domestic creditor protection is associated with a lower level of the foreign 
bond bias, i.e. investors from countries where their rights are well protected are less likely to 
diversify their portfolios abroad, and the investors’ sensitivity to the foreign creditor protection 
is not significantly affected by the level of creditor protection at home.  
                                                          
2 In this respect, Portes et al. (2001) show that the impact of information asymmetries on the US 
residents’ foreign transactions is higher for equities than for bonds. 
3 Existing literature documents that there are substantial differences in the impact of the protection of 
investor rights in destination countries on the cross-border investment in equities and bonds: De Moor and 
Vanpée (2013) and Giofré (2013) show that the level of investor protection in destination countries is less 
important for cross-border investment in bonds compared to equities.  
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With respect to the "good country bias" and "comparative corporate governance" theories, the 
empirical evidence finds little support for these concepts in the context of the cross-border 
investment decisions in bond markets. However, this study shows that the difference between 
domestic and foreign creditor protections affects the foreign investment indirectly via the 
sensitivity of foreign investment to creditor protections in home and host countries. A higher 
domestic creditor protection relative to the creditor protection in the destination country reduces 
(increases) the sensitivity of foreign investment to foreign (domestic) creditor protection. This 
evidence strengthens the importance of domestic creditor protection in the foreign debt portfolio 
choices. It appears to be more than a simple benchmark against which the protection of creditor 
rights abroad is evaluated. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the existing literature on home 
bias and creditor protection. In Section 3, data and methodology are outlined. Section 4 presents 
the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Related Literature 
The importance of investor protection for portfolio allocation decisions has attracted 
considerable attention in the empirical and theoretical research. Several studies confirm both 
empirically and theoretically the importance of corporate governance of the home (host) country 
as an explanation of domestic (foreign) bias in equity markets (e.g. Dahlquist et al., 2003; 
Giannetti and Simonov, 2006; Kho et al., 2009). In equity markets, two types of investors are 
distinguished: portfolio investors whose returns from the share ownership consist solely of 
dividends and capital gains/losses and controlling shareholders who draw an additional 
advantage from their shares, namely the private benefits from control (Dahlquist et al., 2003). 
This differentiation is closely related to the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms that 
protect portfolio investors from expropriation by managers and controlling shareholders.  
In the framework of Dahlquist et al. (2003), international diversification in equity portfolios is 
impeded by the increasing demand of controlling shareholders who are not willing to sell their 
closely held shares at the prevailing market price. Controlling shareholders demand a control 
premium that portfolio investors are not willing to pay (Dahlquist et al., 2003). In the 
framework of Giannetti and Koskinen (2010), stock prices in countries with a low degree of 
investor protection do not fully reflect losses that accrue to portfolio investors as a consequence 
of the rising demand of controlling shareholders.4 According to Giannetti and Koskinen (2010), 
                                                          
4 Given that the market price is determined by the demand of both the controlling and portfolio 
shareholders, the demand of controlling shareholders drives up the price above the value that would 
prevail in the absence of controlling shareholders and that is needed to compensate portfolio shareholders 
for the extraction of private benefits by corporate insiders (Giannetti and Koskinen, 2010). 
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portfolio investors exhibit the so called good country bias: They invest more in a host country 
that offers more efficient corporate governance mechanisms than their home country.  
Compared to home bias in equities, the importance of investor protection for home bias in bonds 
has received less attention. Moreover, the existing empirical evidence on the impact of creditor 
protection on home bias in bonds is controversial. Ferreira and Miguel (2011) show that, 
whereas domestic bias in bonds, i.e. the overinvestment in domestic bonds, is negatively related 
to the efficiency of the domestic judicial system, neither the efficiency of the judicial system nor 
the common law legal origin of destination countries have any robust impact on the foreign 
bond bias, i.e. international diversification in bond portfolios. Fidora et al. (2007) document that 
the cross-border investment in bonds is more sensitive to institutional and political variables of 
the destination country, e.g. investment and political risk, the efficiency of the judicial system, 
corruption and the quality of information disclosure, than the cross-border investment in 
equities. De Moor and Vanpée (2013) show that corporate governance both on the country and 
corporate level5 matters only for home bias in equities, but not for home bias in bonds. Giofré 
(2013) examines the impact of creditor and shareholder protection of host countries on home 
bias in bond and equity portfolios over the 2001-2006 period. The impact of the protection of 
both creditor and shareholder rights on the international investment in equity securities is 
positive. By contrast, host countries characterized by a strong protection of shareholder rights 
are less attractive for bondholders, whereas the positive impact of creditor rights on foreign 
bond investment manifests itself only in conjunction with the efficiency of the judicial system 
(Giofré, 2013).  
The study that is most closely related to the subject of this paper is that of Giofré (2014a) who 
examines the role played by domestic corporate governance mechanisms in the cross-country 
allocation decisions in equity markets. In addition to a positive impact of shareholder protection 
in both host and home countries on international diversification in equity portfolios, Giofré 
(2014a) documents a negative interaction effect between the corporate governance practices of 
home and host countries on home bias in equities. In particular, she shows that the foreign 
portfolio composition is indirectly affected by domestic corporate governance: Shareholder 
protection at home influences the investors’ responsiveness to the shareholder protection in 
foreign countries. This evidence is interpreted in favor of decreasing marginal returns on 
corporate governance: An efficient domestic protection of shareholder rights contributes 
substantially to the optimal corporate governance level such that less attention is paid to the 
investor protection in destination countries (Giofré, 2014a). Furthermore, Giofré (2014b) shows 
                                                          
5 The government effectiveness indicator of the World Bank is used as a proxy for country level 
governance, whereas corporate governance is approximated by the corporate board efficacy indicator of 
the Global Competitiveness Report (De Moor and Vanpée, 2013). 
18 
 
that it is not the foreign shareholder protection scaled by the world average corporate 
governance, but the foreign shareholder protection relative to the domestic corporate 
governance that determines the foreign equity allocation decisions.  
This study complements the existing literature on the relationship between creditor protection 
and foreign bias in bonds in several ways. First, it examines the role of domestic creditor 
protection in the foreign investment decisions in bond markets. The focus lies on the role of the 
domestic protection of creditor rights in allocation decisions regarding foreign bonds and on 
whether the twofold effect of domestic investor protection, as documented by Giofré (2014a) for 
equity markets, applies uniformly to all debt markets. For this purpose, I consider a broad 
sample of developed and developing investing countries both during the crisis and more tranquil 
times and a variety of internationally recognized measures for the protection of creditor rights. 
Second, this study explores the "good country bias" theory of Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) 
and the "comparative corporate governance theory" of Giofré (2014b) in the context of the 
home bias in bonds. Finally, it investigates whether the difference between the levels of creditor 
protection in domestic and destination countries affects the sensitivity of foreign investment to 
domestic and foreign creditor protections. 
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
3.1.1 Foreign Bond Bias 
The analysis encompasses the annual cross-border investment of major developed and 
developing countries (22 developed and 15 developing countries as shown in Table 1) during 
the 2004-2012 period. Given that portfolio allocation to bonds issued in a country ݆ depends on 
the market capitalization of these bonds relative to the world bond market capitalization, the 
cross-border investment is examined in the context of the foreign bias. Foreign bias is a widely 
used measure of international diversification that captures the relative under- or overweighting 
of foreign assets relative to the optimal benchmark, i.e. the foreign bond bias reflects the 
difference between the actual fraction of the country ݅’s total debt portfolio allocated to debt 
securities issued by residents of a host country݆ (ݓ௜ǡ௝) and the weight of the country ݆’ debt 
securities in the world debt market portfolio (ݓ௝כ). Following the existing literature (e.g. Chan et 
al., 2005), the foreign bias ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝ of investors domiciled in country ݅ towards debt securities 
issued by residents of a host country ݆ is computed as: 
ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝ ൌ  ൫ݓ௜ǡ௝൯ െ ሺݓ௝כሻ                                                                                                   (1). 
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ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝ takes negative values in case of underinvestment, whereas overinvestment in bonds 
issued in the host country ݆ results in a positive ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝. The higher the foreign bias ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝ 
is, the more residents of the country ݅ allocate to bonds issued by residents of the country ݆. In 
the following, the terms foreign bias, international diversification and cross-border investment 
will be used interchangeably. Table 1 reports the equally weighted average foreign bias levels 
that investors in country ݅ display towards sample host countries.  
The data on bond market capitalizations provided by the Debt Securities Statistics of the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) are used to derive the optimal portfolio weights ݓ௝כ. The data 
on the bilateral and total foreign investment are drawn from the Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey (CPIS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The computation of the 
actual portfolio weights ݓ௜ǡ௝ requires information on the total debt portfolio of the investing 
country ݅ that, however, is not reported. In order to derive the total value of investment in 
domestic bonds, I adopt the procedure of Fidora et al. (2007) who approximate domestic debt 
holdings by the difference between the home country ݅’s debt market capitalization and the sum 
of portfolio holdings of the home country ݅’s debt securities by reporting countries. Then, the 
total debt portfolio is calculated as the sum of the derived domestic debt holdings and the total 
value of foreign debt investment as reported by the CPIS. 
Despite the fact that the CPIS provides the most comprehensive and widely used dataset on 
cross-country portfolio holdings, there are several disadvantages associated with the CPIS data. 
First, the CPIS compilers face difficulties in determining the country of residence of non-
resident issuers of securities held by their residents (IMF, 2002). Second, as far as the valuation 
of positions is concerned, if reporting takes place on an aggregate basis, the CPIS compilers 
cannot verify whether the reported securities have been evaluated correctly (IMF, 2002). 
Moreover, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) criticize the lack of data on some large portfolio 
holders such as Taiwan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. An additional major 
drawback of the applied methodology is the valuation method. Whereas the CPIS data on 
foreign holdings are valued at current market prices or as the net present value of the expected 
cash flows, the Total Debt Securities data of the BIS are derived based on nominal values for a 
variety of countries such as Austria, Germany, Belgium etc. 
3.1.2 Creditor Protection 
The creditor rights index of Djankov et al. (2007) is used as the main proxy for the efficiency of 
creditor rights protection. It ranges from zero to four with higher scores corresponding to a 
higher protection of secured creditors. The index has been compiled based on an analysis of 
bankruptcy-related laws and a survey of local bankruptcy lawyers (Djankov et al., 2007). It 
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aggregates four rights of secured lenders: whether filing for reorganization is contingent on 
creditor consent, whether the collateral accrues to secured creditors once the petition for 
reorganization has been approved, whether claims of secured creditors are given priority in case 
of liquidation and whether the responsibility for running the debtor’s business lies with an 
administrator instead of management (Djankov et al., 2007). Annual data are available over the 
1978-2003 period. Since the sample ranges from 2004 to 2012, the creditor rights index as of 
2003 is used in all estimations.  
In order to ensure that the creditor rights index as of 2003 reflects the actual level of creditor 
protection over the 2004-2012 sample period, I review the recent laws and jurisdiction changes 
that took place in the last decade. The World Bank’s Doing Business report provides an 
overview of the relevant reforms for most sample countries.6 As a next step, the reforms are 
scrutinized under the aspect whether the four rights of secured creditors as defined by Djankov 
et al. (2007) have been affected. Surprisingly, none of the laws has resulted in an improvement 
of the secured creditor rights protection of Djankov et al. (2007) during the sample period. One 
potential explanation may be that the most recent amendments and reforms of bankruptcy laws 
have been aiming at facilitating business recoveries, whereas the going concern option is often 
either of no use to or not in the interest of the secured creditors.  
Although the creditor rights index indicates that laws and legislations that protect the rights of 
secured bondholders exist, it does not provide any insight as to whether the enforcement of 
these laws is efficient. The wedge between the existence of laws protecting creditor rights and 
the efficient enforcement of these laws may be crucial for investment decisions. For instance, 
Miller and Puthenpurackal (2002) find that the premium that investors demand for public debt 
issues of non-US firms in the Yankee bond market depends both on the existence of laws 
protecting the creditor rights and the enforcement of these laws. Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) 
show that it is the enforcement of creditor rights and not the existence of laws that protect 
creditor rights that determines the corporate bond yield spreads and ratings.  
Therefore, variables that account for the efficiency of legal system are included in all regression 
specifications. The rule of law index is a time-varying indicator that is drawn from the World 
Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank. Inter alia, it reflects the quality of contract 
enforcement as well as efficiency and impartiality of courts (Kaufmann et al., 2010). As an 
alternative to the rule of law index, I use the integrity of legal system from the Economic 
Freedom of the World (EFW) 2014 dataset. It provides a time-varying assessment of the 
efficiency of legal system over the 2004-2012 period. It is based on the political risk component 
                                                          
6 More information can be found at: http://www.doingbusiness.org/reforms/overview/topic/resolving-
insolvency.  
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for law and order of the International Country Risk Guide and assesses the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system as well as the popular observance of law (EFW, 2013).   
Alternative measures of the protection of creditor rights are also used. The time-varying strength 
of legal rights index is drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). It 
assesses whether collateral laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and whether 
bankruptcy laws safeguard the rights of secured creditors. It aggregates various aspects of legal 
rights in collateral and bankruptcy laws, of which the majority is related to collateral laws. As 
far as the rights of secured creditors are concerned, it is assessed whether the claims of secured 
creditors are given priority in case of liquidation (or when the default takes place outside an 
insolvency procedure) and whether the secured creditors’ claims are exempt from an automatic 
stay or moratorium on enforcement procedures in case of reorganization.7 Thus, only two 
aspects of the creditor rights index of Djankov et al. (2007) are reflected in the strength of legal 
rights index of the World Bank: the priority of the secured creditors’ claims in case of 
liquidation and the ability to seize the collateral after the approval of a reorganization petition. 
The index is available for all sample years from 2004 to 2012. 
An additional proxy for the protection of creditor rights is the efficiency of debt enforcement 
procedures of Djankov et al. (2008) derived based a survey of bankruptcy practitioners faced 
with a case study regarding an insolvent firm as of January 2006. The efficiency ܧ is defined as 
the value preserved in debt enforcement proceedings and is computed as the terminal value of 
the firm discounted by the nominal lending rate ݎ (Djankov et al., 2008): 
ܧ ൌ ଵ଴଴כீ஼ା଻଴כሺଵିீ஼ሻିଵ଴଴כ௖ሺଵା௥ሻ೟                                                                                                        (2). 
The terminal value is determined by whether the firm chooses the going concern option that is 
assumed to be the most efficient basic procedure: ܩܥ is the dummy variable that takes the value 
of one if the insolvent firm continues as going concern, and zero otherwise. Bankruptcy costs ܿ 
and the time needed to resolve insolvency ݐ diminish the terminal value (Djankov et al., 2008). 
ͳͲͲ is the firm value as going concern, whereas liquidation yields a lower terminal value of ͹Ͳ. 
Importantly, a high terminal value may benefit predominantly shareholders and junior 
bondholders, whereas a senior bondholder may be better off with liquidation that typically 
results in lower terminal values.  
As opposed to the time-invariant efficiency of debt enforcement procedures of Djankov et al. 
(2008), the recovery rate of the World Bank’s Doing Business report may be a more appropriate 
                                                          
7 See http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/getting-credit for more detailed information on the 
definition and computation of the strength of legal rights index. 
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measure for the efficiency of debt enforcement procedures. It is available for individual years 
during the entire sample period. As the efficiency of debt enforcement procedures of Djankov et 
al. (2008), the recovery rate represents cents per dollar obtained by secured creditors as a 
consequence of reorganization, liquidation or debt enforcement proceedings.8 Both measures for 
the economic efficiency of debt enforcement proceedings are highly correlated (Table 2). 
Table 2 shows the correlations between different proxies for the creditor rights protection (the 
creditor rights index of Djankov et al. (2007), the efficiency of debt enforcement of Djankov et 
al. (2008), the recovery rate of the World Bank’s Doing Business, the legal rights index of the 
World Bank) and the quality of law enforcement (the rule of law index of the World Bank and 
the integrity of legal system of the EFW) with each other and their correlations with some of the 
country-specific economic and financial characteristics that are used as control variables. All 
proxies for creditor protection are positively correlated. As the creditor rights index of Djankov 
et al. (2007) displays the lowest correlation with control variables, it is used as the main proxy 
for creditor protection in order to contain collinearity problems.  
La Porta et al. (1998) argue that creditor rights are more complex than shareholder rights, inter 
alia due to the heterogeneity within the bondholders as a group. An important limitation of our 
analysis is the derivation of the foreign bias based on the CPIS data on total debt. The derivation 
of the dependent variable does not allow differentiating between corporate and sovereign debt 
as well as senior and junior bondholders. Senior and junior bondholders may have conflicting 
interests. For instance, senior creditors may prefer liquidation that guarantees a repayment of 
their claims, whereas junior bondholders may opt for the less certain going concern solution if 
they do not receive their claims in case of an immediate liquidation of a firm’s assets. Several 
proxies for the strength of creditor protection (the creditor rights index and the strength of legal 
rights index) are derived from the perspective of senior lenders who have secured claims vis-à-
vis corporations.  
Furthermore, creditor control, monitoring and enforcement are much more complex in 
sovereign debt markets compared to markets for corporate debt. There are no formal bankruptcy 
procedures for sovereign debt and typical creditor rights such as access to management and 
seizing secured assets cannot be easily enforced vis-à-vis a sovereign (Yadav, 2014). Although 
it is commonly assumed that sovereign creditors have little or no legal recourse, non-legal 
mechanisms such as a damaged reputation and legal terms that can be enforced by courts9 
                                                          
8 See http://www.doingbusiness.org/Methodology/resolving-insolvency#creditorScore for more details. 
9 Examples for these legal terms are enforcement clauses (e.g. waivers of sovereign immunity) and 
restructuring clauses (e.g. collective action clauses). This is, however, not the case for sovereign debt with 
contracts governed under the local law that can be easily modified at a sovereign’s discretion. By 
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protect the rights of creditors in countries affected by a high default risk (Choi et al., 2012). 
Thus, in spite of the strong heterogeneity within the examined group of bondholders, the proxies 
for the quality of the law enforcement (rule of law and integrity of legal system) may still be 
useful indicators for the protection of investor rights in sovereign and junior debt markets even 
if the effect of proxies for the protection of secured creditors rights, e.g. the creditor rights index 
of Djankov et al. (2007), on the aggregate cross-border investment may be less prominent. 
Table 3 shows the correlations of different proxies for the protection of secured creditors and 
the quality of law enforcement with annual foreign bias levels of sample countries during the 
2004-2012 period. As expected, the proxies for the efficiency and quality of law enforcement 
display higher correlations with foreign bias than the proxies for the protection of the secured 
creditors’ rights. Importantly, the correlation between foreign bias and domestic creditor 
protection is considerably higher than the correlation between foreign bias and creditor 
protection in destination countries. 
3.2 Methodology 
Direct and Indirect Effects of Domestic Creditor Protection 
Following Giofré (2014a), the foreign bias ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝ that investors from country ݅ display 
towards debt securities issued by residents in a destination country ݆ is specified as:10 
ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝ ൌ ݂ሺܥ ௜ܸǡ ܥ ௝ܸǡ ܥ ௜ܸǡ௝ǡ ࡯ࡾ࢏ǡ ࡯ࡾ࢐ǡ ࡯ࡾ࢏ כ ࡯ࡾ࢐ሻ                                                                   (3). 
Foreign bias is a function of control variables that capture home and host country-specific 
characteristics,ܥ ௜ܸ andܥ ௝ܸ, control variables that reflect bilateral effects, ܥ ௜ܸǡ௝, and the 
variables of interest: creditor protections in home and host countries, ܥܴ௜ and ܥ ௝ܴ, and their 
interaction term, ܥܴ௜ כ ܥ ௝ܴǤ As home and host country-specific effects, ܥ ௜ܸ and ܥ ௝ܸ, I include 
the bank size,11 capital account liberalization of the EFW, GDP per capita growth rate drawn 
from the World Bank’s WDI, sovereign stability, bond market development, rule of law and 
depth of credit information indices of the World Bank’s WGI and WDI and a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one in case of a developed host or home country.12 Bilateral effects ܥ ௜ܸǡ௝ 
                                                                                                                                                                          
contrast, creditors who purchase sovereign debt governed under foreign law (typically New York or 
English law) enjoy a higher protection (Choi et al., 2011). 
10 For the sake of simplicity, time subscripts for the dependent and time-varying explanatory variables are 
omitted in all regression specifications. 
11 Bank size is proxied by the ratio of deposit assets to GDP as reported by the Global Financial 
Development Database of the World Bank. Since data are not available for several sample countries (e.g. 
Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Norway, Hungary) and do not cover the year 2012, this control variable 
is included only in one regression specification (column (3) of Table 4). 
12 Fitch local currency sovereign credit ratings are converted to numerical values with higher numbers 
reflecting a higher degree of sovereign stability. Positive and negative credit outlooks are also accounted 
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are closely related to information asymmetries and familiarity: geographical distance, bond 
market return correlation and dummy variables that account for common border, legal origin, 
colonial past, language and regional membership in the EMU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, 
ASEAN.13  
Importantly, the foreign bias ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝ is determined by the domestic bias ܦܤܫܣ ௜ܵ (i.e. the 
overinvestment in domestic bonds) in the sense that the higher the fraction of domestic bonds in 
the portfolio is, the less can be allocated to foreign bonds (Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010; 
Anderson et al., 2011). Given that domestic creditor protection ܥܴ௜ is an important determinant 
of ܦܤܫܣ ௜ܵ (e.g. Ferreira and Miguel, 2010), ܥܴ௜ may be found to be significant in Eq. (3) 
simply due to its correlation with ܦܤܫܣ ௜ܵ. In order to ensure that its impact on ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝ does 
not arise as a consequence of the omitted variable bias, Eq. (4) substitutes the control variables 
related to home country-specific characteristics by the domestic bias ܦܤܫܣܵ௜: 
ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝ ൌ ݂ሺܦܤܫܣܵ௜ǡ ܥ ௝ܸǡ ܥ ௜ܸǡ௝ǡ ࡯ࡾ࢏ǡ ࡯ࡾ࢐ǡ ࡯ࡾ࢏ כ ࡯ࡾ࢐ሻ                                                            (4). 
Home country-specific characteristics ܥ ௜ܸ are omitted in Eq. (4) to avoid collinearity problems 
given that control variables that account for home country-specific characteristics also impact 
the overinvestment in domestic bonds. Domestic bias is computed as: 
ܦܤܫܣ ௜ܵ ൌ ሺݓ௜ሻ െ ሺݓ௜כሻ                                                                                                        (5), 
where ݓ௜ is the actual debt portfolio weight allocated to domestic debt securities by investors 
from country ݅ and ݓ௜כ represents the weight of domestic bonds in the world debt market 
capitalization. Table 1 reports domestic bias levels of the sample countries. 
The main estimation technique is the ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors 
and time dummies that account for time effects. One disadvantage of the OLS estimation with 
time-fixed effects is the neglected cross-sectional information. In order to account for both time-
series and cross-sectional information, I also use the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) 
estimator for panel data under the assumption of a heteroskedastic error structure with no cross-
sectional correlation.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
for. Bond market development is approximated by the ratio of international debt to the total international 
debt outstanding (Source: BIS).  
13 Geographical distance is computed as natural logarithm of the distance in kilometers between the 
capitals of host and home countries. Correlations are computed based on the JP Morgan GBI 1-10 years 
total return indices denominated in USD on a monthly basis over the 2000-2013 period. For Norway, 
BofA Merrill Lynch 1-10 years total return index is used. The data on geographical distance, common 
border, language and colonial past are drawn from the CEPII. 
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The focus of this study is to identify the impact of domestic creditor protection on foreign 
investment decisions. Following Giofré (2014a), direct and indirect effects are distinguished. In 
the following, the coefficient estimates on ܥܴ௜ǡ ܥ ௝ܴ and ܥܴ௜ כ ܥ ௝ܴ will be denoted as ߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௠௘, 
ߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௦௧ and ߜ௜௡௧, respectively. ߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௠௘ reflects the direct effect of domestic creditor 
protection ܥܴ௜ on the investment in bonds issued by residents in the host country ݆. The sign of 
ߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௠௘ is a priori unclear. ߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௠௘ ൏ Ͳ would imply that investors from countries with poor 
protection of their rights diversify their bond portfolios internationally where they are more 
likely to benefit from a higher level of creditor protection. This would be in line with the "good 
country bias" theory of Giannetti and Koskinen (2010). By contrast, ߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௠௘ ൐ Ͳ would be 
consistent with the evidence of Giofré (2014a) that investors who benefit from a high level of 
protection at home invest more in foreign securities.  
Whereas ߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௠௘ denotes the direct effect of domestic creditor protection ܥܴ௜ on ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝, 
ߜ௜௡௧ measures the indirect effect of domestic creditor protection on foreign investment: Creditor 
protection at home influences the international diversification ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝ by affecting the 
sensitivity of domestic investors to the foreign creditor protection ܥ ௝ܴ (Giofré, 2014a). The 
responsiveness of the domestic investors’ holdings of the host country ݆’s bonds to the level of 
creditor protection in this host country is given as: 
 డி஻ூ஺ௌ೔ǡೕడ஼ோೕ ൌ ߜ
஼ோ̴௛௢௦௧ ൅ ߜ௜௡௧ כ ܥܴ௜                                                                                              (6). 
If investors from countries with more efficient protection of creditor rights (ܥܴ௜ ՛) are more 
tolerant towards or pay little attention to the degree of creditor protection abroad, a negative 
ߜ௜௡௧ is expected, whereas a positive coefficient ߜ௜௡௧ would imply that a high level of creditor 
protection at home (ܥܴ௜ ՛) makes investors more demanding with respect to the creditor 
protection in foreign countries (Giofré, 2014a).  
Is domestic creditor protection only a benchmark against which the foreign creditor 
protection is evaluated? 
The "good country bias" theory of Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) suggests that the difference 
between domestic and foreign investor protections matters for portfolio allocation decisions. 
Giofré (2014b) elaborates this idea by showing that domestic shareholder protection serves as a 
benchmark against which the foreign investor protection is evaluated. I test whether the results 
of Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) and Giofré (2014b) are also valid in bond markets. The 
following regression specifications are used in order to examine whether the role of domestic 
creditor protection is restricted merely to a benchmark against which the foreign creditor 
protection is evaluated: 
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ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝ ൌ ݂൫ܥ ௜ܸǡ ܥ ௝ܸǡ ܥ ௜ܸǡ௝ǡ ࡯ࡾ࢐ െ ࡯ࡾ࢏൯                                                                                  (7), 
ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝ ൌ ݂ሺܥ ௜ܸǡ ܥ ௝ܸǡ ܥ ௜ܸǡ௝ǡ
࡯ࡾ࢐
ࢌሺ࡯ࡾ࢏ሻ
ሻ                                                                                           (8). 
Following Giofré (2014b), the ratio ஼ோೕ௙ሺ஼ோ೔ሻ denotes the creditor protection in the destination 
country ܥ ௝ܴ relative to the function of domestic creditor protection ݂ሺܥܴ௜ሻ. Under the 
assumption of information asymmetries, investors who are less informed about investor 
protection abroad than about investor protection at home are supposed to attach a 
disproportionately high importance to the domestic investor protection that serves as a 
benchmark against which the host country’s investor protection is evaluated (Giofré, 2014b). In 
this case, I expect a positive coefficient estimate on the absolute and relative differences 
between creditor protections in host and home countries ܥ ௝ܴ െ ܥܴ௜ and  
஼ோೕ
௙ሺ஼ோ೔ሻ
. 
In addition, I further elaborate on the "good country bias" and "comparative corporate 
governance" theories by exploring whether the difference between domestic and foreign creditor 
protections indirectly affects foreign investment, i.e. whether the sensitivity of foreign 
investment to creditor protection depends on the difference between domestic and foreign 
creditor protections:  
 ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝ ൌ ݂ሺܥ ௜ܸǡ ܥ ௝ܸǡ ܥ ௜ܸǡ௝ǡ ࡯ࡾ࢏ǡ ࡯ࡾ࢐ǡࡰ כ ࡯ࡾ࢏ǡࡰ כ ࡯ࡾ࢐ሻ                                                       (9). 
The dummy variable ܦ is supposed to capture the "comparative effect": It takes the value of one 
if domestic creditor protection is higher than creditor protection abroad, and zero otherwise: 
ܦ ൌ ቊ
ͳ݂݅ܥܴ௜ ൐ ܥ ௝ܴ
Ͳ݂݅ܥܴ௜ ൑ ܥ ௝ܴ
                                                                                                           (10). 
The coefficient estimates on the interaction terms ܦ כ ܥܴ௜ and ܦ כ ܥ ௝ܴ, designated as 
ߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௠௘̴஽ and ߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௦௧̴஽, reflect the sensitivity of foreign investment to the level of creditor 
protection in home and host countries. The sensitivity is assumed to depend on a direct 
comparison between domestic and foreign creditor protections. Thus, the total effects of 
domestic and foreign creditor protections on foreign investment can be summarized as: 
డி஻ூ஺ௌ೔ǡೕ
డ஼ோ೔
ൌ ቊ
ߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௠௘ ൅ ߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௠௘̴஽݂݅ܥܴ௜ ൐ ܥ ௝ܴ
ߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௠௘݂݅ܥܴ௜ ൑ ܥ ௝ܴ
                                                               (11), 
డி஻ூ஺ௌ೔ǡೕ
డ஼ோೕ
ൌ ቊ
ߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௦௧ ൅ ߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௦௧̴஽݂݅ܥܴ௜ ൐ ܥ ௝ܴ
ߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௦௧݂݅ܥܴ௜ ൑ ܥ ௝ܴ
                                                                  (12). 
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4 Results 
Main estimation results 
As a preliminary analysis, Eq. (3) is estimated without the interaction term ܥܴ௜ כ ܥ ௝ܴ for the 
creditor rights index of Djankov et al. (2007) in column (1) of Table 4. Domestic creditor 
protection ܥܴ௜ exerts a positive and highly significant impact on international diversification. 
The positive coefficient on ܥܴ௜ does not support the theory of Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) 
who argue that investors whose rights are efficiently protected by domestic legislation are less 
willing to diversify their portfolios abroad. The estimation results indicate that when creditor 
protection in the home country deteriorates there is no "flight to quality" effect in the sense that 
investors rebalance their portfolios away from domestic bonds and increase their foreign bond 
holdings. On the contrary, a deterioration of creditor protection at home is accompanied by a 
reduction in foreign investment. The positive direct effect of domestic creditor protection is, 
however, compatible with the results of Giofré (2014a) for the bilateral equity investment.14 The 
coefficient estimate on creditor protection in the host country ܥ ௝ܴ is negative, but only 
marginally significant. The negative sign is not consistent with the preliminary analysis based 
on correlations (Table 3) and is counterintuitive suggesting that an efficient protection of 
creditor rights in the destination country deters the cross-border investment.  
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 4 report the estimation results based on Eq. (3) that accounts for 
creditor protections in host and home countries, ܥܴ௜ and ܥ ௝ܴ, and additionally includes the 
interaction effect between the creditor rights indices in home and host countries, ܥܴ௜ כ ܥ ௝ܴ. 
Once the interaction effect ܥܴ௜ כ ܥ ௝ܴ is included, the coefficient on the creditor rights index in 
the destination country has the expected positive sign. The direct effect of domestic creditor 
protection on international diversification (i.e. the coefficient estimate on ܥܴ௜) remains positive 
and highly significant. The economic significance is considerable: One point increase in the 
creditor rights index of the home country (that ranges from zero to four) increases the foreign 
bias by 0.35.15 The interaction variable ܥܴ௜ כ ܥ ௝ܴ enters with a highly significant negative sign.  
The negative indirect effect of domestic creditor protection is consistent with the evidence of 
Giofré (2014a) for the bilateral equity investment. Not only the shareholders, but also the 
bondholders are less sensitive to the protection of their rights abroad, the more their rights are 
                                                          
14 Giofré (2014a) finds that, once the interaction term is included, cross-border equity allocations increase 
with the domestic antidirector rights index. 
15 The average foreign bias of all investing countries over the 2004-2012 period amounts to -2.84. The 
negative value indicates underinvestment in foreign bonds compared to the optimal benchmark, i.e. the 
weight in the world debt market capitalization. Thus, an increase in the creditor rights index by one point 
corresponds to a reduction in underinvestment by 0.35. 
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protected in their home countries. When domestic creditor protection increases by one point, the 
positive (albeit not always significant) effect of the destination country’s creditor protection on 
the foreign bias (that is captured by ߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௦௧ that amounts to 0.05-0.16) falls by 0.04-0.05. In 
other words, a high creditor protection in the home country has a negative effect on the positive 
relationship between creditor protection in destination countries and cross-border investment.16  
The impact of control variables is broadly consistent with expectations. Countries with high 
sovereign credit ratings, more efficient judicial systems and more developed international bond 
markets attract more foreign investment and are characterized by a higher degree of 
international diversification (i.e. higher foreign bias levels). Investors from developed countries 
also hold more internationally diversified bond portfolios. Geographical distance that is 
associated with more pronounced information asymmetries decreases foreign investment. A 
high correlation between home and host bond market returns that implies lower diversification 
benefits deters foreign investment. Common language, common legal origin and a common 
membership in the EMU, ASEAN and MERCOSUR increase international diversification in 
bond markets. However, credit depth of information, capital account liberalization and common 
border exert a counterintuitive effect on the foreign bias. 
Robustness checks  
Column (4) of Table 4 reports the estimation results for Eq. (4) that substitutes the home 
country-specific control variables ܥ ௜ܸ by the domestic bias ܦܤܫܣ ௜ܵ. The direct effect of 
domestic creditor protection remains positive and highly significant. The indirect effect of 
domestic creditor protection (i.e. the interaction variableܥܴ௜ כ ܥ ௝ܴ) retains its negative sign, but 
is now only marginally significant. Creditor protection in the destination country ܥ ௝ܴ has the 
expected positive sign, but is not statistically significant. 
In Table 4, the estimations are based on the creditor rights index of Djankov et al. (2007) as a 
proxy for the protection of creditor rights and the results are based on the OLS with robust 
standard errors (reported in parentheses) and dummy variables that account for time effects. In 
order to account for both time-series and cross-sectional information, Eq. (3) is re-estimated by 
means of the FGLS for panel data under the assumption of a heteroskedastic error structure with 
no cross-sectional correlation in Table 5. Columns (1)-(4) of Table 5 report the estimation 
results for different proxies for the protection of creditor rights: the creditor rights index of 
                                                          
16 It has to be pointed out that adding the interaction term ܥܴ௜ כ ܥ ௝ܴ to the creditor protections of home 
and host countries ܥܴ௜ and ܥ ௝ܴ adds little explanatory power to the whole model, i.e. the adjusted R-
squared increases only marginally in columns (3) and (4) compared to column (1) of Table 4. However, 
the negligible increase in the adjusted R-squared can also be observed in Giofré’s (2014a) estimations for 
equity markets. 
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Djankov et al. (2007), the strength of legal rights index of the World Bank, the efficiency of 
debt enforcement of Djankov et al. (2008) and the recovery rate of the World Bank’s Doing 
Business. With the exception of the efficiency of debt enforcement and recovery rate, the results 
are consistent with main findings: The coefficient estimates on ܥܴ௜ (ܥܴ௜ כ ܥ ௝ܴ) remain positive 
(negative) and highly significant. 
La Porta et al. (1998) emphasize the importance of law enforcement and argue that active and 
impartial courts may compensate bondholders for a weak protection of creditor rights. Thus, I 
explore the direct and indirect effects of the efficiency of judicial system, ܮܽݓ௜, ܮܽݓ௝ and 
ܮܽݓ௜ כ ܮܽݓ௝, approximated by the rule of law index of the World Bank and the integrity of 
legal system of the EFW in columns (5) and (6) of Table 5.17 The results are consistent with 
previous estimations: The direct effects of ܥܴ௜, ܥ ௝ܴ, ܮܽݓ௜ and ܮܽݓ௝ are positive, whereas the 
coefficient estimates on the interaction variables ܥܴ௜ כ ܥ ௝ܴ and ܮܽݓ௜ כ ܮܽݓ௝ are negative and 
highly significant.  
The subprime crisis and the subsequent eruption of the euro area sovereign debt crisis may have 
affected the validity of results for the total sample that spans a time period from 2004 to 2012. 
In times of crisis, agents’ uncertainty, risk aversion and information asymmetries increase. 
Moreover, although relatively stable over time, familiarity considerations may also become 
more relevant (Giannetti and Laeven, 2012). As a consequence, the importance attached to 
investor protection that is closely linked to familiarity and information asymmetries may 
increase in times of crisis. For instance, the ambiguity aversion is likely to make investors 
particularly demanding about the protection of their rights in foreign countries. To explore the 
potential differences, Eq. (3) is estimated for the pre-crisis (2004-2006) and crisis (2007-2012) 
periods based on the creditor rights indices of Djankov et al. (2007) in columns (1a) and (1b) of 
Table 6. Although the magnitude is slightly higher in the pre-crisis period, the coefficient 
estimate on the domestic creditor protection ܥܴ௜ is positive and highly significant both in the 
pre-crisis and crisis samples. The lower magnitude of the direct impact of ܥܴ௜ in the crisis 
period (compared to the pre-crisis period) is consistent with the "flight home effect" that 
predicts a decreased appetite for foreign investment when payment profiles are more difficult to 
evaluate during the periods of increased uncertainty. The coefficient on the interaction variable 
ܥܴ௜ כ ܥ ௝ܴ remains negative and significant, albeit only marginally significant in the pre-crisis 
sample.  
 
                                                          
17 In all preceding regression specifications, the rule of law index of host and home countries have always 
been included among the control variables ܥ ௜ܸ and ܥ ௝ܸ. 
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Different sample specifications 
Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) argue that there is a pronounced heterogeneity in the protection of 
creditor rights, especially between developed and developing countries. Given that the dummy 
variable that differentiates between developed and developing investing countries is highly 
significant in all regression specifications, Eq. (3) is re-estimated for developed and developing 
investing countries. The results are reported in columns (2a) and (2b) of Table 6.  
For developed countries, the results for ܥܴ௜ and ܥܴ௜ כ ܥ ௝ܴ are consistent with the total sample: 
The direct effect of the domestic creditor protection ܥܴ௜ on cross-border bond investment is 
positive, whereas the investors’ sensitivity to the creditor protection abroad declines with the 
level of domestic creditor protection, i.e. the coefficient estimate on ܥܴ௜ כ ܥ ௝ܴ is negative. By 
contrast, the results are completely different when the cross-border investment of developing 
investing countries is considered. For these countries, the direct effect of domestic creditor 
protection on the foreign bias is negative: Investors from countries where their rights are 
insufficiently protected prefer to diversify abroad. However, there is little evidence that the level 
of creditor protection in the destination country matters. Neither the host country’s creditor 
protection ܥ ௝ܴ nor the interaction variable ܥܴ௜ כ ܥ ௝ܴhave any significant effect on the foreign 
bias of developing countries.  
The detected differences between developed and developing countries may be due to the fact 
that developed countries, in general, offer a higher level of creditor protection to domestic 
shareholders than developing countries. Indeed, the average creditor rights index amounts to 
2.14 (1.6) for developed (developing) sample countries. Therefore, I examine whether the direct 
and indirect effects of domestic creditor protection vary with the level of domestic creditor 
protection. For this purpose, the total sample is split into investing countries with creditor 
protection above and below the world average creditor rights index of Djankov et al. (2007).  
For investing countries that display comparatively high, i.e. above the world average, levels of 
domestic creditor protection, the results are the same as for the total sample (column (1a) of 
Table 7). In these countries, the direct effect of domestic creditor protection on the foreign bond 
bias is positive (i.e. ܥܴ௜ is positively related to international diversification), whereas the 
coefficient estimate on the interaction variable ܥܴ௜ כ ܥ ௝ܴ, which determines the sensitivity of 
foreign investment to the creditor protection in a destination country, is negative. By contrast, 
the effect of domestic creditor protection on foreign bias is negative for investing countries that 
offer only a relatively low, i.e. below the world average, level of creditor protection: In these 
countries, a high level of creditor protection at home deters international diversification and an 
insufficient protection of creditor rights by domestic legislation induces bondholders to increase 
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their foreign bond holdings (column (1b) of Table 7). There is no evidence that domestic 
creditor protection affects the investors’ sensitivity to foreign creditor protection for investing 
countries with creditor protection below the world average: The coefficient estimate on the 
interaction variable ܥܴ௜ כ ܥ ௝ܴ is not significant in this subsample. 
Thus, it seems that the twofold effect of domestic creditor protection manifests itself only in 
investing countries that offer a relatively high level of creditor protection. By contrast, the level 
of creditor protection in destination countries does not appear to affect the initial results: 
Columns (2a) and (2b) of Table 7 differentiate between destination countries with creditor 
protections above and below the world average. In both subsamples, there is strong evidence of 
a twofold effect of domestic creditor protection on foreign bias: Both the direct and indirect 
effects, ߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௠௘ and ߜ௜௡௧, bear opposite signs and are highly significant.  
Domestic and foreign investor protection: a comparative effect 
It is rather puzzling that, compared to the creditor protection in destination countries, the direct 
effect of domestic creditor protection on foreign investment is more robust and its economic and 
statistical significance is higher.18 The coefficient estimates on different proxies for the 
protection of creditor rights in destination countries bear the expected positive and statistically 
significant sign only in seven out of 18 regression specifications.19 One potential explanation 
may be the fact that the creditor rights index of Djankov et al. (2007), which reflects the 
protection of secured creditors, may only insufficiently capture the interests of bondholders who 
are a heterogeneous group (Giofré, 2013). When the efficiency of legal enforcement of the host 
country ܮܽݓ௝ is considered, it is highly economically and statistically significant and has the 
expected positive sign in most regression specifications. Nonetheless, its economic significance 
is, in general, lower compared to the economic significance of the efficiency of legal 
enforcement of the home country ܮܽݓ௜. Another potential explanation for the estimation results 
concerning the creditor protection in destination countries may be that it is not the creditor 
protection of the destination country alone, but some function that relates the foreign to the 
domestic creditor protection that determines the foreign portfolio allocations. This idea is the 
basis of the "comparative corporate governance" theory of Giofré (2014b) who shows that it is 
                                                          
18 In order to ensure that the strong positive effect of the domestic creditor protection does not arise as a 
consequence of the omitted variable bias, a variety of home country-specific control variables have been 
introduced. Pradkhan (2016) shows that patriotism and cultural variables are important determinants of 
the foreign bond bias. The strong positive effect still remains when patriotism and cultural variables are 
introduced. The estimation results for regression specifications that include patriotism and uncertainty 
avoidance are available on demand. 
19 The lack of significance of creditor protection in destination countries is consistent with the results of 
Giofré (2013) who also finds only a limited evidence of a significant impact of the host country’s creditor 
protection on the foreign bias in bonds. Similarly, Giofré (2013) frequently faces a counterintuitive 
negative effect of the host country’s creditor protection on foreign bond bias. 
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the ratio of foreign to domestic investor protection that is crucial for foreign investment 
decisions in equity markets. 
Thus, instead of ܥܴ௜ and ܥ ௝ܴ, it is examined whether it is the absolute and/or relative difference 
between creditor protections in host and home countries, ܥܴ஺஻ௌ஽ூி ൌ ܥ ௝ܴ െ ܥܴ௜ and/or ܥܴோா௅஽ூி ൌ
஼ோೕ
஼ோ೔
, that determine the international portfolio allocations in bond markets, i.e. whether the 
bondholders’ decisions on foreign portfolio allocations are influenced by a direct comparison of 
the creditor protection in a host country with the creditor protection at home. Tables 8a and 8b 
report the estimation results based on Eq. (7) and (8).20 Different proxies for creditor protection 
are used: the creditor rights index of Djankov et al. (2007),21 the strength of legal rights index of 
the World Bank, the efficiency of debt enforcement of Djankov et al. (2008), the rule of law of 
the World Bank and the integrity of legal system of the EFW.  
If investors display a preference towards bonds issued in the destination countries that offer a 
more efficient protection of their rights than their home country, we should expect a positive 
impact of ܥܴ஺஻ௌ஽ூி and ܥܴோா௅஽ூி on international diversification. However, the opposite is the case: 
The more efficient the creditor protection at home compared to the creditor protection in a 
destination country is, the higher is the investment in bonds issued in this destination country 
(Tables 8a and 8b). It seems that the positive effect of domestic creditor protection dominates 
any simple comparison between creditor protections at home and abroad. The ratio of foreign to 
domestic creditor protection ஼ோೕ஼ோ೔ exerts the expected positive impact on cross-border investment 
only for the rule of law index, in which case the economic significance is close to zero (column 
(5) of Table 8b). In the remaining regression specifications, the coefficient estimates on ܥܴ஺஻ௌ஽ூி 
and ܥܴோா௅஽ூி have a counterintuitive, highly significant negative effect on foreign bias (columns 
(1)-(6) of Table 8a and columns (1)-(4) of Table 8b).  
The obtained results indicate that neither the "good country bias" of Giannetti and Koskinen 
(2010) nor the "comparative corporate governance theory" of Giofré (2014b) hold in bond 
markets. At least, it is not the foreign relative to the domestic creditor protection or the absolute 
difference between foreign and domestic creditor protections that increase the cross-border 
foreign investment. The negative impact of ܥܴ஺஻ௌ஽ூி and ܥܴோா௅஽ூி  on ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝ can be explained by 
                                                          
20 Table 8b reports the estimation results for Eq. (8) for ݂ሺܥܴ௜ሻ ൌ ܥܴ௜. Different function specifications 
(݂ሺܥܴ௜ሻ ൌ ܥܴ௜ଶ and ݂ሺܥܴ௜ሻ ൌ ሺܥܴ௜ሻ) lead to similar results. Estimations for alternative specifications 
of ݂ሺܥܴ௜ሻ are available on demand. 
21 Modified creditor rights indices of Djankov et al. (2007) are used in column (1) of Table 8b as ܥܴ௜ and 
ܥ ௝ܴ: A value of one is added to the original creditor rights indices that range from zero to four in order to 
avoid values of zero in the denominator. Thus, the modified creditor rights indices of Djankov et al. 
(2007) range from one to five. 
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the strong positive effect of domestic creditor protection ܥܴ௜ on foreign bias: It appears that the 
role of domestic creditor protection in foreign investment decisions is not restricted to a simple 
benchmark against which the foreign creditor protection is evaluated.  
The "comparative corporate governance theory" as suggested by Giofré (2014b) and the "good 
country bias" of Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) may manifest themselves in the sense that the 
difference between domestic and foreign creditor protections does not affect the foreign bias 
directly, but impacts the sensitivity of foreign bias to the level of creditor protection in home 
and host countries. Thus, as an alternative to the regression specification proposed by Giofré 
(2014b), I explore how the difference between domestic and foreign creditor protections affects 
the sensitivity of foreign bond investment to domestic and foreign creditor protections (Eq. (9)). 
Table 9 reports the estimation results based on Eq. (9) for different proxies for creditor 
protection. In most regression specification, the coefficient on ܦ כ ܥ ௝ܴ is negative (ߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௦௧̴஽ ൏
Ͳ). This result confirms the hypothesis that a comparatively high domestic creditor protection 
(relative to the creditor protection in the destination country) reduces the sensitivity of foreign 
investment to the creditor protection abroad. This effect is so strong that it practically cancels 
the positive effect of the creditor protection in the destination country, i.e. หߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௦௧ห ൏
หߜ஼ோ̴௛௢௦௧̴஽ห in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) of Table 9. This result is consistent with the 
negative interaction effect: Investors from countries with a comparatively high level of creditor 
protection display a lower sensitivity to the creditor protection in the destination country. The 
interaction term for domestic creditor protection ܦ כ ܥܴ௜ is positive in most regression 
specifications: Foreign investment is higher for investors from countries where the home 
country offers a higher level of creditor protection than the destination country.  
5 Conclusion 
Giofré (2014a) documents a twofold effect of domestic corporate governance on cross-border 
investment in equities: On the one hand, domestic shareholder protection increases the 
preference for foreign stocks (positive direct effect of domestic investor protection). On the 
other hand, domestic shareholder protection reduces the positive effect of foreign shareholder 
protection on international diversification (negative indirect effect of domestic investor 
protection). This study shows that the results of Giofré (2014a) also hold with respect to 
international diversification in bond portfolios, but not unrestrictedly.  
The reduced responsiveness to the creditor protection in destination countries, i.e. the negative 
indirect effect of domestic creditor protection, is particularly pronounced in investing countries 
where the protection of creditor rights is relatively high, i.e. above the world average. By 
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contrast, for countries with a comparatively low protection of creditor rights, domestic creditor 
protection does not affect the sensitivity of foreign investment to the creditor protection in 
destination countries. Similarly, there are also differences concerning the direct effect of 
domestic creditor protection on foreign investment. In countries with a protection of creditor 
rights above the world average, international diversification in bond portfolios increases with 
the level of domestic creditor protection (positive direct effect of domestic creditor protection). 
By contrast, a high level of domestic creditor protection makes foreign investment less attractive 
for investing countries characterized by a creditor protection below the world average (negative 
direct effect of domestic creditor protection). For equity markets, Giofré (2014a) does not detect 
any comparable heterogeneity, possibly due to the fact that her sample includes only developed 
investing countries. 
Furthermore, this study shows that the difference between domestic and foreign creditor 
protections matters for the foreign investment decisions. However, the "good country bias" 
theory of Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) and the "comparative corporate governance" theory of 
Giofré (2014b) that have been developed for equity markets cannot be applied to the foreign 
bond bias: Neither the difference between the levels of creditor protection in home and host 
countries nor the ratio of the foreign to the domestic creditor protection deliver meaningful 
results when a direct effect on the foreign bias is considered. As opposed to equity markets, 
domestic investor protection appears to be more than a simple benchmark against which the 
foreign investor protection is evaluated in bond markets. On the contrary, the positive effect of 
domestic creditor protection on foreign bond bias is both economically and statistically more 
significant than the positive effect of the creditor protection in destination countries. Albeit not 
directly affecting the foreign bond bias, the difference between domestic and foreign creditor 
protections influences the sensitivity of foreign investment to domestic and foreign creditor 
protections. A domestic creditor protection that is higher than creditor protection in the 
destination country reduces (increases) the sensitivity of foreign investment to foreign 
(domestic) creditor protection. The fact that a comparatively high level of domestic creditor 
protection reduces the foreign investment’s sensitivity to the creditor protection in the host 
country is closely related to the negative indirect effect of domestic creditor protection. 
The negative indirect effect of domestic creditor protection can be explained in the context of 
decreasing marginal returns on investor protection. Given that the portfolios are biased towards 
domestic assets, an efficient domestic protection of investor rights contributes substantially to 
the optimal investor protection level in the portfolio such that less attention is paid to investor 
protection in destination countries (Giofré, 2014a). This theory would also explain why 
domestic creditor protection does not affect the responsiveness of foreign investment to the 
35 
 
creditor protection in destination countries for investors from countries with creditor protection 
below the world average. Only when domestic creditor protection is high, a portfolio biased 
towards domestic securities has a sufficiently high, close to the optimal level of creditor 
protection and this is not the case for investors from countries that offer only a poor, relative to 
the world average, protection of creditor rights.  
The "decreasing marginal returns" theory may also explain the positive direct effect of domestic 
creditor protection on cross-border investment for investing countries with relatively high levels 
of domestic creditor protection. If domestic creditor protection is high, the optimal level of the 
creditor protection in the total portfolio is already achieved by investing in a low fraction of 
domestic securities such that a higher fraction of the total portfolio can be allocated to foreign 
debt securities. The positive direct effect of domestic creditor protection on foreign investment 
may also reflect the fact that investors from countries with more developed bond markets are 
more open to international diversification - under the assumption that an efficient protection of 
creditor rights at home is positively correlated with the bond market development. This is not 
the case for investing countries with creditor protection below the world average. In investing 
countries with comparatively low levels of the protection of creditor rights, the negative direct 
effect of domestic creditor protection may indicate a substitution effect between domestic and 
foreign bond investment: Investors from countries that offer only a relatively inefficient 
protection of creditor rights tilt their portfolios towards domestic assets in response to a rising 
creditor protection in the domestic bond market and diversify abroad when domestic creditor 
protection deteriorates. As a consequence, we observe a negative relationship between domestic 
creditor protection and international diversification in countries with a relatively poor protection 
of creditor rights.   
Yield considerations may also explain the positive direct effect of domestic creditor protection 
on the foreign bond bias in countries with creditor protection above the world average. Under 
the assumption that the benefits related to a high level of creditor protection are reflected in 
lower yields, the strong positive relationship between domestic creditor protection and 
international diversification may be the consequence of a preference towards high-risk 
jurisdictions that permit obtaining higher yields as opposed to comparatively low yields 
associated with a low risk at home. Importantly, this effect holds only for countries that offer a 
comparatively high, i.e. above the world average, protection of creditor rights. 
Another potential explanation for the negative indirect effect of domestic creditor protection 
may stem from behavioral finance. Cao et al. (2011) model the familiarity bias as the tendency 
to evaluate investment decisions that deviate from a focal choice option, known as status quo, 
with an unduly high skepticism. In the theoretical framework of Cao et al. (2011), a portfolio 
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composed entirely of domestic assets is assumed to be the status quo. In this case, a reluctance 
to shift investment towards foreign assets reflects the investors’ unwillingness to deviate from 
the status quo. The negative indirect effect of domestic creditor protection on international 
diversification may reflect the comparison between the status quo (i.e. the given level of 
domestic creditor protection associated with a portfolio heavily biased towards domestic assets) 
and the alternative (i.e. investing more in a destination country’s assets and, thus, increasing the 
weight of the destination country-specific creditor protection). The preference for the status quo 
reduces the sensitivity of foreign investment to the creditor protection in foreign countries: Even 
if the creditor protection in a host country improves, the shift towards debt securities issued in 
this host country is not as strong as it would be in the absence of the familiarity bias. 
Importantly, the framework of Cao et al. (2011) departs from the traditional assumption that 
foreign assets are associated with a greater uncertainty than domestic assets and show that, even 
under the assumption of an identical distribution of payoff outcomes, the effect of the 
familiarity bias increases with the level of uncertainty. This may help explaining the positive 
direct effect of domestic creditor protection on international diversification: A high level of 
creditor protection at home is associated with less uncertainty and, thus, with a greater 
international diversification. However, the familiarity bias of Cao et al. (2011) does not fully 
explain the observed heterogeneity between investing countries with high and low levels of 
creditor protection. 
The fact that domestic creditor protection reduces the foreign investment’s sensitivity to foreign 
creditor protection for countries that are characterized by high levels of creditor protection as 
well as the negative direct effect of domestic creditor protection on international diversification 
in countries that offer only a comparatively weak protection of creditor rights challenge the 
typical explanation of home bias in terms of diversification costs that investors face vis-à-vis 
foreign assets. It seems that not only host country-specific characteristics such as an inefficient 
protection of creditor rights and a low quality of legal environment deter the foreign investment, 
but also the perception of domestic legal environment may implicitly increase the diversification 
costs and become a barrier to the foreign investment. These findings may have important policy 
implications. An improvement in the protection of creditor rights at home reduces international 
diversification in countries with creditor protection below the world average. In addition, trying 
to improve creditor protection in the hope of making domestic bonds more attractive to foreign 
investors from countries that offer a high protection of creditor rights may not achieve the 
desired outcome: Investors from countries where their rights are well protected do not pay much 
attention to the creditor protection in the destination country. Future research may explore 
whether the documented effects of domestic creditor protection on the cross-border investment 
hold uniformly for institutional and individual investors.  
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Appendix 
Table 1: Foreign bond bias and creditor protection 
Home 
Country 
Average 
foreign bias 
ܨܤܫܣܵ௜ 
(2004-2012 
average) 
Domestic 
bias 
(2004-2012 
average) 
Creditor 
rights 
index 
Strength 
of legal 
rights 
index 
Recovery 
rate 
Efficiency 
of debt 
enforcement 
Rule of 
law 
Integrity 
of legal 
system 
         
Argentina -5.96 6.23 1 4 31.1 35.8 -0.66 4.2 
Australia -3.00 3.96 3 9 80 87.8 1.75 9.3 
Austria -1.17 4.23 3 7 72.6 78 1.86 10.0 
Belgium -2.24 4.00 2 5 86.5 90.8 1.32 8.3 
Brazil -8.05 4.03 1 3 10.7 13.4 -0.27 3.5 
Canada -3.44 3.79 1 7 89.6 93.2 1.76 9.6 
Chile -3.12 6.38 2 4 27.6 40.9 1.29 8.1 
Colombia -4.36 6.80 0 5 55.3 64.8 -0.47 2.8 
Czech 
Republic -2.79 6.54 3 6 27.1 40.7 0.89 8.3 
Denmark -1.76 4.36 3 9 77.8 76.7 1.94 10.0 
Finland -1.00 5.02 1 8 88.4 92.4 1.95 10.0 
France -1.62 2.46 0 4 45.9 54.1 1.45 8.3 
Germany -1.39 2.41 3 7 82.0 57 1.67 8.3 
Greece -2.76 4.88 1 4 44.4 53.8 0.71 7.3 
Hong Kong -1.47 5.08 4 10 80.4 88.3 1.54 8.2 
Hungary -5.27 6.61 1 7 38.3 46.7 0.82 6.7 
Indonesia -4.90 6.55 2 5 21.4 25.1 -0.68 4.9 
Israel -4.24 6.01 3 9 50.5 66.2 0.87 8.3 
Italy -2.54 2.90 2 3 57.6 45.3 0.42 6.6 
Japan -2.56 1.69 2 6 92.6 95.5 1.30 8.3 
Malaysia -4.27 5.78 3 10 39.8 48.4 0.51 6.6 
Mexico -5.66 5.10 0 5 64.8 72.6 -0.53 4.2 
Netherlands -0.93 2.89 3 6 86.3 94.9 1.78 10.0 
Norway -1.31 4.54 2 6 90.5 91.8 1.93 10.0 
Peru   0 6 27.7 41.8 -0.67 5.2 
Philippines -2.47 6.66 1 4 4.3 17.5 -0.52 4.0 
Poland -3.30 5.82 1 8 33.2 67.7 0.53 7.4 
Portugal -1.43 4.81 1 3 72.5 82.3 1.06 8.3 
Russia -4.28 5.72 2 5 40.9 39 -0.85 6.5 
Singapore -0.83 5.08 3 10 89.7 96.1 1.69 8.3 
South Africa -5.78 6.06 3 7 33.1 39.8 0.10 4.2 
Spain -2.02 3.35 2 6 72.1 82 1.13 8.3 
Sweden -2.48 4.48 1 7 75.8 86 1.90 10.0 
Thailand -3.86 6.06 2 5 42.9 54.9 -0.09 4.2 
Turkey -6.34 5.73 2 5 16.3 6.6 0.09 6.0 
UK -1.10 2.34 4 10 85.8 92.3 1.68 9.0 
US -2.66 0.87 1 9 78.9 85.8 1.57 8.2 
Note: The average foreign bias ܨܤܫܣܵ௜ is the equally weighted average foreign bias that a country ݅ displays towards 
the sample host countries over the 2004-2012 period. The data are averaged over the 2008-2012 period for Chile and 
over the 2005-2012 period for Malaysia and Mexico. Domestic bias is computed as the log ratio of the actual portfolio 
weight to the optimal portfolio weight (Eq. (5)). Data on cross-border investment are not available for Peru that is 
considered only as one of the host countries. The creditor rights index of Djankov et al. (2007) and the efficiency of 
debt enforcement of Djankov et al. (2008) are as of 2003 and 2006; the rule of law, strength of legal rights, the recovery 
rate and the integrity of legal system of the EFW are averaged over the 2004-2012 period. 
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Table 2: Correlations between different proxies for creditor protection and control 
variables 
 
Creditor 
rights index 
of Djankov 
et al. (2007) 
Legal rights 
index of the 
World Bank 
Efficiency of 
debt 
enforcement 
of Djankov et 
al. (2008) 
Rule of law 
index of the 
World Bank 
Integrity of 
legal system 
of the EFW 
Recovery 
rate of the 
World 
Bank’s 
Doing 
Business 
Creditor rights index  1      
Legal rights index  0.50 1     
Efficiency of debt enforcement  0.18 0.56 1    
Rule of law index  0.36 0.60 0.74 1   
Integrity of legal system  0.37 0.47 0.67 0.90 1  
Recovery rate  0.24 0.48 0.93 0.75 0.67 1 
Credit depth of information 0.10 0.18 0.13 0.10 0.01 0.16 
GDP per capita growth rate -0.06 -0.16 -0.24 -0.27 -0.24 -0.27 
Sovereign stability 0.37 0.59 0.75 0.88 0.79 0.76 
Bond market development 0.18 0.29 0.31 0.38 0.31 0.37 
Capital account liberalization 0.28 0.19 0.43 0.54 0.54 0.47 
 
Table 3: Correlations between foreign bond bias and creditor protection  
 Foreign bias 
Creditor rights index (home country) 0.22 
Strength of legal rights index (home country) 0.25 
Efficiency of debt enforcement (home country) 0.46 
Recovery rate (home country) 0.47 
Rule of law (home country) 0.50 
Integrity of legal system (home country) 0.48 
Creditor rights index (host country) 0.04 
Strength of legal rights index (host country) 0.05 
Efficiency of debt enforcement (host country) 0.05 
Recovery rate (host country) 0.04 
Rule of law (host country) 0.11 
Integrity of legal system (host country) 0.12 
Note: Table 3 reports correlations between foreign bias and different proxies for the protection of 
bondholders in investing (i.e. home) and destination (i.e. host) countries.  
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Table 4: OLS and creditor rights index of Djankov et al. (2007) 
Creditor rights 
index of Djankov 
et al. (2007); 
Eq. (3) without the 
interaction term 
 
(1) 
Creditor rights 
index of Djankov et 
al. (2007); 
Eq. (3) with the 
interaction term 
 
(2) 
Creditor rights 
index of Djankov et 
al. (2007);       
 Eq. (3) with bank 
size included as a 
control variable 
(3) 
Creditor rights 
index of Djankov 
et al. (2007);       
Eq. (4) with 
domestic bias as 
control variable 
(4) 
࡯ࡾ࢏ (home) 0.275*** (0.02) 0.354*** (0.03) 0.344*** (0.04) 0.589*** (0.04) 
࡯ࡾ࢐ (host) -0.031* (0.02) 0.053 (0.04) 0.157*** (0.04) 0.048 (0.04) 
࡯ࡾ࢏ כ ࡯ࡾ࢐    -0.042*** (0.01) -0.045*** (0.02) -0.033* (0.02) 
Home country-specific control variables 
Domestic bias       -0.415*** (0.01) 
Depth of credit information -0.312***  (0.02) -0.311*** (0.02) -0.356*** (0.03)   
Capital account liberalization -0.048***  (0.01) -0.049*** (0.01) -0.063*** (0.01)   
GDP growth rate -0.035  (0.36) -0.031 (0.36) -0.450*** (0.43)   
Sovereign stability 0.151*** (0.01) 0.151*** (0.01) 0.150*** (0.02)   
Developed dummy 1.203*** (0.10) 1.208*** (0.10) 1.109*** (0.13)   
Bond market development 2.882*** (0.42) 2.802*** (0.42) 3.432*** (0.48)   
Rule of law  0.341*** (0.07) 0.339*** (0.07) 0.274*** (0.08)   
Bank size 0.002*** (0.00)   
Host country-specific control variables 
Depth of credit information -0.144*** (0.02) -0.144*** (0.02) -0.097*** (0.02) -0.122*** (0.02) 
Capital account liberalization -0.078*** (0.01) -0.078*** (0.01) -0.072*** (0.01) -0.074*** (0.01) 
GDP growth rate 1.421***  (0.31) 1.414*** (0.31) 1.640*** (0.37) 1.722*** (0.35) 
Sovereign stability 0.032***  (0.01) 0.032*** (0.01) 0.019 (0.01) 0.013 (0.01) 
Developed dummy -0.107 (0.09) -0.105 (0.08) 0.197* (0.12) -0.199** (0.09) 
Bond market development 10.092*** (0.53) 9.987*** (0.53) 9.617*** (0.60) 9.270*** (0.58) 
Rule of law  0.196*** (0.05) 0.195*** (0.05) 0.273*** (0.07) 0.116* (0.06) 
Bank size -0.005*** (0.00)   
Bilateral effects 
Return correlation -0.945*** (0.10) -0.944*** (0.10) -0.967*** (0.12) -0.101 (0.12) 
Common legal origin 0.416*** (0.05) 0.426*** (0.05) 0.388*** (0.06) -0.017 (0.06) 
Common border -0.223*** (0.09) -0.231*** (0.08) -0.421*** (0.09) -0.225** (0.11) 
Common language 0.597*** (0.07) 0.604*** (0.07) 0.600*** (0.09) 1.143*** (0.08) 
Common colonial past 0.074 (0.08) 0.108 (0.09) 0.147 (0.10) 0.017 (0.10) 
Geographical distance -0.802*** (0.03) -0.805*** (0.03) -0.779*** (0.03) -0.886*** (0.03) 
EMU 1.486*** (0.06) 1.481*** (0.06) 1.674*** (0.07) 1.618*** (0.07) 
NAFTA -0.002 (0.27) 0.067 (0.27) 0.191 (0.35) -0.197 (0.28) 
MERCOSUR 1.540*** (0.28) 1.585*** (0.28) 1.695*** (0.32) -0.128 (0.31) 
ASEAN 2.339*** (0.18) 2.333*** (0.18) 2.352*** (0.19) 1.271*** (0.18) 
R-squared adjusted 0.5522  0.5525  0.5679  0.4102  
No. of observations 8431  8431  6205  8431  
Note: The dependent variable is the foreign bias displayed by 36 investing countries over the 2004-2012 
period computed based on Eq. (1). The variable of interest ࡯ࡾ is the creditor rights index of Djankov et al. 
(2007). 
In column (1), only host and home country-specific control variables, control variables that account for 
bilateral effects (e.g. information asymmetries) and the creditor rights indices of home and host countries ࡯ࡾ࢏ 
and ࡯ࡾ࢐ are included. Columns (2)-(4) report the estimation results based on Eq. (3) and (4), respectively. 
Column (3) reports the estimation results based in Eq. (3) where the bank size is included as an additional 
control variable. The estimation procedure is ordinary least squares with robust standard errors and time 
dummies that account for time effects. The constant and time dummies are included, but not explicitly 
reported.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote significance at one, five and ten percent, respectively. 
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Table 6: Different sample specifications  
 
Pre-crisis period 
(2004-2006) 
(1a) 
Crisis period 
(2007-2012) 
(1b) 
Developed 
investing countries 
(2a) 
Developing investing 
countries 
(2b) 
࡯ࡾ࢏ (home) 0.419*** (0.06) 0.330*** (0.04) 0.340*** (0.03) -0.197** (0.10) 
࡯ࡾ࢐ (host) 0.040 (0.06) 0.054 (0.05) -0.061* (0.03) 0.108 (0.08) 
࡯ࡾ࢏ כ ࡯ࡾ࢐  -0.043* (0.03) -0.040** (0.02) -0.027** (0.01) 0.041 (0.04) 
Home country-specific control variables 
Depth of credit information -0.314*** (0.04) -0.324*** (0.03) -0.203*** (0.03) -0.209*** (0.05) 
Capital account liberalization -0.073*** (0.02) -0.040*** (0.01) 0.009 (0.01) -0.013 (0.04) 
GDP growth rate -2.021*** (0.76) 0.687* (0.41) -0.573 (0.38) 2.130*** (0.67) 
Sovereign stability 0.194*** (0.03) 0.131*** (0.01) 0.073*** (0.01) 0.184*** (0.02) 
Developed dummy 1.546*** (0.21) 1.047*** (0.11)     
Bond market development 2.832*** (0.70) 3.207*** (0.54) 2.178*** (0.42) -460.573*** (38.71) 
Rule of law  -0.067 (0.12) 0.504*** (0.08) 0.924*** (0.07) -0.240** (0.12) 
Host country-specific control variables 
Depth of credit information -0.083*** (0.03) -0.185*** (0.03) -0.154*** (0.02) -0.181*** (0.05) 
Capital account liberalization -0.092*** (0.02) -0.079*** (0.01) -0.096*** (0.01) -0.041* (0.02) 
GDP growth rate 4.049*** (0.62) 0.681* (0.36) 1.404*** (0.30) 1.545** (0.74) 
Sovereign stability -0.005 (0.02) 0.040*** (0.01) 0.048*** (0.01) -0.015 (0.03) 
Developed dummy 0.524*** (0.19) -0.265*** (0.10) 0.218*** (0.08) -1.289*** (0.23) 
Bond market development 9.314*** (0.86) 10.705*** (0.68) 8.666*** (0.53) 14.290*** (1.11) 
Rule of law  0.225** (0.11) 0.184*** (0.06) 0.108** (0.05) 0.548*** (0.13) 
Bilateral effects         
Return correlation -0.795*** (0.19) -1.045*** (0.12) -0.655*** (0.09) -1.131*** (0.26) 
Common legal origin 0.559*** (0.08) 0.361*** (0.06) 0.661*** (0.05) 0.261** (0.11) 
Common border -0.496*** (0.14) -0.108 (0.10) -0.121* (0.07) -0.165 (0.23) 
Common language 0.464*** (0.13) 0.681*** (0.09) 0.187*** (0.07) 1.341*** (0.17) 
Common colonial past 0.007 (0.15) 0.132 (0.11) 0.124 (0.08) 0.084 (0.21) 
Geographical distance -0.803*** (0.05) -0.812*** (0.03) -0.617*** (0.03) -1.162*** (0.06) 
EMU 1.473*** (0.09) 1.482*** (0.07) 1.618*** (0.05)   
NAFTA -0.551 (0.53) 0.321 (0.31) -0.077 (0.26) 0.681 (0.53) 
MERCOSUR 2.515*** (0.52) 1.269*** (0.31)   0.628** (0.31) 
ASEAN 2.249*** (0.37) 2.318*** (0.20)   1.178*** (0.23) 
R-squared adjusted 0.5714  0.5473  0.4973  0.4100  
No. of observations 2544  5887  5963  2468  
Note: The dependent variable is the foreign bias computed based on Eq. (1). The estimation period encompasses 
annual data over the 2004-2012 period. The variable of interest ࡯ࡾ is the creditor rights index of Djankov et al. 
(2007).  
The estimation procedure is ordinary least squares with robust standard errors and time dummies that account for 
time effects (Eq. (3)). The constant and time dummies are included, but not explicitly reported. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote significance at one, five and ten percent, respectively. 
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Table 7: Creditor protection above and below the world average 
 
Investing countries 
with creditor 
protection above 
world average 
 
(1a) 
Investing countries 
with creditor 
protection below 
world average 
 
(1b) 
Destination 
countries with 
creditor protection 
above world 
average 
(2a) 
Destination 
countries with 
creditor protection 
below world 
average 
(2b) 
࡯ࡾ࢏ (home) 0.186*** (0.07) -0.663*** (0.17) 0.603*** (0.10) 0.367*** (0.05) 
࡯ࡾ࢐ (host) 0.198** (0.09) -0.108* (0.06) 0.419*** (0.09) 0.557*** (0.15) 
࡯ࡾ࢏ כ ࡯ࡾ࢐  -0.090*** (0.03) 0.094 (0.07) -0.115*** (0.03) -0.171*** (0.06) 
Home country-specific control variables 
Depth of credit information -0.260*** (0.03) -0.133*** (0.05) -0.413*** (0.03) -0.157*** (0.04) 
Capital account liberalization 0.031** (0.01) -0.151*** (0.02) -0.066*** (0.01) -0.027* (0.02) 
GDP growth rate 0.805* (0.43) -0.125 (0.64) 0.381 (0.47) -0.182 (0.55) 
Sovereign stability 0.232*** (0.02) 0.117*** (0.02) 0.132*** (0.02) 0.188*** (0.02) 
Developed dummy 0.224* (0.12) 2.789*** (0.18) 1.188*** (0.13) 1.178*** (0.15) 
Bond market development 3.328*** (0.60) 1.866** (0.89) 3.797*** (0.55) 1.167* (0.63) 
Rule of law  0.637*** (0.09) -0.277* (0.15) 0.450*** (0.09) 0.179* (0.09) 
Host country-specific control variables 
Depth of credit information -0.159*** (0.02) -0.133*** (0.04) -0.313*** (0.03) -0.106*** (0.04) 
Capital account liberalization -0.066*** (0.01) -0.109*** (0.02) -0.141*** (0.01) -0.035** (0.02) 
GDP growth rate 1.049*** (0.36) 1.916*** (0.56) 1.486*** (0.42) -0.261 (0.48) 
Sovereign stability 0.043*** (0.01) 0.006 (0.02) 0.087*** (0.02) 0.093*** (0.02) 
Developed dummy -0.170* (0.10) 0.099 (0.15) -0.098 (0.12) 0.407*** (0.13) 
Bond market development 8.631*** (0.61) 12.538*** (0.92) 12.807*** (0.74) 3.373*** (0.84) 
Rule of law  0.222*** (0.06) 0.156 (0.10) 0.225*** (0.08) -0.504*** (0.12) 
Bilateral effects         
Return correlation -1.179*** (0.13) -0.739*** (0.21) -0.989*** (0.15) -1.431*** (0.14) 
Common legal origin 0.495*** (0.06) 0.132 (0.09) 0.427*** (0.07) 0.487*** (0.07) 
Common border -0.241*** (0.09) 0.145 (0.17) -0.224** (0.10) -0.151 (0.16) 
Common language 0.317*** (0.09) 1.337*** (0.12) 0.379*** (0.10) 0.846*** (0.11) 
Common colonial past 0.262** (0.12) -0.574*** (0.13) 0.388*** (0.12) -0.473*** (0.13) 
Geographical distance -0.743*** (0.03) -1.099*** (0.06) -0.797*** (0.03) -0.977*** (0.05) 
EMU 1.427*** (0.07) 1.257*** (0.10) 1.454*** (0.08) 1.448*** (0.09) 
NAFTA   -0.899** (0.35)   -0.658** (0.30) 
MERCOSUR 1.957*** (0.28) 0.356 (0.31) 1.581* (0.84) 0.989*** (0.29) 
ASEAN 2.189*** (0.20) 3.289*** (0.37) 2.552*** (0.19) 1.045*** (0.39) 
R-squared adjusted 0.5399  0.5995  0.5582  0.5888  
No. of observations 5413  3018  4990  3441  
 
Note: The dependent variable is the foreign bias computed based on Eq. (1). The estimation period encompasses 
annual data over the 2004-2012 period. The variable of interest ࡯ࡾ is the creditor rights index of Djankov et al. 
(2007). The estimation procedure is ordinary least squares with robust standard errors and time dummies that 
account for time effects (Eq. (3)). The constant and time dummies are included, but not explicitly reported. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote significance at one, five and ten percent, respectively. 
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Abstract 
Extant research has documented a substantial impact of culture and patriotism on equity home 
bias. This paper examines whether culture and patriotism influence home bias in bond 
portfolios. In this respect, I differentiate between two different aspects of home bias: domestic 
bias (overinvestment in domestic debt securities) and foreign bias (over- or underinvestment in 
debt securities issued by different host countries). The analysis uses the Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey data over the 2004-2012 period and relies on extensive robustness checks 
based on four internationally recognized cross-cultural research projects: the GLOBE study of 
House et al. (2004), the "Cultures and Organizations" of Hofstede et al. (2010), the International 
Social Survey Program and the World Values Survey. There is strong evidence that patriotism 
deters foreign investment and increases overinvestment in domestic bonds. Investors from 
countries with higher levels of uncertainty avoidance invest less in foreign debt markets.  
JEL Classification: G02, G11, G15 
Keywords: home bias, international diversification, patriotism, culture, bonds. 
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1 Introduction 
According to the international version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model of Sharpe (1964) and 
Lintner (1965), all investors should hold the world market portfolio of risky assets. Instead, 
home bias in different asset classes is observed: Investors allocate a larger share of their 
portfolios to domestic equities and bonds than justified by the weights in the world market 
capitalization. This paper explores whether patriotism, cultural distance, individualism and 
uncertainty avoidance contribute to the explanation of the home bias phenomenon in bond 
markets. In the empirical analysis of the impact of culture and patriotism on international 
diversification in bond portfolios, this study distinguishes two aspects of home bias: the 
domestic bias that designates the relative overweighting of domestic bonds and the foreign bias 
that describes the relative underweighting or overweighting of foreign debt securities. 
In the world of behavioral finance, culture and patriotism are assumed to influence preferences 
and behavior of individual investors and, thus, are important determinants of the financial 
decision making. Patriotic investors derive additional utility from investing in domestic 
securities. Cultural differences between countries imply a lower degree of familiarity. 
Uncertainty avoidance is associated with intolerance of ambiguity. Individualism is related to 
overconfidence. Several studies confirm that culture and patriotism impact home bias in equities 
(Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010; Anderson et al., 2011; Morse and Shive, 2011).  
These results cannot be a priori extended to bond markets that differ from equity markets in 
several aspects such as a lower trading activity in secondary bond markets or a limited 
participation of individual investors that constitute the investor group that is supposed to be 
most affected by behavioral heuristics. However, an asset-invariant impact of culture and 
patriotism on investment decisions cannot be ruled out. There is no apparent reason why 
patriotic loyalty should manifest itself only with regard to stocks and not other types of tradable 
securities.1 Moreover, the intolerance of ambiguity, overconfidence and familiarity (i.e. the 
behavioral underpinnings of the examined cultural variables) are not asset-specific behavioral 
determinants and culture is shown to affect the portfolio investment decisions of not only 
individual, but also institutional investors (e.g. Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010; Anderson et al., 
2011). This study examines whether the documented importance of culture and patriotism for 
the explanation of equity home bias can be extended to home bias in bond markets, and, thus, 
indirectly explores whether patriotism and cultural characteristics of the home country are asset-
invariant home bias drivers that determine allocations to both debt and equity securities. 
                                                          
1 For instance, governments frequently appeal to the patriotic feeling of citizens to promote sovereign 
debt issuances. The “Patriot Bonds” issued by the US government to finance the anti-terrorism efforts are 
one example of a successful patriotic promotion of sovereign bonds (Morse and Shive, 2011). 
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Empirical analysis confirms that patriotism and uncertainty avoidance of the home country play 
an important role in the explanation of the home bias in bonds. Patriotism fosters 
overinvestment in domestic debt securities and increases underinvestment in foreign debt 
markets. Societies characterized by higher uncertainty avoidance display a lower preference for 
foreign debt securities. The obtained results are robust to various regression specifications. In 
addition to the cultural dimensions derived by Hofstede et al. (2010), I incorporate cultural 
dimensions of the GLOBE study of House et al. (2004). Following Morse and Shive (2011), the 
patriotism proxies are derived based on two different social surveys, the World Values Survey 
and the International Social Survey Program.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the existing literature on 
culture, patriotism and home bias. Section 3 describes the data used and the methodology 
applied to derive bond bias levels and proxies for culture and patriotism. Section 4 presents 
estimation results. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Related Literature 
In general, contrary to a vast literature on equity home bias, studies on home bias in bonds are 
rather scarce, and, to my knowledge, none of them incorporates either cultural aspects or 
patriotism in the empirical examination of domestic and foreign bond bias levels. Most existing 
studies on home bias in bonds focus on neoclassical factors such as financial liberalization, real 
exchange rate risk, investor protection, economic and financial market development as well as 
traditional familiarity proxies such as common border, common language and geographical 
distance (Fidora et al., 2007; Ferreira and Miguel, 2011). De Moor and Vanpée (2013) 
investigate the differences in the determinants of home bias in bond and equity portfolios. As 
expected, they find that public debt issues, sovereign bond ratings and bank credit supply 
determine the home bias in bonds, but not the home bias in equities. Apart from familiarity, 
behavioral explanations of home bias in bond markets have received little attention. One of the 
few studies that address behavioral aspects is that of Solnik and Zuo (2014) who show that, 
although relative optimism exerts an economically significant impact on domestic bias in bond 
and equity markets, the economic importance of optimism is lower for bonds compared to 
equities. Moreover, the relative optimism in bond markets is characterized by a higher time-
series variation than the relative optimism in equity markets that is more persistent over time 
(Solnik and Zuo, 2014).  
The economic impact of cultural characteristics has been examined e.g. in the context of 
syndicated loan markets (Giannetti and Yafeh, 2012), national preferences for bank-based 
versus market-based financing (Kwok and Tadesse, 2006; Aggarwal and Goodell, 2009), life 
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insurance consumption (Chui and Kwok, 2008), trading volume and momentum profits (Chui et 
al., 2010), investor rights protection (Stulz and Williamson, 2003), cross-border acquisition 
performance (Morosini et al., 1998), international trade and investment (Guiso et al., 2009), 
return smoothing behavior of hedge funds (Kang et al., 2015) and trading frequency (Beracha et 
al., 2015). Studies that examine the impact of culture on portfolio allocation decisions focus 
either on equity home bias or on international debt and equity portfolios, but not directly on 
domestic and foreign bias in bonds. Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) examine the impact of 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism and cultural distance on the foreign bias in the mutual fund 
equity holdings of developed countries in 1999 and 2000. They differentiate between developed 
and emerging host countries and find that uncertainty avoidance exerts a stronger impact on 
investment in equities issued in emerging markets, whereas cultural distance between host and 
home countries matters only for investment in equities issued in developed countries. 
Individualism significantly increases international diversification in both developed and 
emerging host markets (Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010). 
Anderson et al. (2011) extend the set of cultural variables of Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) in 
order to account for the influence of long-term orientation and masculinity on domestic and 
foreign bias in equity holdings of institutional investors as of 2006. They show that cultural 
distance and uncertainty avoidance increase the domestic bias levels, whereas masculinity and 
long-term orientation reduce the overinvestment in domestic equities and increase international 
diversification. With respect to foreign bias and cultural distance, their results confirm the major 
findings of Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010): Investment funds are more likely to underweight 
equities of those host countries that are more culturally distant from the home country. The 
impact of individualism on domestic bias is negative, but not robust across different 
specifications. As far as the relationship between individualism and the foreign bias is 
concerned, the results are not compatible with the evidence of Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010). 
According to Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010), more individualistic societies are less likely to 
underweight foreign equities in their portfolios. By contrast, Anderson et al. (2011) show that 
individualism increases underinvestment in foreign equities. 
Aggarwal et al. (2012) investigate the impact of individualism, masculinity, power distance and 
uncertainty avoidance on cross-country bond and equity foreign portfolio investment positions. 
They show that cultural proximity and the three cultural dimensions of Hofstede (2001) - 
individualism, masculinity and power distance of both host and home countries - have a positive 
and significant impact on cross-country bond and equity foreign portfolio investment. 
Individualism, masculinity and power distance of host countries increase cross-border debt and 
equity holdings by similar amounts. By contrast, home country-specific cultural characteristics 
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exert different impacts on cross-border debt and equity holdings: Whereas individualism of the 
home country has a stronger impact on cross-border equity investment, the impact of 
masculinity is more pronounced for the cross-border debt investment. Uncertainty avoidance of 
either home or host countries does not significantly influence cross-border debt and equity 
holdings (Aggarwal et al., 2012).  
One potential drawback of the study of Aggarwal et al. (2012) is that cross-border debt and 
equity holdings are absolute values measured in million USD. Absolute values allow no 
conclusions about the actual weights of cross-country holdings in debt and equity portfolios of 
investing countries. Moreover, Aggarwal et al. (2012) do not account for the fact that host 
countries with higher market capitalizations of their debt and equity markets attract more 
foreign investment. Thus, their results on cross-border debt portfolio holdings cannot be a priori 
extended to home bias that measures the deviation of the actual portfolio weight from the 
optimal portfolio weight, i.e. the under- and overinvestment in domestic and foreign debt 
securities. 
Several studies suggest that patriotism may be an important determinant of investor behavior. 
Benartzi (2001) and Cohen (2009) document a strong tendency among employees to invest their 
discretionary benefits into their employer’s stocks. Benos and Jochec (2013) show that patriotic 
sentiment can affect stock returns and that investors may be subconsciously driven towards 
stocks with patriotic names at times when patriotic sentiment is especially high, e.g. during 
wartime. Morse and Shive (2011) examine the relationship between patriotism and different 
domestic bias measures in equity markets. They document a positive and economically 
significant impact of patriotism on the overinvestment in domestic equities.  
This paper examines the impact of uncertainty avoidance, individualism and cultural distance on 
home bias in bonds and, thus, contributes to the existing research of Beugelsdijk and Frijns 
(2010), Anderson et al. (2011) and Aggarwal et al. (2012) who focus on the impact of culture on 
home bias in equities and absolute values of foreign portfolio investment positions. 
Furthermore, following the research of Morse and Shive (2011) on patriotism and domestic 
equity bias, I fill a gap by studying the impact of patriotism on domestic and foreign bias in 
bond portfolios.   
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Domestic and Foreign Bias 
The empirical analysis is based on debt portfolios of 40 countries (24 developed and 16 
developing countries) over the 2004-2012 period. Following Fidora et al. (2007), the term 
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"bonds" is used to account for both short- and long-term debt securities. I distinguish between 
two different aspects of home bias: domestic and foreign bias (Chan et al., 2005). The domestic 
bias describes how strongly domestic investors overweigh domestic bonds compared to an 
optimal benchmark, whereas the foreign bias (also referred to as the bilateral home bias in the 
existing literature) reflects the degree to which domestic investors overweigh or underweight the 
bonds of a particular host country in their debt portfolios.  
Following Chan et al. (2005), domestic bias of a country ݅ is calculated in the following way:  
 ܦܤܫܣ ௜ܵ ൌ ሺݓ௜ሻ െ ሺݓ௜כሻ                                                                                                      (1). 
ݓ௜ designates the actual debt portfolio weight allocated to domestic debt securities by investors 
from country ݅, whereas ݓ௜כ represents the weight of domestic bonds in the world debt market 
capitalization. The higher the domestic bias ܦܤܫܣ ௜ܵ is, the more market participants overinvest 
in domestic bonds. Given that all countries invest more in domestic debt securities than justified 
by their weights in the world market capitalization, domestic bias ܦܤܫܣܵ௜ takes only positive 
values. Table 1 reports the actual and optimal portfolio weights allocated to domestic debt 
securities, ݓ௜ and ݓ௜כ, as well as the domestic bond bias levels of the sample countries. The 
lowest domestic bias level is observed in the United States. Developed countries and members 
of the European Monetary Union (with the exception of Greece) display lower domestic bias 
levels compared to developing countries where overinvestment in domestic debt securities is 
more pronounced. 
Following Chan et al. (2005), foreign bias ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝displayed by the investors from home 
country ݅ with regard to the debt securities of the host country݆ is computed as: 
ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝ ൌ  ൫ݓ௜ǡ௝൯ െ ሺݓ௝כሻ                                                                                                  (2). 
ݓ௜ǡ௝ corresponds to the actual fraction of the country ݅’s total debt portfolio that investors 
domiciled in country ݅ allocate to debt securities issued by residents in host country݆. Following 
the existing literature, the optimal benchmark according to the International Capital Asset 
Pricing Model, ݓ௝כ, is computed as the weight of the host country ݆’ debt securities in the world 
debt market portfolio (e.g. Fidora et al., 2007). Negative values of the foreign bias measure 
ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝ reflect a bias against foreign debt securities, i.e. the underinvestment in foreign debt 
securities. If the actual and optimal portfolio weights are equal (ݓ௝כ ൌ ݓ௜ǡ௝), the foreign bias 
measure takes the value of zero. Positive values of the foreign bias indicate a bias towards debt 
securities issued by residents in host country݆, i.e. investors overinvest in the debt securities of 
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the host country compared to the optimal benchmark. Table 1 shows the equally weighted 
average foreign bias that a country ݅ displays towards ݊ െ ͳ sample host countries:  
ܨܤܫܣܵ௜ ൌ
σ ி஻ூ஺ௌ೔ǡೕ೙ೕసభǡೕಯ೔
௡ିଵ                                                                                                             (3).  
On average, every country ݅ underinvests in the debt securities issued in other sample countries 
݆ ് ݅, i.e. the average foreign bias ܨܤܫܣܵ௜ is negative in every country. However, when 
individual target countries are considered, underinvestment (i.e. negative foreign bias 
values:ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝ ൏ Ͳ) is not always observed. For instance, the EMU countries predominantly 
display positive foreign bias ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝ with respect to other EMU countries, i.e. they overinvest 
in debt securities issued in other EMU countries. In addition, investors appear to overinvest in 
debt securities issued in those host countries that are geographically or culturally closer. For 
instance, Austrian investors display positive foreign bias levels towards debt securities issued in 
the Czech Republic and Hungary. Similarly, Scandinavian countries invest more in each others’ 
debt securities than would be warranted by the weights in the world debt market portfolio.  
Bond market capitalizations are collected from the Total Debt Securities Statistics published by 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). For those countries that are not included in the 
Total Debt Securities Statistics, bond market capitalizations are calculated as the sum of the 
amounts outstanding of international and domestic debt securities issued by residents, compiled 
by combining the Domestic and International Debt Securities Statistics of the BIS. The data on 
the cross-border investment are taken from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) 
of the International Monetary Fund that provides the data on cross-country debt holdings for 80 
countries over the 1997-2012 period. However, the survey does not report domestic debt 
holdings. Following Fidora et al. (2007), domestic debt holdings are approximated by the 
difference between the home country ݅’s debt market capitalization and the sum of the portfolio 
holdings of the home country ݅’s debt securities by the remaining reporting 79 countries. The 
underlying assumption is that non-reporting countries do not invest in bonds issued in country ݅ 
(Fidora et al., 2007). The country ݅’s total holdings of foreign bonds are approximated by the 
total value of foreign investment as reported by the CPIS. Thus, the total debt portfolio is 
computed as the sum of the derived domestic debt holdings and the total value of foreign debt 
investment as reported by the CPIS. 
3.2 Culture and Patriotism 
Culture is defined by Hofstede (2001) as "the collective programming of the mind that 
distinguishes members of one group or category of people from another" (Hofstede, 2001, p. 9). 
Hofstede (2001) identifies four cultural dimensions (power distance, masculinity, individualism 
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and uncertainty avoidance) that are derived based on a survey of the IBM employees conducted 
during the 1967-1973 period. Hofstede et al. (2010) add further cultural dimensions, long-term-
orientation and indulgence, that are derived based on the 1995-2004 and 2005-2008 World 
Values Survey (WVS) data.  
The GLOBE study of House et al. (2004) distinguishes nine cultural dimensions (uncertainty 
avoidance, power distance, gender egalitarianism, in-group collectivism, institutional 
collectivism, assertiveness, humane orientation, performance orientation and future orientation) 
and is derived based on a broader industrial setting (financial services, food processing and 
telecommunications). Contrary to the research design of Hofstede et al. (2010), the GLOBE 
study targets only managerial employees. The self-report questionnaires were collected during 
the time interval between 1994 and 1997. House et al. (2004) differentiate between cultural 
practices and cultural values: Cultural values are supposed to reflect ideology and the values 
that should prevail in a society, whereas cultural practices are assumed to describe the actual 
state of the world, namely the values that currently prevail in the society according to the 
perception of survey participants. Hofstede (2006) questions the respondents’ ability to correctly 
assess the values that currently determine their societies. For reasons of consistency, this study 
deals only with the cultural value dimensions of the GLOBE study of House et al. (2004). 
The existing literature that examines the impact of culture on investment behavior relates 
cultural dimensions to unobservable psychological attributes. Cultural proximity is commonly 
associated with familiarity (Anderson et al., 2011; Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010), uncertainty 
avoidance is related to ambiguity aversion (Hofstede, 2001), whereas individualism is assumed 
to reflect overconfidence (Chui et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2011). A clear-cut distinction 
between cultural aspects and the corresponding behavioral patterns is difficult. However, the 
existing studies find that the impact of culture goes beyond traditional behavioral proxies (e.g. 
Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010). From a variety of cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede et 
al. (2010) and House et al. (2004) I choose uncertainty avoidance and individualism for two 
reasons. First, these cultural dimensions reflect behavioral aspects that are relevant to portfolio 
allocation decisions. Second, their definition and measurement are consistent across different 
studies.  
Uncertainty avoidance 
The uncertainty avoidance dimension characterizes societies that shun ambiguous situations and 
strive to minimize the probability of unpredictable future events (Hofstede et al., 2010; House et 
al., 2004). Importantly, uncertainty avoidance is not merely a reflection of risk aversion that 
would imply that investors avoid highly risky securities independently of whether these 
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securities are the domestic or the foreign ones.2 By contrast, Hofstede (2001) argues that 
uncertainty avoidance is related more to intolerance of ambiguity than to risk avoidance and that 
uncertainty avoidance affects solely the tendency to take unknown risks, not risks in general. In 
this respect, foreign securities are more likely to be the source of unknown risks than the 
domestic ones. It is the risk type that is central to the uncertainty avoidance concept: If 
uncertainty avoidance is high, only known risks (such as driving fast) are taken, whereas low 
levels of uncertainty avoidance imply that taking unknown risks (such as changing employers) 
is equally acceptable (Hofstede, 2001). 
Furnham and Ribchester (1995) argue that one of the primary characteristics of ambiguity 
intolerance is the preference for the familiar and the rejection of the different or unusual. 
Similarly, Heath and Tversky (2001) define aversion to ambiguity as a preference for betting on 
chance events the probabilities of which are known and well defined. Boyle et al. (2012) 
complement the classic Markowitz model by introducing ambiguity aversion that results in a 
preference for familiar securities. Thus, investors from cultures characterized by high 
uncertainty avoidance should react more strongly to information asymmetries and familiarity. 
Their preference for domestic and, hence, more familiar debt securities as well as the 
unwillingness to invest in less known foreign securities should be more pronounced as 
compared to societies with lower scores for uncertainty avoidance. As a consequence, I expect a 
positive relationship between uncertainty avoidance and overinvestment in domestic debt 
securities (domestic bias). By contrast, high uncertainty avoidance should reduce investment in 
foreign debt securities and, thus, exert a negative impact on the foreign bias.  
As shown in Tables 1 and 2, countries with the highest uncertainty avoidance scores of Hofstede 
et al. (2010) such as Portugal and Greece range among the countries with the highest domestic 
bias levels. By contrast, Spain and Japan are among the countries with the highest uncertainty 
avoidance scores, but display comparatively low domestic bond bias levels. Whereas the 
correlation between uncertainty avoidance of the GLOBE study and domestic bias amounts to 
0.58, the correlation between uncertainty avoidance of Hofstede et al. (2010) with domestic bias 
is close to zero and insignificant (Table 3). 
Individualism 
As opposed to collectivism, Hofstede et al. (2010) relate individualism to the importance of 
individual rights and independence. The GLOBE study of House et al. (2004) distinguishes two 
                                                          
2 If uncertainty avoidance reflected only risk aversion, its impact on domestic bias would be ambiguous. 
It would, indeed, be positive for investors from home countries with less risky bonds. By contrast, an 
investor located in a country with comparatively risky bonds would be unwilling to invest much of his 
wealth in domestic bonds and, instead, reduce risk by international diversification. In this case, the impact 
of uncertainty avoidance on domestic bias would be negative. 
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aspects of the individualism-collectivism dimension. Institutional collectivism describes the 
degree to which institutional practices and economic system encourage collective action and 
group loyalty. In-group collectivism designates the importance of collective actions and 
interdependence within families. Both collectivism dimensions are positively correlated. Given 
that low collectivism scores reflect high individualism, the correlations of the collectivism 
dimensions of the GLOBE study with the individualism of Hofstede et al. (2010) are negative. 
This study uses institutional collectivism instead of in-group collectivism since institutional 
collectivism displays the strongest negative correlation with the individualism score of Hofstede 
et al. (2010) for the chosen sample countries.  
Chui et al. (2010) relate the individualism of Hofstede et al. (2010) to overconfidence: In 
societies characterized by higher individualism, decisions are made by individuals and not by 
groups and, therefore, are more likely to be driven by overconfidence. Similarly, Markus and 
Kitayama (1991) argue that the view of an individual as an independent and autonomous entity 
coincides with the self-favorability bias that results in an overestimation of one’s skills and 
abilities. Odean (1998) and Van den Steen (2004) argue that overconfident individuals 
overestimate their abilities and the precision of their knowledge.  
With respect to the impact of individualism and the associated overconfidence on international 
diversification, there are two conflicting strands of opinion in the existing literature. Studies that 
test the impact of individualism on home bias in equities postulate that overconfidence induces a 
lower risk perception with regard to the foreign investment. Thus, overconfidence is supposed 
to boost foreign investment and should result in greater international diversification (higher 
foreign bias) and lower domestic bias levels (Anderson et al., 2011; Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 
2010). Visual inspection of the data lends some support to this argument: The US and UK are 
countries with the highest (lowest) individualism (collectivism) scores and display the lowest 
degree of overinvestment in domestic debt securities. In addition, domestic bond bias is very 
high in countries such as Colombia, Greece and Indonesia that range among countries with the 
lowest individualism (and highest institutional collectivism) scores. The correlation between 
domestic bond bias and individualism is, as expected, negative and amounts to -0.59 (Table 3).  
By contrast, the link between the institutional collectivism and the overinvestment in domestic 
bonds appears to be rather weak: The correlation bears the expected positive sign, but is 
insignificant and amounts to merely 0.23 (Table 3). While there is indeed a strong positive link 
between overconfidence and risk taking, the empirical and theoretical literature also relates 
overconfidence to more concentrated and less diversified portfolios (e.g. Goetzmann and 
Kumar, 2008; Odean, 1998). In this case, we should expect a positive (negative) relationship 
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between domestic bias and individualism (collectivism of the GLOBE study) and a negative 
(positive) relationship between individualism (collectivism) and foreign bias. 
Cultural distance 
In the context of syndicated loan markets, Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) identify two channels 
through which cultural distance may influence individual portfolio decisions: information 
asymmetries and transaction costs. First, they argue that cultural differences exacerbate the 
intensity of information asymmetries and the resulting agency problems. Hence, cultural 
distance should enhance the perceived riskiness of foreign bonds. Second, Giannetti and Yafeh 
(2012) point out that cultural distance may also reflect institutional differences related to legal 
systems and contracting terms that increase the cost of information gathering and, thus, further 
reduce the attractiveness of foreign investment. Finally, investors perceive host countries that 
are culturally similar to their home countries as more familiar (Huberman, 2001; Grinblatt and 
Keloharju, 2001). A number of control variables for institutional similarities, information 
asymmetries and familiarity (such as common language, common border, geographical distance 
and common legal origin) are used in order to examine whether cultural distance has an impact 
that goes beyond institutional proximity, information asymmetries and familiarity 
considerations. 
The cultural distance ܥܦ௜ǡ௝ between the home country ݅ and the host country ݆ is measured in the 
following way: 
ܥܦ௜ǡ௝ ൌ
σ ൬
צ಴೙ǡ೔ష಴೙ǡೕצ
ೡ೙
൰ಿ೙సభ
ே                                                                                                                 (4). 
ܥ௡ǡ௜ corresponds to the ݊th cultural dimension of the country ݅. ݒ௡ denotes the standard 
deviation of the ݊th cultural dimension. ܥܦ௜ǡ௝
ு௢௙௦௧௘ௗ௘is compounded based on four cultural 
dimensions ሺܰ ൌ Ͷሻ3 of Hofstede et al. (2010), and ݒ௡ு௢௙௦௧௘ௗ௘is computed based on 76 
countries. By contrast, ܥܦ௜ǡ௝ீ௅ை஻ா incorporates nine cultural value dimensions ሺܰ ൌ ͻሻ derived 
by the GLOBE study of House et al. (2004), and ݒ௡ீ௅ை஻ா is calculated based on 59 countries. 
For domestic bias regressions, cultural distance is computed as the average cultural distance to 
the rest of the world, ܥܦതതതത௜. The "rest of the world'' is approximated by 75 countries for the 
cultural distance based on Hofstede et al. (2010) and 58 countries for the cultural distance 
computed based on the GLOBE study of House et al. (2004). 
                                                          
3 These dimensions are power distance, masculinity, individualism and uncertainty avoidance. Indulgence 
and long-term orientation are not included since these scores are not available for several countries in my 
sample. 
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Tables 1 and 2 report the domestic bias levels and the average cultural distances based on 
cultural dimensions of Hofstede et al. (2010) and the GLOBE study. A visual inspection of the 
data does not confirm the hypothesis that countries that are more culturally distant from the rest 
of the world display higher domestic bond bias levels. Although the correlation between the two 
average cultural distance measures is positive, both proxies for cultural distance are negatively, 
but not significantly correlated with domestic bond bias (Table 3). For instance, Japan is one of 
the countries that are the most culturally distant from other countries and, still, it displays the 
second lowest domestic bias level among the sample countries. 
Patriotism 
Shimp and Sharma (1987) introduce the concept of consumer ethnocentrism that describes the 
behavior of a consumer who questions the appropriateness and morality of purchasing foreign 
products. They argue that, albeit a separate concept, consumer ethnocentrism is closely related 
to patriotism. Morse and Shive (2011) elaborate on further channels through which patriotism 
may affect consumer and investor choices: Either patriotic loyalty induces investors to believe 
that domestic financial products are superior to the foreign ones, or investors purchase domestic 
products in spite of being aware of their sub-optimality inasmuch as they derive additional 
utility from supporting the domestic economy.  
One proxy for patriotism is calculated based on the World Values Survey (WVS). Given that the 
2005 WVS does not encompass all sample countries, for Israel, the Philippines and Singapore 
the 2000 WVS is used, and the patriotism proxies for Czech Republic and Hungary are 
computed based on the 1995 WVS. Following Morse and Shive (2011), I concentrate on one 
particular question as a proxy for patriotism: "How proud are you to be (substitute 
nationality)?".  I assign to the possible answers "very proud", "quite proud", "not very proud" 
and "not at all proud" discrete numbers ranging from four to one, respectively, and compute the 
country averages. Another patriotism score that is used as a robustness check is derived based 
on the 2003 National Identity Survey of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). The 
answers to the question "I would rather be a citizen of this country" range from "agree strongly" 
and "agree" to "neither agree or disagree", "disagree" and "disagree completely". These answers 
are assigned the numerical values from five to one, respectively.  
Both the WVS and ISSP patriotism proxies are constructed in such a way that higher scores 
correspond to a higher patriotism displayed by the home country. The correlation between these 
two patriotism proxies amounts to 0.58 for the sample countries and is highly significant (Table 
3). Given that patriotism is assumed to shift preferences towards domestic assets, it should 
reduce international diversification and increase overinvestment in domestic assets. Hence, a 
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positive (negative) relationship between patriotism and domestic (foreign) bond bias is 
expected.  
A visual inspection of the data indicates a link between domestic bias and the WVS patriotism. 
For instance, Colombia and Philippines display the highest WVS patriotism and range among 
the countries with the highest domestic bias levels. In addition, Japan is the country with one of 
the lowest WVS patriotism scores and is characterized by the lowest domestic bias. By contrast, 
the positive relationship between the ISSP patriotism and the domestic bias is less evident. For 
instance, the US is assigned the highest ISSP patriotism score, but displays the lowest domestic 
bond bias. Indeed, whereas the correlation between the ISSP patriotism and domestic bias is 
comparatively low and statistically insignificant, it amounts to 0.45 for the WVS patriotism and 
domestic bond bias (Table 3). 
3.3 Methodology 
In order to identify the determinants of domestic bias, the following model is used: 
ܦܤܫܣ ௜ܵ ൌ ݂ሺܨܥ௜ǡ ܥ ௜ܸǡ ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ௜ǡ ܫ݊݀݅ݒ݅݀ݑ݈ܽ݅ݏ݉௜ǡ ܲܽݐݎ݅݋ݐ݅ݏ݉௜ǡ ܥܦതതതത௜ሻ                             (5). 
Domestic bias ܦܤܫܣܵ௜ is the function of uncertainty avoidance, individualism and patriotism 
scores assigned to the home country ݅ as well as the average cultural distance ܥܦതതതത௜ between the 
home country ݅ and the rest of the world. The dummy variable ܨܥ௜ takes the value of one if the 
home country is one of the large financial centers (Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, Singapore, 
Switzerland, UK and US). Investment in bonds does not only depend on culture and patriotism, 
but is also affected by familiarity, institutional proximity, information asymmetries as well as 
economic and institutional characteristics of the home country. These factors are captured by the 
home country-specific control variables ܥ ௜ܸ. 
A visual inspection of the data suggests a link between domestic bias and patriotism, 
individualism, uncertainty avoidance and cultural distance. However, the correlation between 
these variables and overinvestment in domestic bonds may simply reflect economic and 
institutional characteristics of the home country. Culture and patriotism may impact investment 
decisions not directly, but through their influence on legal and institutional environment. 
Therefore, the following home country-specific characteristics are included as control variables 
ܥ ௜ܸ: banking system stability, sovereign stability, bond market development, creditor protection, 
capital account liberalization, GDP per capita growth rate, average geographical distance to the 
rest of the world, GDP per capita growth rate correlation with the world GDP per capita growth 
rate, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the home country is a member of the EMU 
or regional trade agreements such as NAFTA/MERCOSUR/ASEAN as well as the number of 
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countries that have a common border/language with the home country. The more detailed 
descriptions of control variables and the used databases are summarized in Table 4.  
Given a high number of explanatory variables, variance inflation factors (VIFs) are used in 
order to ensure that multicollinearity problems do not arise. The VIF of a regressor measures by 
how much the variance of the coefficient estimate increases due to the non-orthogonality of 
independent variables compared to the situation in which the regressor is orthogonal to other 
independent variables. According to a rule of thumb, VIFs of ten or higher indicate severe 
multicollinearity (e.g. Hill and Adkins, 2001). I adopt a more conservative approach: The 
maximum acceptable value that the VIFs are allowed to take is five for the variables of interest 
(cultural distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance and patriotism).  
As one of the robustness checks, I substitute the domestic bias by the actual portfolio weight 
assigned to domestic bonds, ݓ௜, and use the optimal portfolio weight, i.e. the weight of domestic 
bond market capitalization in the world bond market capitalization, ݓ௜כ, as one of the 
explanatory variables: 
ݓ௜ ൌ ݂ሺܨܥ௜ǡ ݓ௜כǡ ܥ ௜ܸǡ ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ௜ǡ ܫ݊݀݅ݒ݅݀ݑ݈ܽ݅ݏ݉௜ǡ ܲܽݐݎ݅݋ݐ݅ݏ݉௜ǡ ܥܦതതതത௜ሻ                               (6). 
The idea behind this procedure is that culture and patriotism may affect not only the actual 
portfolio weights allocated to domestic debt securities, ݓ௜, but also the domestic debt market 
capitalization that constitutes the benchmark ݓ௜כ against which the overinvestment is measured. 
Culture influences the structure of markets and institutions (Kwok and Tadesse, 2006; Aggarwal 
and Goodell, 2009). Corporate governance practices may be also determined by cultural 
variables (Stulz and Williamson, 2003). Similarly, Hofstede (2001), House et al. (2004) and 
Morse and Shive (2001) argue that culture may influence economic and institutional 
development. Thus, an impact of culture on the bond market development of the home country 
and on the home country’s weight in the world debt market capitalization ݓ௜כ cannot be ruled 
out. Domestic bias is computed as the log ratio of the actual to the optimal portfolio weight of 
domestic securities. In this case, even if culture and patriotism significantly affect the actual 
portfolio allocations, the impact of culture on domestic bond bias that captures the deviation of 
the actual portfolio allocation from the optimal benchmark may sum up to zero. Eq. (6) accounts 
for the fact that cultural characteristics and patriotism of the home country may influence only 
the actual allocations to domestic bonds, but not the domestic bias. 
In order to evaluate the impact of culture and patriotism on the foreign bond bias ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝, the 
following model is used:  
ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ௝ ൌ ݂ሺܨܥ௜ǡ ܦܤܫܣ ௜ܵǡ ܥ ௝ܸǡ ܥ ௜ܸǡ௝ǡ ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ௜ǡ ܫ݊݀݅ݒ݅݀ݑ݈ܽ݅ݏ݉௜ǡ ܲܽݐݎ݅݋ݐ݅ݏ݉௜ǡ ܥܦ௜ǡ௝ሻ  (7). 
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Following Chan et al. (2005), Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) and Ferreira and Miguel (2011), I 
include the level of domestic bias of the home country, ܦܤܫܣ ௜ܵ, as one of the explanatory 
variables. It accounts for the automatic impact of domestic bias on the foreign bias. The higher 
the overinvestment in domestic debt securities is, the lower is the fraction of debt portfolio that 
can be invested in foreign debt securities. Once the absolute level of domestic bias is included in 
the regression specification related to the foreign bias, home country-specific variables are not 
considered (Chan et al., 2005; Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010; Ferreira and Miguel, 2011).  
ܥ ௝ܸ is the vector of control variables that are supposed to reflect the host country-specific 
characteristics: bond market development, sovereign stability, banking system development, 
creditor rights protection, GDP per capita growth rate, capital account liberalization and a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the host country is a developed country. ܥ ௜ܸǡ௝ 
designates control variables that account for familiarity, institutional proximity and information 
asymmetries: geographical distance between the capitals of home and host countries, dummy 
variables that take the value of one if host and home countries have a common border, common 
language or common legal origin, and regional dummies that take the value of one if both the 
host and the home country are members of the EMU, NAFTA, ASEAN or MERCOSUR. 
Furthermore, I include bond market return correlations that are supposed to reflect potential 
diversification benefits. ܥܦ௜ǡ௝ is the cultural distance between the home country ݅ and the host 
country ݆ computed based on Eq. (4). ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ௜, ܫ݊݀݅ݒ݅݀ݑ݈ܽ݅ݏ݉௜ and ܲܽݐݎ݅݋ݐ݅ݏ݉௜ are 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism and patriotism scores assigned to the home country ݅.  
As a robustness check, I substitute the foreign bias by the actual portfolio weight assigned by 
residents in the home country ݅ to the debt securities issued by residents in the host country ݆, 
ݓ௜ǡ௝. The optimal portfolio weight, i.e. the weight of the host country ݆’s debt securities in the 
world debt market capitalization ݓ௝כ, is included as an additional explanatory variable: 
ݓ௜ǡ௝ ൌ ݂ሺܨܥ௜ǡ ݓ௝כǡ ܦܤܫܣܵ௜ǡ ܥ ௝ܸǡ ܥ ௜ܸǡ௝ǡ ܷ݊ܿ݁ݎݐܽ݅݊ݐݕ௜ǡ ܫ݊݀݅ݒ݅݀ݑ݈ܽ݅ݏ݉௜ǡ ܲܽݐݎ݅݋ݐ݅ݏ݉௜ǡ ܥܦ௜ǡ௝ሻ    (8). 
Ferreira and Miguel (2011) argue that the inclusion of financial centers may distort the 
estimation results. Sample countries such as Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, Singapore, 
Switzerland, UK and US attract and invest foreign funds from all over the world and, therefore, 
display comparatively low domestic bias levels. In every regression specification, I include a 
dummy variable ܨܥ௜ that takes the value of one if the home country is one of the above 
mentioned financial centers. Ferreira and Miguel (2011) split the sample into financial and non-
financial centers. However, splitting the sample into financial and non-financial centers is 
problematic for two reasons. First, a separate estimation for financial centers would have 
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resulted in a very low number of observations for domestic bias regressions. Second, the results 
for the foreign bias regressions that incorporate only financial centers as home countries are 
strongly affected by multicollinearity: Variance inflation factors associated with patriotism and 
individualism are above 40 and, therefore, exceed the maximum acceptable threshold levels of 
five. Therefore, as a robustness check, I estimate the base models (Eq. (5) and (7)) for non-
financial centers only.  
In the empirical analysis of the determinants of home bias levels, Ferreira and Miguel (2011) 
apply ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations with time-fixed effects. Fidora et al. (2007) 
estimate a pure cross-section with averaged data for home bias levels over the 2001-2003 
period. Whereas the consideration of the average home bias levels fails to incorporate 
information contained in the time dimension, the OLS estimations with time-fixed effects 
neglect cross-sectional information. The incorporation of both time-series and cross-sectional 
information based on the standard panel data techniques is not possible given that both the 
Hausman and Sargan-Hansen tests reject the null hypothesis of the validity of the random 
effects model.4 However, the fixed effects model does not permit estimating the coefficients on 
the time-invariant variables of interest: patriotism, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and 
cultural distance. Similarly, it is not possible to account for home country-fixed effects due to 
the time-invariability of cultural variables. Therefore, this study follows Ferreira and Miguel 
(2011) and examines the impact of culture and patriotism on home bias in bonds by means of 
the OLS estimations with dummy variables that account for time effects. This procedure is 
applied to both the domestic and foreign bias estimations that are based on yearly observations 
over the 2004-2012 period. As a robustness check, a pure cross-section based on the data 
averaged over the 2004-2012 sample period is estimated for the foreign bias regressions.5 
4 Results 
4.1 Domestic Bias 
In columns (1)-(4) of Table 5, the WVS patriotism and the cultural variables of Hofstede et al. 
(2010) are included one by one. Columns (4)-(7) report the results based on Eq. (5) where all 
four variables of interest are included as independent variables in the same regression. Columns 
(4) and (6) combine the cultural variables of Hofstede et al. (2010) and the GLOBE study with 
the WVS patriotism scores. The WVS patriotism is substituted by the ISSP patriotism in 
columns (5) and (7). There is strong evidence that patriotism increases overinvestment in 
domestic debt securities. By contrast, the negative and significant coefficient estimate on the 
                                                          
4 Results on the Hausman and Sargan-Hansen tests are available on demand. 
5 A comparable cross-sectional test for domestic bias is not possible due to a low number of sample 
countries: It would result in a regression model with 15 regressors and only 39 observations. 
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uncertainty avoidance of Hofstede et al. (2010) is not compatible with the prediction that 
societies characterized by high uncertainty avoidance display higher domestic bias levels 
(columns (2)-(5) of Table 5). The high statistical significance of the coefficient estimate on the 
Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance is not compatible with the insignificant, close to zero 
correlation between domestic bias and uncertainty avoidance either (Panel A in Table 3). 
Although highly statistically significant, the economic significance of Hofstede’s uncertainty 
avoidance is negligible: A ten point increase in the corresponding cultural variable measured on 
a scale from one to 120 corresponds to a decline in domestic bias by 0.1-0.2. By contrast, the 
GLOBE uncertainty avoidance has the expected positive and highly significant impact on 
domestic bias in bonds (columns (6) and (7) of Table 5). 
There is little evidence that the preference for domestic bonds is significantly affected by 
individualism and that cultural distance to the rest of the world increases the domestic bias. The 
individualism of Hofstede et al. (2010) is not significant in either specification (columns (3)-(5) 
of Table 5), and the sign on the institutional collectivism of the GLOBE study changes 
depending on the patriotism proxy used (columns (6) and (7) of Table 5). Similarly, cultural 
distance computed based on the cultural dimensions of Hofstede et al. (2010) is either not 
significant or bears the counterintuitive negative sign (columns (4) and (5) of Table 5). By 
contrast, the cultural distance based on the cultural dimensions of the GLOBE study appears to 
have a positive effect on the preference for domestic bonds (columns (6) and (7) of Table 5). 
Table 6 reports the estimation results for the sample that excludes the major financial centers 
(Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, Singapore, Switzerland, UK and US). In columns (1)-(4), different 
combinations of the cultural variables of Hofstede et al. (2010) and the GLOBE study with the 
WVS and ISSP patriotism are considered. The coefficients on both the WVS and ISSP 
patriotism are positive and highly significant in the regression specifications that involve the 
cultural variables of Hofstede et al. (2010). The uncertainty avoidance scores of Hofstede et al. 
(2010) and the GLOBE study exert the predicted positive impact on domestic bond bias only in 
conjunction with the WVS patriotism (columns (1) and (3) of Table 6). The GLOBE 
institutional collectivism is significant in only one regression specification and its impact on 
domestic bias is negative (column (3) of Table 6). Similarly, the positive impact of the 
individualism of Hofstede et al. (2010) on domestic bond bias is significant in only one 
regression specification (column (2) of Table 6). The coefficient estimate on cultural distance 
has the expected positive and significant sign in two of four regression specifications (columns 
(1) and (3) of Table 6). 
As an additional robustness check, domestic bias as dependent variable is replaced by the actual 
portfolio weight allocated to domestic debt securities according to Eq. (6). Table 7 summarizes 
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the estimation results. There is strong evidence that patriotic loyalty shifts investor preferences 
towards domestic assets and, as a consequence, increases domestic bias. The patriotism variable 
is positive and highly significant in three of four regression specifications (columns (1)-(3) of 
Table 7). The economic significance is substantial: One point increase in the WVS (ISSP) 
patriotism measured on a scale from one to four (five) raises the portfolio share allocated to 
domestic debt securities by 13.1 to 15.6 percent. Similarly, uncertainty avoidance significantly 
increases the portfolio shares allocated to domestic debt securities in three of four regression 
specifications (columns (1), (3) and (4) of Table 7). Moreover, there is evidence that 
individualism (institutional collectivism) impacts positively (negatively) the preference for 
domestic bonds. The evidence on cultural distance is less robust: Only cultural distance 
computed based on the GLOBE cultural dimensions increases significantly the investment in 
domestic bonds (columns (3) and (4) of Table 7). 
All in all, culture and patriotism significantly contribute to the explanation of the domestic bias 
phenomenon: The Wald tests reject the null hypothesis of the restricted model (a model without 
cultural variables and patriotism) at one percent significance level in practically all regression 
specifications. Nonetheless, only for patriotism, there is robust evidence of a significant impact 
on domestic bias: Patriotic loyalty shifts investor preferences towards domestic assets and, as a 
consequence, increases domestic bias. The economic importance of patriotism is substantial. 
One point increase in the WVS (ISSP) patriotism measured on a scale from one to four (five) 
triggers an increase in domestic bias by up to 0.8 and raises the actual portfolio fraction invested 
in domestic debt securities by up to 15.6 percent. 
For the cultural distance and individual cultural variables (individualism and uncertainty 
avoidance), the estimation results are less robust. There is some evidence that cultural distance 
to the rest of the world increases the overinvestment in domestic debt securities, but this 
evidence is not very robust across different regression specifications: The impact of the home 
country’s cultural distance to the rest of the world on the domestic bias is positive and 
significant only in half of all regression specifications. The individualism of Hofstede et al. 
(2010) is significant only in three regression specifications where its impact on domestic bond 
bias is positive: The positive impact is not consistent with the prediction that high 
overconfidence associated with this cultural dimension reduces the overinvestment in domestic 
bonds. Albeit highly significant in most regression specifications, the direction of the impact of 
institutional collectivism is rather unstable across different regression specifications. The 
coefficient estimates on uncertainty avoidance are significant in a majority of regression 
specifications, but have the expected positive sign only in seven out of 13 specifications. It is 
the GLOBE uncertainty avoidance for which there is most robust evidence of a positive and 
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significant relationship between domestic bias and uncertainty avoidance. By contrast, although 
the uncertainty avoidance scores of the GLOBE study and Hofstede et al. (2010) are closely 
interrelated,6 there is only weak evidence of a comparable positive impact of the uncertainty 
avoidance of Hofstede et al. (2010).  
The economic significance of the GLOBE cultural variables is more pronounced compared to 
the cultural variables of Hofstede et al. (2010). For instance, one point increase in the GLOBE 
collectivism (the opposite of individualism that is measured on a scale from one to seven) 
results in a decline of domestic bias by 0.42-1.22 and reduces the actual portfolio weight of 
domestic bonds by 9.8-16 percent. By contrast, a ten point increase in the individualism of 
Hofstede et al. (2010) that is measured on a scale from one to 120 increases domestic bias only 
by 0.12 and the portfolio weights allocated to domestic bonds by 1.33-1.73 percent.7 
Furthermore, whereas one point increase in the uncertainty avoidance score of the GLOBE 
study raises the portfolio fraction assigned to domestic debt securities by 7.4-22.4 percent and 
triggers an increase in domestic bias by 0.29-0.74, a ten point increase in the uncertainty 
avoidance of Hofstede et al. (2010) increases in the portfolio share assigned to domestic bonds 
by merely 2.1 percent and the domestic bias by only 0.07. 
For individualism and uncertainty avoidance, the results for regressions where the actual 
portfolio weight assigned to domestic bonds is used as dependent variable (Table 7) are more 
robust than in regression specifications with the domestic bias as dependent variable (Tables 5 
and 6). One potential explanation is that cultural characteristics of the home country impact not 
only the actual portfolio allocations to domestic bonds,ݓ௜, but also the development and, thus, 
the capitalization of the domestic bond market, ݓ௜כ. As a consequence, the impact of individual 
cultural characteristics on the domestic bias that measures the discrepancy between ݓ௜ and ݓ௜כ 
may be less pronounced. The instability of the coefficient estimates on individualism, 
uncertainty avoidance and cultural distance in the regression specifications related to domestic 
bias may also be due to collinearity. Correlations between patriotism and cultural variables and 
of cultural variables with each other are considerable (Table 3). However, a harmful 
multicollinearity can be ruled out since neither variance inflation factor for the variables of 
interest (culture and patriotism) exceeds the critical value of five in any regression specification. 
The impact of control variables is mostly consistent with expectations. Financial centers and 
countries with more developed bond markets attract more foreign investment due to higher 
liquidity and lower transaction costs and are characterized by lower domestic bias levels and 
                                                          
6 The correlation between the uncertainty avoidance scores of Hofstede et al. (2010) and the GLOBE 
study amounts to 0.34 for the sample countries. 
7 The impact of the individualism scores of Hofstede et al. (2010) on domestic bond bias is substantially 
lower compared to the results of Anderson et al. (2011) for domestic equity bias. 
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lower portfolio weights assigned to domestic bonds. A more efficient protection of creditor 
rights enhances the attractiveness of domestic bonds and induces higher domestic bias levels. 
Average geographical distance to the rest of the world that is associated with lower familiarity 
and a higher degree of information asymmetries exerts a positive and highly significant impact 
on domestic bias and portfolio shares allocated to domestic debt securities.  
4.2 Foreign Bias 
Table 8 reports the estimation results based on Eq. (7) for different combinations of cultural 
variables of the GLOBE study and Hofstede et al. (2010) with the WVS and ISSP patriotism 
scores. In columns (1)-(4), the WVS patriotism and cultural variables of Hofstede et al. (2010) 
are included one by one. In column (5), the ISSP patriotism is combined with the cultural 
variables of Hofstede et al. (2010), whereas in columns (6) and (7) the cultural variables of the 
GLOBE study are included together with the WVS and ISSP patriotism proxies, respectively. 
Patriotism and uncertainty avoidance exert a negative and highly significant impact on the 
foreign bias in bonds in practically all regression specifications.8 Individualism of Hofstede et 
al. (2010) is significant only in conjunction with the ISSP patriotism (column (5) of Table 8), 
whereas the sign on the institutional collectivism of the GLOBE study changes with the 
patriotism proxy used (columns (6) and (7) of Table 8). Cultural distance computed based on the 
cultural dimensions of Hofstede et al. (2010) positively and significantly impacts the foreign 
bias, whereas the GLOBE cultural distance is not significant. The positive sign on the cultural 
distance does not support the hypothesis that cultural distance is associated with more 
pronounced information asymmetries and that lower familiarity deters the foreign investment.  
As one of the robustness checks, financial centers are excluded from the total sample (Table 9). 
Patriotism is significant in two of four regression specifications (columns (3) and (4) of Table 
9). The negative sign is consistent with the prediction that patriotic loyalty decreases the cross-
border investment. The results on individualism are the same as for the total sample. The 
coefficient estimate on the cultural distance based on the cultural dimensions of Hofstede et al. 
(2010) is significant, but it bears a counterintuitive positive sign that is not consistent with the 
hypothesis that cultural distance between investing and destination countries impedes the cross-
border investment. 
                                                          
8 Columns (4) and (6) of Table 2 show that the coefficient estimate on the WVS patriotism looses more 
than half of its value when the GLOBE cultural variables instead of the cultural variables of Hofstede et 
al. (2010) are used. One potential explanation may be collinearity: Table 3 shows that cultural distance, 
uncertainty avoidance and institutional collectivism of the GLOBE study are more strongly correlated 
with the WVS patriotism than the corresponding cultural variables of Hofstede et al. (2010). 
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As a next step, Eq. (7) is estimated for a simple cross-section with dependent and explanatory 
variables averaged over the sample period from 2004 to 2012. The results are reported in Table 
10. In this case, the WVS and ISSP patriotism proxies are significant only in conjunction with 
the cultural variables of Hofstede et al. (2010). Coefficients on uncertainty avoidance are 
negative and significant in all four regression specifications, whereas cultural distance is not 
significant in any regression specification. The evidence on individualism/ institutional 
collectivism remains vague: The sign on institutional collectivism depends on the patriotism 
proxy used, and the individualism of Hofstede et al. (2010) is negative and significant only 
combined with the ISSP patriotism.  
As the last robustness check, Table 11 reports the estimation results for Eq. (8) that substitutes 
the foreign bias by the actual debt portfolio weights allocated to different host countries. For 
patriotism and uncertainty avoidance, there is very robust evidence that foreign investment is 
lower for investing countries characterized by high patriotism and high uncertainty avoidance 
(columns (1)-(4) of Table 11). Only when the individualism of Hofstede et al. (2010) is 
considered, there is evidence that more individualistic societies are less likely to invest in 
foreign bonds (columns (1) and (2) of Table 11). The coefficient estimates on cultural distance 
are not significant in either regression specification. 
All in all, although the null hypothesis of a restricted model (a model without cultural variables 
and patriotism) is rejected at one percent significance level in all regression specifications, there 
is robust evidence of a significant and unambiguous impact on the foreign bias only for 
patriotism and uncertainty avoidance. The coefficient estimates on patriotism are negative and 
significant in most specifications. One point increase in the WVS patriotism, measured on a 
scale from one to four, is associated with a decline in foreign bias by up to 1.02 and lowers the 
actual portfolio fraction of foreign debt securities by up to 0.54 percent. Compared to the 
foreign bias, the impact of patriotism on the actual portfolio weights allocated to foreign debt 
securities appears to be rather modest. Nonetheless, it is substantial since the actual portfolio 
weights assigned to foreign debt securities amount on average to merely 0.66 percent. Given 
that lower values of the foreign bias are associated with a higher degree of underinvestment in 
foreign securities, the results confirm the hypothesis that patriotism induces a bias against 
foreign assets.  
Similarly, there is strong evidence that uncertainty avoidance negatively impacts the foreign 
bias, i.e. countries characterized by high levels of uncertainty avoidance display a higher degree 
of underinvestment in foreign debt securities. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 show that adding 
uncertainty avoidance to the regression specification with patriotism increases the adjusted R-
squared from 0.37 to 0.45. The coefficient estimates on uncertainty avoidance are negative and 
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highly significant in most specifications and the economic impact is considerable. Increase by 
one point in the uncertainty avoidance of the GLOBE study that is measured on a scale from 
one to seven reduces the foreign bias by 0.79-1.37 points and the actual portfolio fraction of 
foreign debt securities by up to 0.46 percent. The economic significance of the uncertainty 
avoidance of Hofstede et al. (2010) is lower. A ten percent increase in the uncertainty avoidance 
score of Hofstede et al. (2010) that is measured on a scale from one to 120 triggers a decline in 
the foreign bias by up to 0.38 points and reduces the actual portfolio weights of foreign debt 
securities by 0.1 percent.9 The magnitude of the uncertainty avoidance coefficient in the foreign 
bond bias regressions is comparable to the impact of uncertainty avoidance on the foreign equity 
bias as documented by Beugeldijk and Frijns (2010). 
There is no evidence that cultural distance between host and home countries reduces 
international diversification (foreign bias). Coefficient estimates on cultural distance are, if 
significant, positive. However, the positive sign is not compatible with the hypothesis that 
cultural distance increases underinvestment in foreign debt securities. In a majority of 
specifications, cultural distance is not significant. The absence of a significant relationship 
between cultural distance and foreign bond investment is not consistent with the evidence of 
Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) for syndicated loan markets. Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) document 
that cultural differences between the countries of the syndicate’s lead bank and the borrower 
determine the contract terms. One possible explanation may be that cultural differences are 
closely related to information asymmetries and that syndicated loans require a more intense 
interaction between contracting parties such that information asymmetries are more important 
compared to the issuance and purchase of standardized debt securities.   
There is only weak and contradictory evidence that individualism/institutional collectivism 
impact significantly the foreign investment in bond markets. If significant, the negative sign on 
individualism of Hofstede et al. (2010) is consistent with the evidence of Odean (1998) and 
Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) who argue that overconfidence (the behavioral underpinning of 
individualism) results in more concentrated and less diversified portfolios. With respect to the 
institutional collectivism of the GLOBE study, there is a great instability in the sign of the 
coefficient estimate: It is negative (positive) in conjunction with the WVS (ISSP) patriotism. 
One reason may be collinearity. However, neither variance inflation factor for the variables of 
interest (culture and patriotism) exceeds the critical value of five in any regression specification 
such that a harmful collinearity should not be a problem. Moreover, the correlations of the 
institutional collectivism with the WVS and ISSP patriotism are not very high (Panel B of Table 
3). The instability of coefficient estimates may be due to different samples used: Since the ISSP 
                                                          
9 Given that the sample mean of the actual portfolio weight amounts to 0.66 percent, the economic impact 
of uncertainty avoidance on the actual portfolio weight is still considerable. 
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patriotism proxy is not available for all sample countries, the samples related to the ISSP 
patriotism exclude a wide range of countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Greece, Hong 
Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore, Thailand and Turkey.  
The coefficient estimates on control variables are consistent with the existing literature on the 
foreign bias. High domestic bias levels are associated with lower foreign bias levels, i.e. lower 
international diversification. Financial centers display higher foreign bias levels, i.e. they are 
less likely to underweight foreign debt securities in their portfolios. Bond market development 
of the host country fosters international diversification and increases foreign bias in bonds. 
Developed countries are more diversified and attract more foreign investment. Traditional 
proxies for familiarity and information asymmetries such as common legal origin, common 
language as well as geographical distance are also highly significant and have the expected 
impact on the foreign bias in bonds. Common EMU membership that is associated with deep 
financial integration and abolition of the real exchange rate risk increases foreign bias and, thus, 
has a positive effect on the diversification across foreign markets.  
5 Conclusion 
Although ideology per se cannot be considered as the only determinant of behavior, values that 
prevail in a society are important guidelines that influence behavioral patterns and investment 
decisions. Patriotism induces a strong preference for domestic goods, uncertainty avoidance is 
associated with intolerance of ambiguity that enhances the perceived risk of foreign securities, 
and individualism is linked to overconfidence. This paper contributes to the existing literature 
on international asset allocation by exploring the impact of culture and patriotism on home bias 
in bonds. It relies on four internationally recognized cross-cultural research projects, "Cultures 
and Organizations" of Hofstede et al. (2010), the GLOBE study of House et al. (2004), the 
International Social Survey Program and the World Values Survey. Two different aspects of 
home bias are considered: the domestic bias that measures the degree of overinvestment in 
domestic debt securities and the foreign bias that reflects the cross-country under- or 
overinvestment in foreign debt securities relative to the market capitalization weights.  
With respect to individualism, the existing studies on home bias in equities arrive at 
contradictory results: Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) show that individualism increases 
allocations to foreign stocks, whereas Anderson et al. (2011) find a negative impact of 
individualism on international diversification (foreign bias) in equity markets. This study finds 
that more individualistic societies display a stronger preference for domestic debt securities and 
underinvest more in foreign debt markets, but this evidence is not very robust. Solnik and Zuo 
(2014) show that relative optimism, which is closely related to overconfidence, is less stable in 
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bond than in equity markets. If overconfidence is strongly affected by time-series variation, the 
time-invariant individualism of Hofstede et al. (2010) and collectivism of the GLOBE study 
may not fully capture the overconfidence dimension. This may partially explain the absence of 
any robust impact of individualism and institutional collectivism on home bias in bonds.  
Contrary to the studies on equity bias (Beugelsdijk and Frijns 2010; Anderson et al. 2011), this 
study does not find any robust evidence that cultural distance increases either overinvestment in 
domestic debt securities or underinvestment in foreign debt securities. One potential explanation 
may be the role of information asymmetries. Perceived information advantages are one of the 
behavioral underpinnings of cultural distance that is associated with higher information 
asymmetries and a lower degree of familiarity. Compared to equities, debt securities are less 
subject to the unknown and unfamiliar: The expected payoff of a fixed claim is less sensitive to 
information asymmetries than the expected payoff of a residual claim and the relevant 
information on sovereign bonds that make up a substantial part of the total bond market is 
available and easy to follow. The results on cultural distance are consistent with the evidence of 
Portes et al. (2001) who show that the impact of geographical distance on the US residents’ 
foreign transactions is higher for equities than for bonds. 
This study confirms the importance of patriotism as one of the explanations of the cross-country 
variation in the domestic and foreign bond bias levels. There is strong evidence that societies 
characterized by higher patriotism display higher domestic bias levels and a stronger bias 
against foreign debt securities. Moreover, contrary to Aggarwal et al. (2012) who do not find 
any significant impact of uncertainty avoidance on cross-border debt investment, this study 
finds strong evidence that uncertainty avoidance reduces investment in foreign debt securities 
resulting in a lower foreign bias, i.e. lower international diversification. The impact of 
uncertainty avoidance on the foreign bias in bonds is comparable to its impact on the foreign 
equity bias as documented by Beugelsdijk and Frjins (2010). However, the evidence of a 
positive relationship between uncertainty avoidance and domestic bond bias is less convincing: 
The expected positive and significant impact of uncertainty avoidance on the overinvestment in 
domestic bonds is observed only in slightly more than half of all regression specifications.  
All in all, the obtained evidence that patriotism and uncertainty avoidance substantially reduce 
international diversification in debt portfolios is an indication that behavioral and cultural 
aspects improve the understanding of the home bias puzzle. Future research may focus on the 
impact of cultural and behavioral aspects on the home bias in debt portfolios held by different 
investor types. In particular, the differentiation between the home bias levels exhibited by 
private and institutional investors may provide additional insight on whether culture and 
patriotism impact the debt portfolio allocations of different investor types in the same way. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Domestic and foreign bond bias levels 
Home 
Country 
Actual 
Portfolio 
Weight of 
Domestic 
Bonds 
(2012) 
Optimal 
Portfolio 
Weight of 
Domestic 
Bonds 
(2012) 
Domestic 
Bias  
(2012) 
Average 
Foreign 
Bias 
ܨܤܫܣܵ௜ 
(2012) 
Actual 
Portfolio 
Weight of 
Domestic 
Bonds  
(2004-
2012 
average) 
Optimal 
Portfolio 
Weight of 
Domestic 
Bonds 
(2004-
2012 
average) 
Domestic 
Bias  
(2004- 
2012 
average) 
Average 
Foreign 
Bias 
ܨܤܫܣܵ௜ 
(2004-
2012 
average) 
Argentina 93.68 0.15 6.41 -4.12 93.56 0.19 6.23 -5.93 
Australia 86.66 2.11 3.71 -2.81 87.70 1.69 3.96 -3.03 
Austria 55.79 0.67 4.42 -1.22 51.92 0.75 4.23 -1.16 
Belgium 49.07 0.77 4.15 -2.45 42.62 0.78 4.00 -2.17 
Brazil 99.56 2.4 3.72 -8.64 99.30 1.83 4.03 -7.90 
Canada 88.68 2.2 3.70 -3.28 89.39 2.03 3.79 -3.34 
Chile 82.03 0.18 6.14 -3.21 80.87 0.14 6.38 -3.16 
Colombia 91.31 0.13 6.56 -4.48 89.75 0.10 6.80 -4.30 
Czech Republic 87.04 0.14 6.41 -3.69 83.30 0.12 6.54 -2.76 
Denmark 77.33 0.96 4.39 -4.78 80.25 1.03 4.36 -1.79 
Finland 35.91 0.3 4.80 -1.82 41.35 0.27 5.02 -0.98 
France 59.07 4.75 2.52 -1.78 54.66 4.67 2.46 -1.58 
Germany 56.20 4.57 2.51 -1.16 63.41 5.73 2.41 -1.38 
Greece 56.84 0.25 5.43 -3.68 58.68 0.44 4.88 -2.64 
Hong Kong 37.01 0.27 4.91 -2.01 27.57 0.17 5.08 -1.30 
Hungary 97.31 0.12 6.68 -4.86 97.59 0.13 6.61 -5.07 
India 99.99 0.67 5.00 -10.24 99.41 0.20 6.71 -7.33 
Indonesia 90.66 0.18 6.20 -5.77 95.98 0.14 6.55 -4.73 
Ireland 30.32 1.26 3.18 -0.99 31.71 1.42 3.11 -1.08 
Israel 86.92 0.24 5.87 -4.67 85.07 0.21 6.01 -4.13 
Italy 83.47 4.08 3.02 -2.77 76.59 4.22 2.90 -2.55 
Japan 83.32 15.3 1.70 -2.63 84.12 15.56 1.69 -2.54 
Malaysia 94.24 0.4 5.47 -4.52 96.59 0.30 5.78 -4.13 
Mexico 90.09 0.71 4.84 -5.67 94.60 0.58 5.10 -5.62 
Netherlands 43.59 2.4 2.90 -0.70 45.19 2.51 2.89 -0.91 
Norway 41.98 0.56 4.32 -0.74 41.11 0.44 4.54 -1.25 
Philippines 92.94 0.14 6.53 -2.81 92.06 0.12 6.66 -2.40 
Poland 98.04 0.33 5.68 -4.38 99.71 0.29 5.82 -3.32 
Portugal 70.96 0.41 5.14 -1.51 47.07 0.37 4.81 -1.27 
Russia 90.07 0.46 5.27 -4.91 83.80 0.30 5.72 -4.03 
Singapore 38.27 0.31 4.82 -1.27 37.22 0.23 5.08 -0.70 
South Africa 93.71 0.26 5.87 -4.10 95.70 0.22 6.06 -5.38 
Spain 85.33 2.54 3.51 -2.20 67.60 2.35 3.35 -1.94 
Sweden 69.87 0.81 4.45 -2.44 68.47 0.77 4.48 -2.42 
Switzerland 18.31 0.24 4.32 -0.93 20.17 0.26 4.35 -1.12 
Thailand 92.58 0.31 5.69 -3.66 94.62 0.23 6.06 -3.80 
Turkey 99.47 0.31 5.76 -6.35 99.17 0.32 5.73 -6.28 
UK 62.92 6.06 2.34 -1.03 61.14 5.93 2.34 -0.98 
US 92.34 36.89 0.92 -2.42 93.56 39.17 0.87 -2.62 
Note: The actual portfolio weights show the debt portfolio shares that 39 sample countries allocate to domestic debt 
securities. Optimal portfolio weights are computed as the fraction of the market capitalization of domestic bonds in 
the world debt market capitalization. Actual and optimal portfolio weights are reported in percentages. Domestic bias 
is computed as the log ratio of the actual portfolio weight to the optimal portfolio weight (Eq. (1)). The average 
foreign bias ܨܤܫܣܵ௜ is the equally weighted average foreign bias that a country ݅ displays towards the sample host 
countries (Eq. (3)). Foreign bias is the log ratio of the actual portfolio weight allocated by the investors domiciled in 
home country ݅ to the country ݆’s debt securities to the weight of debt securities issued by residents in country ݆ in the 
world debt market portfolio (Eq. (2)). 39 host countries are considered: countries listed in the first column of Table 1 
as well as Peru. Columns 2-5 report the data as of 2012. Columns 6-9 report data averaged over the 2004-2012 
sample period. The data are averaged over the 2008-2012 period for Chile, over the 2009-2012 period for Ireland and 
over the 2005-2012 period for Malaysia and Mexico. 
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Table 2: Culture and patriotism 
 
 
Hofstede 
average 
cultural 
distance 
GLOBE 
average 
cultural 
distance 
WVS 
patriotism 
ISSP 
patriotism 
Hofstede 
uncertainty 
avoidance 
GLOBE 
uncertainty 
avoidance 
Hofstede 
individualism 
GLOBE 
institutional 
collectivism 
Argentina 0.90 1.12 3.54 n/a 86 4.66 46 5.32 
Australia 1.24 0.97 3.63 4.41 51 3.98 90 4.40 
Austria 1.40 1.23 n/a 4.08 70 3.66 55 4.73 
Belgium 1.04 n/a n/a n/a 94 n/a 75 n/a 
Brazil 0.85 1.23 3.17 n/a 76 4.99 38 5.62 
Canada 1.11 1.28 3.66 4.39 48 3.75 80 4.17 
Chile 1.04 n/a 3.51 4.19 86 n/a 23 n/a 
Colombia 1.01 n/a 3.88 n/a 80 4.98 13 5.38 
Czech 
Republic 0.87 n/a 3.18 3.89 74 n/a 58 n/a 
Denmark 1.72 1.30 n/a 4.24 23 3.82 74 4.19 
Finland 1.16 1.23 3.49 4.28 59 3.85 63 4.11 
France 0.98 1.03 3.14 3.75 86 4.26 71 4.86 
Germany 1.06 1.12 2.85 3.43 65 3.63 67 4.75 
Greece 1.12 1.09 n/a n/a 112 5.09 35 5.40 
Hong Kong 1.08 1.18 2.62 n/a 29 4.63 25 4.43 
Hungary 1.36 0.88 3.39 4.31 82 4.66 80 4.50 
India 1.01 0.97 3.68 n/a 40 4.73 48 4.71 
Indonesia 1.05 1.10 3.38 n/a 48 5.23 14 5.18 
Ireland 1.31 0.96 n/a 4.15 35 4.02 70 4.59 
Israel 1.19 0.92 3.44 4.22 81 4.38 54 4.27 
Italy 1.08 0.93 3.30 n/a 75 4.47 76 5.13 
Japan 1.32 1.41 2.80 4.30 92 4.33 46 3.99 
Malaysia 1.31 1.08 3.64 n/a 36 4.88 26 4.87 
Mexico 1.05 1.00 3.77 n/a 82 5.26 30 4.92 
Netherlands 1.39 1.37 3.07 3.26 53 3.24 80 4.55 
Norway 1.45 n/a 3.42 3.84 50 n/a 69 n/a 
Philippines 1.18 1.15 3.84 4.28 44 5.14 32 4.78 
Poland 1.01 0.95 3.58 4.03 93 4.71 60 4.22 
Portugal 1.15 1.08 n/a 4.10 104 4.43 27 5.30 
Russia 1.19 1.13 3.25 3.93 95 5.07 39 3.89 
Singapore 1.33 1.06 3.48 n/a 8 4.22 20 4.55 
South Africa 1.00 0.99 3.73 4.10 49 4.76 65 4.34 
Spain 0.89 0.99 3.53 3.85 86 4.76 51 5.20 
Sweden 1.65 1.25 3.29 3.73 29 3.60 71 3.94 
Switzerland 1.13 1.19 3.20 3.31 58 3.50 68 4.50 
Thailand 0.97 1.20 3.84 n/a 64 5.61 20 5.10 
Turkey 0.88 1.14 3.77 n/a 85 4.67 37 5.26 
UK 1.37 1.00 3.44 4.01 35 4.11 89 4.31 
US 1.25 1.03 3.58 4.56 46 4.00 91 4.17 
Note: The table reports patriotism and cultural variables scores for 39 sample countries. Patriotism proxies are 
derived based on the World Values Survey (WVS) and International Social Survey Program (ISSP). Cultural 
variables are based on the cultural dimensions of Hofstede et al. (2010) and the GLOBE study of House et al. (2004). 
The Hofstede’s scores for Belgium, Switzerland and South Africa are drawn from Hofstede’s website: 
http://www.geert-Hofstede.com. Cultural distance is computed based on Eq. (4). The average cultural distance is 
calculated as the average cultural distance to the "rest of the world". The "rest of the world" is approximated by 75 
countries for cultural distance based on Hofstede et al. (2010) and 58 countries for cultural distance computed based 
on the GLOBE study of House et al. (2004). 
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Table 3: Correlations between domestic bias, cultural dimensions and patriotism 
Panel A: Domestic bias, patriotism and cultural variables of Hofstede et al. (2010) 
 Domestic 
bias 
WVS 
patriotism 
ISSP 
patriotism 
Cultural 
distance 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
Individualism 
Domestic bias 1      
WVS patriotism 0.45*** 1     
ISSP patriotism 0.12 0.58*** 1    
Cultural distance -0.27 -0.16 0.07 1   
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
0.08 -0.02 -0.03 -0.50*** 1  
Individualism -0.59*** -0.17 -0.03 0.36** -0.16 1 
 
Panel B: Domestic bias, patriotism and GLOBE cultural variables 
 Domestic bias WVS 
patriotism 
ISSP 
patriotism 
Cultural 
distance 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
Collectivism 
Domestic bias 1      
WVS patriotism 0.45*** 1     
ISSP patriotism 0.12 0.58*** 1    
Cultural 
distance 
-0.20 -0.38* -0.23 1   
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
0.58*** 0.42** 0.38* 0.32* 1  
Collectivism 0.23 0.25 -0.26 -0.15 0.50*** 1 
 
Note: The table shows correlations between the 2004-2012 average domestic bias, the WVS and ISSP patriotism 
measures and cultural value variables. The higher the domestic bias is, the higher is the overinvestment in 
domestic debt securities. Panel A contains cultural variables (average cultural distance to the rest of the world, 
uncertainty avoidance and individualism) of Hofstede et al. (2010). Panel B is based on cultural variables 
(average cultural distance to the rest of the world, uncertainty avoidance and collectivism) of the GLOBE study 
of House et al. (2004).  
***, **, * denote significance at one, five and ten percent, respectively. 
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Table 4: Control variables for domestic and foreign bias regressions 
Banking system stability is approximated by domestic credit provided by the banking sector (% of GDP). 
Source: World Development Indicators of the World Bank. 
Bond market development is approximated by the ratio of international debt to the total international debt 
outstanding. Source: Bank for International Settlement. 
Capital account liberalization is an index of capital restrictions based on the IMF data compiled by the 
Economic Freedom of the World Annual Report. A higher score corresponds to a lower level of capital 
controls. Source: Gwartney et al. (2013). 
Common border is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the host and home countries have a 
common border. For the regressions related to the domestic bias, it is computed as the number of 
countries that have a common border with the home country. Source: CEPII.  
Common language is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the host and home countries share 
the same official language. For domestic bias regressions, it is computed as the number of countries that 
have a common language with the home country.  Source: CEPII. 
Common legal origin is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the host and home countries have 
the same legal origin. With respect to different legal origins, I distinguish between common law, French 
civil law, Scandinavian civil law and German civil law countries. Source: La Porta et al. (1997, 2008). 
Creditor protection is the strength of legal rights index of the World Bank that assigns higher numbers to 
countries with more efficient collateral and bankruptcy laws. Source: World Development Indicators of 
the World Bank. 
GDP per capita annual growth rate correlation is a proxy for international diversification benefits and is 
based on the correlation between the annual growth rate of the GDP per capita of the home country with 
the annual growth rate of the world GDP per capita over the 1990-2012 period. Source: World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank. 
Geographical distance is the natural logarithm of the distance in kilometers between the capitals of the 
host and home countries. For domestic bias regressions, the average distance is computed as the natural 
logarithm of the average distance between the capitals of the home country and 224 potential host 
countries. Source: CEPII. 
To account for the diversification potential, I compute return correlations between the JP Morgan GBI 1-
10 years total return indices denominated in USD on a monthly basis over the 2000-2013 period. BofA 
Merrill Lynch 1-10 years total return indices (denominated in USD) are used for Norway and 
Switzerland. Source: Datastream. 
Local currency sovereign credit ratings are converted to numerical values with higher numbers reflecting 
a higher sovereign stability. Positive and negative credit outlooks are also accounted for. Source: Fitch 
Ratings. 
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83 
Table 6: Determinants of domestic bond bias (robustness check I) 
Domestic bias as dependent variable, financial centers are excluded 
 Hofstede & WVS 
(1) 
Hofstede & ISSP 
(2) 
GLOBE & WVS 
(3) 
GLOBE & ISSP 
(4) 
Patriotism 0.104*** (0.09) 1.576*** (0.37) -0.014 (0.25) 0.134 (0.28) 
Uncertainty avoidance 0.007* (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.740*** (0.11) -0.231 (0.15) 
Individualism/collectivism -0.004 (0.00) 0.012*** (0.00) -1.217*** (0.10) -0.094 (0.14) 
Cultural distance 1.456*** (0.38) -0.458* (0.27) 0.990*** (0.34) 0.030 (0.34) 
Bond market development -31.08*** (3.68) -46.45*** (4.53) -15.65*** (1.83) -22.06*** (3.83) 
Capital account liberalization -0.095*** (0.03) 0.068*** (0.03) -0.019 (0.02) -0.036 (0.02) 
Creditor protection 0.053* (0.03) 0.054 (0.04) 0.171*** (0.02) 0.073*** (0.03) 
Banking system stability -0.002 (0.00) -0.004*** (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) -0.003** (0.00) 
GDP per capita growth 0.031 (0.67) -0.300 (0.60) -0.595 (0.47) 0.025 (0.57) 
Sovereign stability -0.103*** (0.02) -0.192*** (0.03) -0.216*** (0.02) -0.257*** (0.04) 
EMU/NAFTA/MERCOSUR/ASEAN 
membership 0.018 (0.13) 0.292* (0.17) -0.143 (0.12) -0.504*** (0.11) 
Common border -0.073** (0.03) -0.026 (0.02) -0.112*** (0.02) -0.071*** (0.02) 
Common language 0.006*** (0.00) <0.001 (0.00) <0.001 (0.00) <0.001 (0.00) 
Geographical distance 1.998*** (0.36) 1.338** (0.62) 1.535*** (0.26) 1.170** (0.49) 
GDP growth correlation with world GDP -1.204*** (0.35) 0.221 (0.54) -1.005*** (0.23) 0.881** (0.37) 
No. of observations 231 161 207 146 
R-squared adjusted 0.8285 0.9050 0.9188 0.9230 
Wald test for a restricted model (p-value) 4.32 (0.000) 8.24 (0.000) 54.31 (0.000) 1.15 (0.337) 
Note: The dependent variable is domestic bias as defined in Eq. (1). Financial centers (Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, Singapore, 
Switzerland, UK and US) are excluded. The estimation is based on Eq. (5) for annual data over the 2004-2012 period. The 
constant and dummy variables that account for time effects are included, but not reported. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
 ***, **, * denote significance at one, five and ten percent, respectively. 
84 
 
Table 7: Determinants of domestic bond bias (robustness check II) 
Actual portfolio weight (in %) as dependent variable, total sample 
 
 Hofstede & WVS 
(1) 
Hofstede & ISSP 
(2) 
GLOBE & WVS 
(3) 
GLOBE & ISSP 
(4) 
         
Patriotism 15.566*** (3.49) 13.085*** (4.44) 15.305*** (3.48) 2.515 (3.35) 
Uncertainty avoidance 0.205*** (0.05) -0.072 (0.09) 7.378*** (1.85) 22.40*** (3.05) 
Individualism/collectivism 0.133** (0.06) 0.173** (0.09) -9.833*** (3.1) -16.00*** (3.42) 
Cultural distance 10.108 (7.20) -4.304 (9.14) 34.35*** (6.94) 46.122*** (4.62) 
         
Optimal porfolio weight (in %) 1.065*** (0.17) 1.324*** (0.26) 0.997*** (0.17) 0.884*** (0.23) 
Financial center dummy -28.31*** (4.81) -36.79*** (5.48) -32.89*** (2.92) -29.68*** (4.30) 
Bond market development 24.61 (32.78) 15.44 (35.41) 80.01*** (21.4) 45.92** (21.61) 
Capital account liberalization -0.920* (0.48) -0.331 (0.55) -0.069 (0.37) -0.990** (0.42) 
Creditor protection 2.300*** (0.58) 4.019*** (0.86) 1.731*** (0.52) 4.460*** (0.70) 
Banking system stability 0.085*** (0.02) 0.046* (0.02) 0.151*** (0.02) 0.088*** (0.02) 
GDP per capita growth -4.74 (10.65) 12.81 (14.15) 2.47 (11.26) -12.48 (11.57) 
Sovereign stability -3.943*** (0.35) -4.608*** (0.44) -4.437*** (0.31) -1.142** (0.53) 
EMU/NAFTA/MERCOSUR/ASEAN 
membership -2.583 (2.37) -6.270 (4.96) -3.726 (2.79) 4.199 (4.73) 
Common border 0.850* (0.44) 0.624 (0.58) 0.830* (0.44) 0.684 (0.44) 
Common language -0.026 (0.04) -0.082* (0.05) -0.130*** (0.03) 0.131*** (0.03) 
Geographical distance 25.914*** (4.85) 23.532** (9.02) 29.761*** (5.38) 21.134** (8.11) 
GDP growth correlation with world GDP 4.505 (6.53) -9.094 (13.71) 14.941*** (4.75) -50.85*** (8.96) 
         
No. of observations 276  201  252  186  
R-squared adjusted 0.7568  0.6960  0.8216  0.8735  
Wald test for a restricted model (p-value) 17.28 (0.000) 4.02 (0.004) 49.10 (0.000) 51.28 (0.000) 
Note: The dependent variable is the actual portfolio weight assigned to the domestic bonds. The sample encompasses investing 
countries shown in Table 1. The estimation is based on Eq. (6) for annual data over the 2004-2012 period. The constant and 
dummy variables that account for time effects are included, but not reported. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
***, **, * denote significance at one, five and ten percent, respectively. 
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Table 9: Determinants of foreign bond bias (robustness check I) 
Financial centers are excluded. 
     
  Hofstede & WVS 
(1) 
Hofstede & ISSP 
(2) 
GLOBE & WVS 
(3) 
GLOBE & ISSP 
(4) 
         
Patriotism -0.082 (0.14) 0.077 (0.09) -1.053*** (0.16) -0.510*** (0.10) 
Uncertainty avoidance -0.038*** (0.00) -0.027*** (0.00) -0.790*** (0.09) -1.135*** (0.08) 
Individualism/collectivism 0.001 (0.00) -0.031*** (0.00) -1.048*** (0.10) 0.451*** (0.10) 
Cultural distance 0.246*** (0.07) 0.196*** (0.06) -0.059 (0.05) 0.115 (0.08) 
         
Domestic bias -0.348*** (0.03) -0.578*** (0.03) -0.412*** (0.04) -0.339*** (0.04) 
Host country-specific control variables        
Capital account liberalization -0.072*** (0.01) -0.067*** (0.01) -0.077*** (0.02) -0.090*** (0.01) 
Creditor protection 0.088*** (0.02) 0.057*** (0.02) 0.091*** (0.02) 0.044*** (0.02) 
Banking system stability -0.004*** (0.00) -0.006*** (0.00) -0.005*** (0.00) -0.006*** (0.00) 
GDP per capita growth 1.860*** (0.44) 0.959** (0.39) 1.440*** (0.49) 0.958** (0.42) 
Sovereign stability -0.005 (0.01) 0.013 (0.01) 0.019 (0.01) 0.019 (0.01) 
Developed dummy  0.455*** (0.12) 0.586*** (0.10) 0.459*** (0.14) 0.615*** (0.12) 
Bond market development 9.352*** (0.72) 10.061*** (0.60) 9.727*** (0.78) 11.893*** (0.67) 
Control variables for diversification, familiarity and information asymmetries 
Return correlation 0.421** (0.18) 0.418*** (0.16) -0.527*** (0.20) -0.287 (0.18) 
Common legal origin 0.231*** (0.07) 0.408*** (0.06) 0.404*** (0.08) 0.339*** (0.07) 
Common border -0.465*** (0.11) -0.276*** (0.09) -0.301*** (0.11) -0.494*** (0.10) 
Common language 0.664*** (0.10) 0.141* (0.09) 0.612*** (0.12) 0.475*** (0.11) 
Geographical distance -1.037*** (0.04) -0.688*** (0.04) -0.736*** (0.05) -0.699*** (0.04) 
Common EMU membership 1.635*** (0.08) 1.513*** (0.07) 2.300*** (0.09) 1.916*** (0.07) 
Common NAFTA membership -0.565 (0.41) -0.336 (0.24) -0.928** (0.40) -0.677** (0.33) 
Common MERCOSUR 
membership 0.311 (0.33) 1.858*** (0.28) 0.265 (0.39)   
Common ASEAN membership 0.909*** (0.17) 1.569*** (0.28) 2.623*** (0.18) 3.414*** (0.29) 
         
No. of observations 6065  4845  5002  3849  
R-squared adjusted 0.4305  0.4879  0.4442  0.5284  
Wald test for a restricted model 
(p-value) 223.03 (0.000) 96.14 (0.000) 136.12 (0.000) 63.09 (0.000) 
         
 
Note: The dependent variable is the foreign bias as defined in Eq. (2). The analysis is based on Eq. (7) for the 
annual data over the 2004-2012 period. Financial centers (Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, Singapore, Switzerland, UK 
and US) are excluded. The constant and dummy variables that are used to account for time fixed effects are 
included, but not reported. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
The dummy variable that accounts for the common MERCOSUR membership of the host and home countries is 
omitted in column (4) since there are no common members of the MERCOSUR in the sample that combines the 
GLOBE cultural variables and the ISSP patriotism. 
***, **, * denote significance at one, five and ten percent, respectively. 
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Table 10: Determinants of foreign bond bias (robustness check II) 
Cross-section with averaged data 
     
  Hofstede & WVS 
(1) 
Hofstede & ISSP 
(2) 
GLOBE & WVS 
(3) 
GLOBE & ISSP 
(4) 
         
Patriotism -0.957*** (0.20) -0.618*** (0.14) -0.349 (0.22) 0.159 (0.17) 
Uncertainty avoidance -0.031*** (0.00) -0.024*** (0.00) -1.038*** (0.14) -1.368*** (0.15) 
Individualism/collectivism -0.001 (0.00) -0.026*** (0.00) -0.721*** (0.18) 0.825*** (0.19) 
Cultural distance 0.341 (0.24) 0.240 (0.14) -0.017 (0.08) 0.145 (0.15) 
         
Domestic bias -0.265*** (0.06) -0.488*** (0.05) -0.093* (0.05) -0.202*** (0.05) 
Financial center dummy 1.103*** (0.18) 0.389*** (0.14) 1.379*** (0.17) 0.902*** (0.13) 
Host country-specific control variables       
Capital account liberalization -0.094*** (0.03) -0.097*** (0.03) -0.113*** (0.04) -0.145*** (0.03) 
Creditor protection 0.077** (0.04) 0.064* (0.03) 0.062 (0.04) 0.057 (0.04) 
Banking system stability -0.003** (0.00) -0.004*** (0.00) -0.004** (0.00) -0.005*** (0.00) 
GDP per capita growth 6.043*** (2.01) 2.330 (1.87) 4.393** (2.17) 2.067 (1.83) 
Sovereign stability -0.013 (0.03) 0.002 (0.03) 0.013 (0.03) 0.009 (0.03) 
Developed dummy  0.747*** (0.26) 0.630*** (0.22) 0.724** (0.33) 0.785*** (0.27) 
Bond market development 11.758*** (1.68) 11.291*** (1.34) 11.634*** (1.78) 11.979*** (1.44) 
Control variables for diversification, familiarity and information asymmetries 
Return correlation 0.705** (0.34) 0.732** (0.31) -0.232 (0.37) -0.004 (0.33) 
Common legal origin 0.160 (0.14) 0.347*** (0.13) 0.311* (0.16) 0.331** (0.14) 
Common border -0.381 (0.28) -0.232 (0.26) -0.454* (0.25) -0.507** (0.23) 
Common language 0.873*** (0.21) 0.476*** (0.17) 0.946*** (0.23) 0.652*** (0.20) 
Geographical distance -0.915*** (0.08) -0.661*** (0.07) -0.715*** (0.10) -0.716*** (0.08) 
Common EMU membership 1.946*** (0.21) 1.446*** (0.17) 2.641*** (0.20) 1.715*** (0.17) 
Common NAFTA membership -0.307 (0.70) 0.027 (0.44) -0.237 (0.67) -0.263 (0.56) 
Common MERCOSUR 
membership 0.403 (0.79) 1.982*** (0.47) 0.007 (0.99)   
Common ASEAN membership 1.513*** (0.41) 2.213*** (0.67) 2.945*** (0.38) 3.655*** (0.70) 
         
Constant 9.075*** (1.13) 9.306*** (1.15) 10.830*** (1.32) 4.535*** (1.42) 
         
No. of observations 1136  907  911  707  
R-squared adjusted 0.4877  0.5284  0.5058  0.5968  
Wald test for a restricted model 
(p-value) 44.78 (0.000) 19.69 (0.000) 27.84 (0.000) 30.63 (0.000) 
 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the foreign bias as defined in Eq. (2). The analysis is based on Eq. (7) for the data 
averaged over the 2004-2012 period. The dummy variable that accounts for the common MERCOSUR 
membership of the host and home countries is omitted in column (4) since there are no common members of the 
MERCOSUR in the sample that combines the GLOBE cultural variables and the ISSP patriotism. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
 ***, **, * denote significance at one, five and ten percent, respectively.
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Table 11: Determinants of foreign bond bias (robustness check III) 
Actual portfolio weight (in %) as dependent variable, total sample. 
     
  Hofstede & WVS 
(1) 
Hofstede & ISSP 
(2) 
GLOBE & WVS 
(3) 
GLOBE & ISSP 
(4) 
         
Patriotism -0.542*** (0.05) -0.370*** (0.04) -0.519*** (0.06) -0.164** (0.06) 
Uncertainty avoidance -0.010*** (0.00) -0.009*** (0.00) -0.376*** (0.04) -0.455*** (0.05) 
Individualism/collectivism -0.003*** (0.00) -0.008*** (0.00) 0.024 (0.05) 0.024 (0.08) 
Cultural distance -0.009 (0.04) -0.052 (0.04) 0.003 (0.02) -0.028 (0.02) 
         
Optimal portfolio weight (in %) 0.106*** (0.01) 0.099*** (0.01) 0.098*** (0.01) 0.092*** (0.01) 
Domestic bias -0.009 (0.01) -0.040*** (0.01) -0.112*** (0.01) 0.043*** (0.01) 
Financial center dummy 0.482*** (0.06) 0.441*** (0.05) 0.745*** (0.07) 0.630*** (0.06) 
Host country-specific control variables       
Capital account liberalization -0.019*** (0.00) -0.029*** (0.01) -0.020*** (0.01) -0.034*** (0.01) 
Creditor protection -0.007 (0.01) -0.032*** (0.01) -0.016** (0.01) -0.042*** (0.01) 
Banking system stability -0.002*** (0.00) -0.002*** (0.00) -0.002*** (0.00) -0.002*** (0.00) 
GDP per capita growth 0.460*** (0.18) 0.523*** (0.20) 0.342* (0.19) 0.492** (0.21) 
Sovereign stability -0.004 (0.00) 0.004 (0.00) 0.007 (0.00) 0.015*** (0.00) 
Developed dummy  0.129*** (0.03) 0.191*** (0.03) 0.084** (0.04) 0.127*** (0.04) 
Bond market development 11.385*** (0.66) 15.953*** (0.79) 11.211*** (0.70) 15.896*** (0.78) 
Control variables for diversification, familiarity and information asymmetries 
Return correlation 1.3351*** (0.12) 0.812*** (0.10) 1.211*** (0.13) 0.707*** (0.10) 
Common legal origin 0.068** (0.03) 0.137*** (0.04) 0.125*** (0.03) 0.235*** (0.04) 
Common border 0.282*** (0.09) 0.639*** (0.11) 0.526*** (0.11) 0.935*** (0.13) 
Common language 0.317*** (0.06) 0.099 (0.06) 0.460*** (0.06) 0.189*** (0.07) 
Geographical distance -0.075*** (0.02) -0.055*** (0.02) 0.000 (0.02) -0.067*** (0.02) 
Common EMU membership 0.724*** (0.07) 0.879*** (0.06) 0.973*** (0.08) 1.073*** (0.08) 
Common NAFTA membership 0.286 (0.30) 0.123 (0.22) 0.355 (0.30) -0.184 (0.23) 
Common MERCOSUR 
membership -0.167*** (0.06) -0.377*** (0.13) -0.386*** (0.08)   
Common ASEAN membership -0.008 (0.06) 0.168** (0.08) 0.406*** (0.06) 0.880*** (0.07) 
         
No. of observations 7677  6286  6456  5143  
R-squared adjusted 0.4922  0.5278  0.5015  0.5543  
Wald test for a restricted model 
(p-value) 64.45 (0.000) 59.01 (0.000) 73.75 (0.000) 50.24 (0.000) 
         
Note: The dependent variable is the actual portfolio weight assigned to foreign debt securities. The analysis is based on Eq. 
(8) for the annual data over the 2004-2012 period. The constant and dummy variables for individual years are included, but 
not reported. The dummy variable that accounts for the common MERCOSUR membership of the host and home countries 
is omitted in column (4) since there are no common members of the MERCOSUR in the sample that combines the GLOBE 
cultural variables and the ISSP patriotism. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 ***, **, * denote significance at one, five and ten percent, respectively. 
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Abstract 
This study analyzes the relationship between financial activity and price returns in twelve 
agricultural futures markets. Contrary to the existing research that relies on the Granger 
causality in mean, it explores causal effects from the perspective of conditional quantiles. The 
comparison of Granger causality in mean and Granger causality at individual quantiles shows 
that the absence of Granger causality in mean does not necessarily rule out the existence of 
Granger-causal effects from positions of speculators and index traders to price returns in a wide 
range of commodity markets such as cocoa, coffee, corn, sugar and SRW wheat.  
JEL classifications: C22, D84, G13, Q02 
Keywords: futures markets, Granger causality, quantile regressions, commodity index traders, 
speculation. 
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1 Introduction 
The 2005-2008 and 2010-2011 commodity price booms have raised concerns about the role of 
speculators and index traders in the observed price bubbles and calls for tighter regulation and 
closer supervision of speculative activity in futures markets have become more urgent (Masters, 
2008). The US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) proposed to re-consider and 
establish limits on speculative positions in 28 physical commodity futures and option contracts 
in November 2013. The initiated public roundtable for the Aggregation and Position Limits 
Proposals ended in July 2014, and the discussion on the scope of and the exemption from the 
position limits still goes on. The aim is to contain excessive speculation in the agricultural, 
energy and metals futures markets.  
There are several ways through which speculators may affect the price mechanism. A price 
impact may manifest itself if traders possess private information about commodity fundamentals 
and/or in case of market illiquidity (Gilbert and Pfuderer, 2014). Singleton (2014) argues that, in 
the "differences of opinion" equilibrium, heterogeneous beliefs about the publicly available 
information may induce a price impact even in the absence of private information. Based on the 
"differences of opinion" equilibrium, Fische et al. (2014) show that money managers benefit 
from strong price signals such that their trading decisions have the potential to affect prices.  
Granger causality tests play an important role in the empirical research on the role of 
speculators and index traders in the price mechanism of agricultural spot and futures markets. 
Many empirical studies do not find any evidence of a significant Granger-causal relationship 
between financial activity and futures returns (e.g. Irwin et al., 2009; Brunetti et al., 2011a). In 
this respect, Gilbert and Pfuderer (2014) argue that trading activity should be impounded in 
prices instantaneously such that causation from past variables that are lagged by one week is 
unlikely to be detected in liquid markets. Another possible explanation for the failure to detect 
any Granger causality from trader positions to returns may be the non-linearity of the causal 
relationship in different parts of the distribution of the dependent variable (Chuang et al., 2009). 
For instance, in the context of stock markets, several studies have demonstrated that, in spite of 
the rejection of the Granger causality in mean, a significant Granger-causal relationship between 
trading volume and returns exists at individual quantiles (Chuang et al., 2009; Gebka and 
Wohar, 2013). 
An analysis of Granger-causal effects at individual quantiles may be a valuable complement to 
the Granger causality in mean. First, the price impact of a single trader category may manifest 
itself particularly strongly only in periods of rising or falling prices (i.e. at high or low quantiles 
of the return distribution). Second, if the impact of positions on subsequent returns is positive at 
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some quantiles and negative at other quantiles, the positive and negative causal effects may 
cancel each other out in the least squares estimations such that no Granger causality in mean is 
detected (Chuang et al., 2009). Non-linearity of the causal relationship between trader positions 
and returns is not an implausible assumption. For instance, non-informational trades that are 
recognized and corrected by market participants should be associated with negative Granger 
causality from past growth in net long positions to returns. Positive Granger causality may arise 
in case of trades that trigger positive feedback trading of other market participants and, thus, 
result in price effects that persist for a week or longer. 
This study focuses on three major trader categories that are associated with the financialization 
of commodity futures markets: commodity index investors, money managers and other 
reportables. Commodity index investors are institutional investors who gain a long-side 
exposure to commodity futures contracts in order to replicate returns on tradable commodity 
futures indices. The impact of index traders on the price mechanism in agricultural futures 
markets has been extensively examined. This paper complements the existing research on this 
trader category by exploring the Granger-causal relationships at individual quantiles of the 
return distribution. Moreover, this study splits the extensively examined category of non-
commercial traders into money managers and other reportables and separately analyzes the 
potential price impact of these two trader categories that are commonly associated with 
speculation. Money managers are e.g. hedge funds that trade in commodity derivatives and are 
regarded as professional speculators. Other reportables are traders that are large enough to 
report, but cannot be classified as money managers.  
My results suggest that there is evidence of Granger causality in mean from positions to returns 
for money managers in coffee and live cattle markets, for other reportables in the lean hogs 
market and for index traders in the cocoa market. Furthermore, quantile regressions indicate that 
significant Granger-causal relationships from trader positions to returns exist at individual 
quantiles for money managers in cocoa, feeder cattle, sugar and SRW wheat markets, for other 
reportables in cocoa, coffee, soybeans and SRW wheat markets and for index traders in the corn 
market. Positions of money managers seem to lead prices in sugar and SRW wheat markets in 
the upper part of the return distribution, whereas the forecasting power in the cocoa market 
manifests itself only in periods associated with negative returns. Granger causality from 
positions of other reportables to returns can be observed at low quantiles of the return 
distribution (i.e. in periods of falling prices) in the cocoa market and at high quantiles (i.e. in 
periods of rising prices) in coffee, soybeans and SRW wheat markets. The negative Granger-
causal effects of index traders’ positions on corn returns manifest themselves predominantly at 
low quantiles of the return distribution. 
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This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing literature. In Section 3, 
different trader categories are presented. Section 4 outlines the data and the empirical model. 
The results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Literature Review 
The financialization of agricultural futures markets and especially the increasing participation of 
index traders have attracted considerable attention of researchers. One strand of literature 
primarily focuses on speculative bubbles (e.g. Gilbert, 2010b; Guttierrez, 2013; Etienne et al., 
2014; Adämmer and Bohl, 2015). For instance, Guttierez (2013) detects explosive price 
behavior for CBOT wheat, corn, rice and, to a lesser extent, soybeans futures prices in the 2007-
2008 period. Etienne et al. (2014) show that, albeit subject to multiple periods of price 
explosiveness, the life time of most bubbles does not typically exceed ten days and that the 
sensitivity of agricultural futures markets to bubbles was lower during the 2006-2011 compared 
to the 1971-1976 period. Adämmer and Bohl (2015) detect speculative bubbles in the wheat 
market over the 2003-2013 period. Several studies examine the linkages and spillovers between 
agricultural and financial markets, inter alia during the recent financial crisis (e.g. Silvennoinen 
and Thorp, 2013; Mensi et al., 2013; Gao and Liu, 2014). Another strand of literature explores 
the impact of speculators and index traders on the price mechanism: spot and/or futures returns 
(e.g. Stoll and Whaley, 2011; Hamilton and Wu, 2014; Sanders and Irwin, 2011), realized and 
conditional volatilities (e.g. Brunetti et al., 2011a; Bohl and Stephan, 2013; Manera et al., 2012) 
as well as spreads between nearby and first deferred contracts (e.g. Stoll and Whaley, 2011; 
Aulerich et al., 2013; Mou, 2011; Brunetti and Reiffen, 2014).  
Granger causality tests play a very important role in the empirical research on the price impact 
of financialization in agricultural markets.1 Compared to the traditional time-series Granger 
causality, cross-sectional and panel Granger causality tests have gained increasing importance. 
In this respect, Sanders and Irwin (2010) and Irwin and Sanders (2012a) argue that traditional 
time-series Granger causality tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of non-causality due to a 
high volatility of price returns. Thus, they analyze the relationship between futures returns and 
lagged (and contemporaneous) growth in positions of index traders by means of cross-sectional 
tests using Fama-MacBeth regressions. Both studies find no evidence that index investment is 
linked to high commodity futures prices. Sanders and Irwin (2011), Capelle-Blancard and 
Coulibaly (2011) and Aulerich et al. (2013) also question the statistical power of the time-series 
Granger causality for individual commodity markets and use the SUR (seemingly unrelated 
                                                          
1 See the reviews of literature by Irwin and Sanders (2011), Irwin and Sanders (2012b), Irwin (2013) and 
Grosche (2014). 
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regression) framework. Sanders and Irwin (2011) find no evidence of any significant Granger-
causal effects of index traders’ positions on futures returns. Capelle-Blancard and Coulibaly 
(2011) confirm a marginally significant, positive effect of net long positions of index traders on 
futures returns only for live cattle. Aulerich et al. (2013) find a significant, but negative Granger 
causality from positions of index traders to returns only in markets for lean hogs, feeder cattle 
and KCBOT wheat.  
While the Granger causality framework relates past trader positions to subsequent returns or 
volatilities, a comparatively small number of studies explore the contemporaneous relationship 
between speculative activity and returns and/or volatilities (e.g. Manera et al., 2013). However, 
a significant contemporaneous relation cannot be interpreted as a causal effect of positions on 
prices due to the endogeneity bias. Gilbert and Pfuderer (2014) avoid the endogeneity bias by 
using the instrumental variables approach. They focus on major grains and oilseed markets and 
find evidence of a significant and positive contemporaneous impact of index traders in the 
soybeans, soybean oil and KCBOT wheat markets. Tang and Xiong (2012) also move away 
from the traditional Granger causality approach. They compare return correlations between 
indexed (i.e. included in most important commodity indices S&P GSCI and DJ-UBSCI) and 
off-index non-energy commodities with oil that has a dominant weight in both S&P GSCI and 
DJ-UBSCI and surmise that any significant increase of return correlations with oil of indexed 
vis-à-vis non-indexed commodities may be interpreted as an influence of index investors on the 
price mechanism (Tang and Xiong, 2012). 
There exist several extensive reviews of literature on the impact of commodity index traders on 
the price mechanism in agricultural futures markets (e.g. Irwin and Sanders, 2011; Irwin and 
Sanders, 2012b; Irwin, 2013; Grosche, 2014). These studies conclude that most empirical 
evidence is inconsistent with the allegations that passive index investment may have affected 
the price mechanism in agricultural spot and futures markets (e.g. Irwin and Sanders, 2012b; 
Irwin, 2013). If there is any significant evidence of Granger causality, it is predominantly 
outside the grains markets (Grosche, 2014). However, the recent evidence of Gilbert and 
Pfuderer (2014) suggests that reliance on the Granger causality approach may underestimate the 
causal relationship between the trading activity of index traders and commodity returns.  
Compared to index traders, speculators have received less attention in the empirical research on 
agricultural futures markets. Irwin et al. (2009) review several studies on the impact of non-
commercial traders on prices and conclude that there is little evidence that non-commercial 
traders’ positions forecast subsequent futures returns in agricultural markets. By contrast, based 
on rolling Granger causality tests, Cooke and Robles (2009) show that past positions of non-
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commercial traders have influenced spot prices in corn, rice, soybeans and wheat markets 
during the 2006-2008 period. For corn, Brunetti et al. (2011a) use daily data on individual trader 
positions from the Large Trader Reporting System (LTRS) of the CFTC: merchants, 
manufacturers, floor brokers, swap dealers and hedge funds. Granger causality from positions to 
corn returns can be confirmed only for merchants, but not for hedge funds (Brunetti et al, 
2011a). Borin and Di Nino (2012) explore the impact of money managers’ long and short 
positions on futures returns and volatilities in eleven agricultural futures markets. They find a 
significant impact of past returns on positions of money managers, but evidence of Granger 
causality from positions to returns is detected only in feeder and live cattle markets (Borin and 
Di Nino, 2012). Mayer (2012) incorporates the positions of both index traders and money 
managers in the analysis of Granger causality in wheat, maize, soybeans and soybean oil 
markets and detects Granger causality from positions to returns only in the maize market for 
money managers and in the soybeans and soybean oil markets for index traders. Brunetti et al. 
(2011b) explore the potential asymmetries in bull and bear market regimes and argue that hedge 
funds have the potential to predict price reversals in the corn futures market. 
Although Granger causality was initially developed for conditional distributions, the existing 
studies on speculation test only Granger causality in mean. However, the absence of Granger 
causality in mean does not rule out Granger causality in other parts of the distribution. Quantile 
regression methodology has gained increasing recognition in empirical economics. This 
approach offers a valuable alternative to the traditional estimation of the conditional mean and 
has been rapidly expanding in various areas such as labor economics (e.g. Buchinsky, 1998a; 
Garcia et al., 2001), microeconomics (e.g. Goel and Ram, 2004), macroeconomics and 
monetary policy (e.g. Lee and Yang, 2012) as well as corporate finance (Fattouh et al., 2005). 
Kuralbayeva and Malone (2012) use quantile regressions in the context of commodity markets 
in order to explore the impact of global financial and commodity-specific factors on extreme 
commodity spot price movements.  
Quantile regressions are typically applied in the context of cross-sections (e.g. in order to 
account for the different size of households and firms). However, Chuang et al. (2009) and 
Gebka and Wohar (2013) extend the quantile regression approach to the time-series dimension. 
Both studies focus on Granger-causal relationships from trading volume to stock returns and 
show that, despite the rejection of Granger causality in mean, significant Granger-causal effects 
exist at individual quantiles. The failure to confirm the Granger causality in mean is assumed to 
be due to the non-linearity in the causal relationship between trading volume and returns 
(Chuang et al., 2009). Gebka and Wohar (2013) predict a negative impact of trading volume on 
subsequent returns at low quantiles of the return distribution and a positive impact at high 
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quantiles. Tests of Granger causality in mean may fail to unveil significant Granger-causal 
effects if positive and negative causal effects cancel each other out in the least-squares 
estimations (Chuang et al., 2009). 
This study complements the growing literature on speculation in agricultural futures markets in 
two ways. First, this paper uses quantile regressions that address asymmetries and allow the 
identification of non-linear relationships between speculative activity and commodity futures 
returns. Second, in addition to commodity index traders, it explores the potential price impact of 
the two trader categories that are commonly associated with speculation: money managers and 
other reportables. Whereas there is comparatively little coverage of the trading activity of 
money managers and their potential price impact, other reportables have received even less 
attention in the empirical literature on speculation in agricultural futures markets.  
3 Index Traders, Money Managers and Other Reportables  
Traditionally, the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission had distinguished two general 
motivations for trading in futures markets: hedging price risks in the underlying cash markets 
and speculation on future price movements (CFTC, 2006). According to these two general 
purposes of trading, the Commitments of Traders (COT) report identifies two categories of 
reportable traders: commercial and non-commercial traders (CFTC, 2006). Commercial traders 
are engaged in a commercial activity with commodities, bear the price risk in the spot market 
and enter futures markets in order to hedge the originating price risk in the underlying cash 
market (CFTC, 2008). Non-commercial traders take a view on future price movements, do not 
have any exposure to a physical commodity, offset their positions in futures contracts at 
expiration and do not make or accept a physical delivery of a commodity (CFTC, 2008).  
The Disaggregated Commitments of Traders (DCOT) report enhances the disclosure on 
commercial and non-commercial traders. It disaggregates the commercial traders into producers 
/merchants/processors/users and swap dealers, whereas the non-commercial trader category is 
broken up into managed money and other reportables (CFTC, 2009). Managed money (or 
money managers) are registered commodity trading advisors, registered commodity pool 
operators and unregistered funds that are supposed to be engaged in organized futures trading on 
clients’ behalf (CFTC, 2009). Commodity pool operators are e.g. hedge funds that trade in 
commodity derivatives, whereas hedge funds that provide advice to their clients register with 
the CFTC as commodity trading advisors (CFTC, 2009). Mayer (2009) argues that returns and 
not diversification considerations are the major drivers of the activity of money managers in 
futures markets.  
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Contrary to money managers, other reportables are not professional speculators. Currently, the 
CFTC disclosure provides little insight into this trader category. Other reportables are defined as 
"a wide array of other non-commercial (speculative) traders" (CFTC, 2009). They are large 
enough to report, but cannot be classified as money managers (CFTC, 2009). According to 
Irwin and Sanders (2012a), the "other reportables" category includes individual speculative 
traders, market makers and firms managing their own assets. In case of crude oil, Tokic (2012) 
assumes that other reportables are large proprietary funds and hypothesizes that these traders are 
fundamentally oriented investors who act as arbitrageurs.  
With the rising participation of commodity index investors whose intentions cannot be classified 
as either hedging or speculation, the CFTC has started to publish data on positions of 
commodity index investors within the CIT supplement to the COT report (CFTC, 2006). 
Whereas money managers "represent the more traditional class of speculative traders" (Irwin 
and Sanders, 2012a) and other reportables are defined as "a wide array of other non-commercial 
(speculative) traders" (CFTC, 2009), index traders cannot be classified as speculators in the 
sense of the CFTC definition of non-commercials as "traders who use futures markets to 
speculate on the future direction of price movements and are generally sensitive to fundamental 
and/or technical factors that might influence prices" (CFTC, 2006). For commodity index 
investors, the general purpose of entering futures markets is to gain a long-side exposure to a 
broad index of commodities as an asset class (CFTC, 2006). Commodity index investors are e.g. 
managed funds, pension funds and other institutional investors who invest in commodities as an 
asset class in a passively managed way (CFTC, 2006). They do not seek to profit from price 
movements, but obtain a long-side exposure to a wide range of commodities for diversification 
purposes (CFTC, 2006). Typically, index investors track a broad index of commodities such as 
S&P GSCI and DJ-UBSCI (CFTC, 2008).  
Table 1 shows the average net long positions (i.e. the differences between long and short 
positions scaled by open interest) of index traders, money managers and other reportables over 
the 2006-2013 period. Compared to index traders and money managers, net long positions of 
other reportables account for a lower fraction of open interest. However, low net long positions 
should not be equated with economic insignificance. The other reportables’ average long (short) 
positions scaled by open interest range from 0.04 (0.03) in cocoa (cocoa and sugar) markets to 
0.10 (0.11) in corn (feeder cattle) markets. 
There are considerable differences between index traders and traditional speculators (money 
managers and other reportables). First, whereas money managers and other reportables typically 
enter both short and long positions, commodity index investment implies long positions in 
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commodity futures contracts.2 Second, diversification as well as hedging inflation and the USD 
depreciation risks are recognized as major drivers of commodity index investors who track a 
broad index of commodities and, thus, gain a long-side exposure to several commodity futures 
simultaneously (Irwin and Sanders, 2011; Tokic, 2011; Brunetti and Reiffen, 2014). By 
contrast, money managers typically attach less importance to diversification motives and trade 
based on their expectations about individual commodity price movements in order to earn 
profits (Mayer, 2009). Third, investment horizons differ. Index investors gain a long-side 
commodity exposure over a longer period of time by rolling their futures positions from the 
expiring to the next deferred contract (Gilbert, 2010a). Money managers typically have short-
term investment horizons (Mayer, 2009). Finally, whereas money managers and other 
reportables pursue active investment strategies by trading based on their expectations about 
future price movements, the CFTC designates the investment strategy of index traders as 
"passive" in the sense that it implies only a limited discretion with regard to trading decisions: 
Index traders track a broad index of commodities which is calculated and adjusted based on 
transparent mathematical rules (CFTC, 2006). However, Gilbert and Pfuderer (2014) argue that 
index investors may equally pursue an active investment strategy if they trade based on their 
expectations about returns on commodities as an asset class relative to returns on other assets 
such as bonds or equities.  
In order to gain some insight in the investment strategies of the three trader categories, I 
investigate the role of individual commodity returns for investment decisions of index traders, 
money managers and other reportables. Changes in net long positions are regressed on changes 
in net long positions lagged by one week, last week’s returns and last week’s changes in control 
variables (spot oil price, MSCI emerging markets index, USD index spot rate and the S&P 500 
index). Table 2 summarizes the estimation results.  
In general, returns do not forecast changes in net long positions of index traders (Table 2). This 
evidence confirms the notion that index traders do not take a view on individual commodities 
and that return considerations may be of minor importance. The slope coefficient on the lagged 
return variable is significant only in markets for cotton, lean hogs and sugar. In these markets, it 
takes a negative sign that is consistent with the idea that index traders strive to maintain fixed 
shares of commodities in their portfolios. For other reportables, negative feedback trading is 
                                                          
2 However, only a comparatively small number of investors replicate a commodity index by establishing 
long positions in the respective commodities, whereas entering into OTC swap contracts or purchasing 
exchange-traded funds or exchange-traded notes is more common (Irwin and Sanders, 2011). Larger 
index traders obtain commodity exposure through swap dealers (CFTC, 2008). Independently of the 
investment vehicle chosen, the consequence is an increase in long futures positions in the commodities 
that make up the index (CFTC, 2008).  
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more pronounced: The coefficient estimate on lagged returns is negative and significant in half 
of the examined markets: cocoa, coffee, live cattle, soybean oil, SRW wheat and sugar. 
Negative feedback trading is consistent with "buy low, sell high" strategies.  
By contrast, the growth in net long positions of money managers is positively and significantly 
related to past returns in all twelve commodity futures markets. Tokic (2012) argues that money 
managers may act as rational speculators who purposely enter long futures positions in order to 
artificially create a trend of rising prices that triggers positive feedback trading of other less 
informed investors. Then, a rational speculator sells his initial position at profit (Tokic, 2012). 
However, an artificial trend creation is arguable given a highly significant and positive Granger 
causality from past returns to changes in money managers’ positions in all examined 
agricultural futures markets. The significant coefficient estimate on the lagged return variable 
may be an indication that return considerations are an important determinant of the investment 
strategy of money managers.  
4 Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data  
Prices 
The relationship between speculative activity and subsequent futures returns is examined for 
twelve agricultural markets: CBOT Corn, CBOT Soybeans, CBOT Soybean Oil, CBOT SRW 
Wheat (formerly listed as CBOT Wheat), ICE Futures U.S. Cotton No. 2, CBOT HRW Wheat 
(formerly listed as KCBT Hard Winter Wheat), CME Feeder Cattle, CME Lean Hogs, CME 
Live Cattle, ICE Futures U.S. Cocoa, ICE Futures U.S. Coffee C and ICE Futures U.S. Sugar 
No. 11. Data on futures prices are collected from Datastream. A continuous series of futures 
prices is created by adopting the rolling procedure of Brunetti and Buyuksahin (2009). The 
switch to the second-nearby contract occurs when the open interest of the second-nearby 
contract is higher than the open interest of the first-nearby contract. Carchano and Pardo (2009) 
argue that this rolling strategy reflects the assumption that traders prefer liquidity peaks to 
switch between contracts. This rolling procedure allows the calculation of weekly returns ܴ௧ 
that are computed as ܴ௧ ൌ ሺ
௉೟
௉೟షభ
ሻ. If switching between contracts takes place at time ݐǁ, the 
return ܴ௧ሚ is calculated based on the prices of the second-nearby contract ܲ௧ሚ and ܲ௧ሚିଵ. Table 1 
summarizes the descriptive statistics for returns in each of the twelve futures markets over the 
period from January 10, 2006 to December 31, 2013. 
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Positions 
As a proxy for the activity of different trader categories, net long positions (difference between 
long and short Tuesday’s closing positions) that are scaled by open interest are used. Scaling by 
open interest reflects the idea that it is the relative, not the absolute magnitude of position 
holdings that impacts prices. The weekly positions are drawn from the DCOT report for money 
managers and other reportables, whereas the data on positions of index traders are taken from 
the CIT supplement to the COT report. The reports that are published each Friday disclose the 
Tuesday’s closing positions of traders. For money managers and other reportables, the position 
data is available from June 13, 2006 onwards. For index traders, the disclosure goes back to 
January 3, 2006.  
Whereas Borin and Di Nino (2012) differentiate between long and short positions, this study 
focuses on net long positions that are computed as the difference between long and short 
positions scaled by open interest. Although both long and short positions may induce a price 
impact, these effects may cancel each other out once net long positions are considered. After all, 
the speculative position limits of the CFTC are determined by net long (or net short) positions.  
To ensure stationarity, weekly changes in net long positions scaled by open interest are used. 
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for net long positions of each trader category and 
the unit root tests for the corresponding weekly changes. The null hypothesis of a unit root 
cannot be rejected for net long positions of money managers in the live cattle market, other 
reportables in the corn market and index traders in the live cattle, lean hogs and soybeans 
markets (Table 1). In these cases, I test for cointegration between net long positions and price 
levels.3 The Johansen test does not support the hypothesis that prices and positions are 
cointegrated. 
As far as positions of index traders are concerned, one important limitation of relying on the 
CIT supplement to the COT report is that it includes all positions of a trader who is classified as 
an index trader, not just those that reflect the exposure to a broad commodity index (CFTC, 
2006). Thus, our data potentially overestimate the net long positions that are related to 
commodity index investment.  
Another important limitation is that the data availability does not allow a clear-cut distinction of 
index traders from money managers and other reportables. Although the swap dealers are 
typically used as a proxy for index investors (Brunetti and Buyuksahin, 2009; Buyuksahin and 
                                                          
3 The price index is constructed based on weekly returns ܴ௧ obtained from the rollover as ௧ܲ ൌ ௧ܲିଵ כ ݁ோ೟ 
with ଴ܲ ൌ ͳͲͲ on January 3, 2006. 
100 
 
Harris, 2011; Sanders and Irwin, 2011), the data on positions of index traders in the 
supplemental report are drawn both from both the commercial and non-commercial categories 
of the COT report. Commercial traders (e.g. some swap dealers) who enter futures markets to 
hedge OTC transactions related to commodity indices are classified as index traders (CFTC, 
2006). Non-commercial traders such as managed and pension funds that gain exposure to 
commodities as an asset class in an unleveraged and passively-managed way are also considered 
as index traders (CFTC, 2006, 2009). Thus, it cannot be excluded that some money managers 
and other reportables, which constitute the two subgroups of the non-commercial trader 
category, are classified as index traders. In this case, their positions are reflected in net long 
positions of index traders, while positions of some index traders are also included in the DCOT 
disclosure on money managers and other reportables.  
However, the predominantly negative correlations of changes in money managers’ and other 
reportables’ net long positions with changes in net long positions of index traders indicate little 
relationship between these trader categories (Table 3). Positive correlations are observed in 
markets for feeder cattle and HRW wheat (for money managers) as well as for cotton and live 
cattle (for other reportables). These correlations are relatively moderate: The highest positive 
correlation is observed in the HRW wheat market (0.17). In general, Table 3 shows that changes 
in net long positions of the three trader types (money managers, other reportables and index 
traders) are predominantly negatively correlated with each other. Hence, it may not be very 
inaccurate to treat index traders, money managers and other reportables as completely separate 
trader groups. Neverheless, it should be borne in mind that there is a potential overlapping 
between index traders and money managers as well as index traders and other reportables. 
4.2 Methodology  
Granger Causality 
According to Granger (1980), the speculative activity ܵ௧ିଵ Granger-causes the subsequent 
return ܴ௧ if: 
ܨோ೟ሺߟȁሺ࣬ǡ ࣭ሻ௧ିଵሻ ് ܨோ೟ሺߟȁ࣬௧ିଵሻ for any ߟ א Թ                                                                       (1). 
ܨோ೟ is the conditional distribution of the random variable ܴ௧. ሺ࣬ǡ ࣭ሻ௧ିଵ encompasses all 
information generated by random variables ܴ and ܵ up to time ݐ െ ͳ, whereas ࣬௧ିଵ denotes the 
information set that is associated with the random variable ܴ and excludes information 
associated with the speculative activity ܵ. Granger causality implies that information related to 
the trading activity ܵ௧ିଵ is crucial to the conditional distribution of the random return variable 
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ܴ௧ (Granger, 1980). In other words, the trading activity ܵ௧ିଵ is useful in forecasting the future 
return ܴ௧ (Hamilton, 1994). Eq. (1) describes the initial concept of Granger causality, namely 
the Granger causality in distribution (Chuang et al., 2009). 
Given the computational difficulties related to estimating and testing conditional distributions, 
the corresponding necessary condition for Granger causality, the so called Granger causality in 
mean, is preferred by the existing studies (Chuang et al., 2009): 
Εሾሺܴ௧ȁሺ࣬ǡ ࣭ሻ௧ିଵሻሿ ് Εሺܴ௧ȁ࣬௧ିଵሻ                                                                                              (2). 
Ƞሺܴ௧ȁ࣠ሻ denotes the mean of the conditional distribution ܨோ೟ሺǤ ȁ࣠ሻ. Granger causality in mean 
(as specified by Eq. (2)) is tested based on the following ADL model: 
ܴ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ σ ߛ௜ כ ܴ௧ି௜௡௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௝ כ ܵ௧ି௝ ൅ ߝ௧௠௝ୀଵ                                                                         (3). 
Eq. (3) relates the return ܴ௧ to its own lagged values ܴ௧ିଵǡǥ ǡ ܴ௧ି௡ and past realizations of the 
speculative activity ܵ௧ିଵǡǥ ǡ ܵ௧ି௠. If the null hypothesis of no Granger causality, ߚ௝ ൌ Ͳ׊݆ ൌ
ͳǡǥ ǡ݉, cannot be rejected, it can be concluded that speculative activity does not Granger-cause 
commodity returns in mean. In this case, adding past values of speculative activity 
ܵ௧ିଵǡǥ ǡ ܵ௧ି௠ to the information set does not improve the forecast of the return variable ܴ௧ 
(Hamilton, 1994). Importantly, the rejection of Granger causality may be the consequence of 
semi-strong information efficiency and, thus, does not allow any inferences regarding the 
absence of any impact of traders on the price mechanism (Grosche, 2014). Moreover, the 
rejection of Granger causality in mean does not necessarily imply that there is no Granger 
causality in other parts of the distribution or in other moments (Chuang et al., 2009; Gebka and 
Wohar, 2013).  
If ܳோ೟ሺߠȁ࣠ሻ denotes the ߠth quantile of ܨோ೟ሺǤ ȁ࣠ሻ, Granger non-causality in distribution is 
equivalent to Granger non-causality at all quantiles ߠ א ሺͲǡͳሻ and can be summarized as 
(Chuang et al., 2009): 
ܳோ೟ሺߠȁሺ࣬ǡ ࣭ሻ௧ିଵሻ ൌ ܳோ೟ሺߠȁ࣬௧ିଵሻ׊ߠ א ሺͲǡͳሻ                                                                        (4). 
Chuang et al. (2009) test Granger non-causality in the entire distribution as specified by Eq. (4). 
However, the concept of Granger causality can be extended to either a particular quantile (Lee 
and Yang, 2012) or a quantile range (Gebka and Wohar, 2013). This study focuses on Granger-
causal effects at individual quantiles. 
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Quantile Regressions 
Quantile regressions estimate a linear relationship between a specified quantile of the dependent 
variable and a set of regressors. The quantile function ܳோ೟ሺߠȁ࣠ሻ denotes the distribution of the 
response variable ܴ௧ conditional on the covariates ܼ௧ିଵ at the ߠth quantile: 
ܳோ೟ሺߠȁ࣠ሻ ൌ ܼ௧ିଵ′ ߦሺߠሻ                                                                                                                (5). 
ܼ௧ିଵ ൌ ሺͳǡ ܴ௧ିଵǡǥ ǡ ܴ௧ି௡ǡ ܵ௧ିଵǡǥ ǡ ܵ௧ି௠) is the vector of explanatory variables. ߦ is the 
parameter vector with ߦ ′ ൌ ሺߙǡ ߛଵǡ ǥ ǡ ߛ௡ǡ ߚଵǡǥ ǡ ߚ௠). Contrary to traditional mean models that 
assume that the mean equation accurately describes all parts of distribution, the quantile 
approach allows the conditional quantile function ܳோ೟ሺߠȁ࣠ሻ to vary across quantiles. Whereas 
the traditional ordinary least squares estimator minimizes the sum of squared residuals, the least 
absolute deviations (LAD) estimator minimizes the sum of asymmetrically weighted absolute 
residuals (Koenker and Hallock, 2001). For a given quantile ߠ, the LAD estimator determines 
the parameter vector ߦመሺߠሻ as the solution to the following minimization problem (Koenker and 
Hallock, 2001; Gebka and Wohar, 2013): 
݉݅݊క ቄσ ߠ כ หܴ௧ െ ܼ௧ିଵ′ ߦห௧ǣோ೟ஹ௓೟షభ′ క ൅ σ ሺͳ െ ߠሻ כ หܴ௧ െ ܼ௧ିଵ
′ ߦห௧ǣோ೟ழ௓೟షభ′ క ቅ                              (6). 
It is worth clarifying that the LAD estimator uses all available observations in estimating any 
quantile.  
The major advantage of the quantile estimation as compared to the ordinary least squares 
estimator is a more profound characterization of the data. Coefficient estimates obtained for 
individual quantiles allow for the possibility that the dependent variable reacts differently to the 
same set of explanatory variables at various points of its conditional distribution (e.g. 
Buchinsky, 1998b). For instance, positive Granger-causal effects at high quantiles may efface 
negative Granger-causal effects at lower quantiles in a least squares estimation such that no 
Granger causality in mean is detected although significant Granger-causal effects exist at 
individual qunatiles. Moreover, quantile regressions account for the possibility that the potential 
price impact or significant Granger causality from positions to returns may manifest itself 
particularly strongly only in periods of rising or falling prices, i.e. at high or low quantiles of the 
return distribution. 
Granger Causality in Mean and at Individual Quantiles  
For each of the twelve commodity markets and each trader category, Granger causality in mean 
is tested based on the following ADL model that relates weekly futures returns ܴ௧ to lagged 
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weekly changes in net long positions of traders (either money managers or other reportables or 
index traders) ܵ௧ିଵ: 
ܴ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ σ ߛ௜ כ ܴ௧ି௜௡௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௝ כ ܵ௧ି௝ ൅ σ ߜ௤஼௏ כ ܥ ௧ܸି௤௣௤ୀଵ௠௝ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧                                        (7). 
ܥ ௧ܸ is the vector of control variables: weekly changes in the USD index spot rate, the S&P 500 
index, the MSCI emerging markets index and the spot oil price.4 Rising demand from emerging 
markets, production costs (inter alia determined by the oil price) and the USD value are cited as 
important determinants of food prices (Mitchell, 2008; Cooke and Robles, 2009; Abbott et al., 
2011; Tang and Xiong, 2012). Moreover, several studies document a link between commodity 
and stock markets (Silvennoinen and Thorp, 2013; Mensi et al., 2013). In addition, the 
incorporation of weekly changes in the USD index spot rate accounts for one of the major 
drivers of the activity of index traders who view commodity investment as a hedge against the 
USD depreciation (Gilbert, 2009; Gilbert, 2010b). These financial and macroeconomic variables 
are supposed to capture at least some fundamental supply and demand factors that may have an 
impact on price formation, and, thus, are supposed to mitigate the omitted variable bias that may 
impair the validity of the causal evidence (Gilbert, 2010b; Grosche, 2014). Table 4 summarizes 
the descriptive statistics for the control variables. 
The lag structure ሺ݊Ǣ݉ሻ is chosen by estimating Eq. (3) for different lag lengths that range from 
one to four and choosing the regression model that minimizes the Schwarz Bayesian 
information criterion.5 The maximum number of four lags is reasonable given that weekly data 
are used. The optimal lag structure is ݊ ൌ ݉ ൌ ͳ for all markets and both trader categories. As 
far as the lag number ݌ for the control variables is concerned, it is chosen to be equal to the 
optimally chosen number of lags for the weekly growth in trader positions. This model 
specification eliminates the possibility that the coefficient estimates on positions are found to be 
statistically significant as a consequence of their correlation with macroeconomic and financial 
factors that Granger-cause commodity returns. 
Newey-West standard errors are used if the Lagrange multiplier test indicates the presence of 
conditional heteroskedasticity. If the White test rejects the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity 
at ten percent significance level, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used for the 
hypothesis testing. In the absence of any form of heteroskedasticity, OLS standard errors are 
used. To ensure that estimation results are not contaminated by collinearity issues, variance 
inflation factors are computed. Neither variance inflation factor exceeds the value of three and, 
                                                          
4 The data are obtained from Datastream. 
5 For each of these estimations, the sample size is chosen such that the resulting ordinary least squares 
estimations are based on the same number of data points. 
104 
 
thus, is below the maximum acceptable threshold value of five that is commonly used as a 
benchmark.  
As a next step, I explore Granger-causal effects from lagged positions to returns at a specified 
quantile range. The focus lies on tail quantiles ߠ ൌ ͲǤͲͷǡ ͲǤͳǡ ͲǤͻǡ ͲǤͻͷ and upper and lower 
parts of the return distribution ߠ ൌ ͲǤʹͷǡ ͲǤ͹ͷ. The intermediate quantiles ߠ א ሺͲǤʹͷǢ ͲǤ͹ͷሻ are 
not reported: The results obtained for these quantiles are similar to the OLS estimations. The 
model is specified as follows: 
ܴ௧ ൌ ߙሺߠሻ ൅ σ ߛ௜ሺߠሻ כ ܴ௧ି௜௡௜ୀଵ ൅ σ ߚ௝ሺߠሻ כ ܵ௧ି௝ ൅ σ ߜ௤஼௏ሺߠሻ כ ܥ ௧ܸି௤௣௤ୀଵ௠௝ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧                 (8). 
In this case, the focus lies on ߚ௝ሺߠሻ that denotes the coefficient estimate on the lagged growth in 
net long trader positions in the regression specification related to the quantile ߠ of the return 
distribution. Granger causality at a particular quantile ߠ implies a statistical significance of the 
coefficient estimates ߚଵሺߠሻǡ ǥ ǡ ߚ௠ሺߠሻ.  
The procedure for choosing the optimal lag structure for quantile regressions loosely follows 
Chuang et al. (2009). For reasons of simplicity, the optimal lag number on the return variable is 
set equal to the optimal lag order on the position and control variables:݊ ൌ ݉ ൌ ݌. However, 
whereas Chuang et al. (2009) determine the optimal lag number for the total quantile range, I 
estimate the appropriate lag order at every individual quantile in order to account for the 
possibility that the lag order may change across quantiles. Thus, Eq. (8) is estimated at every 
individual quantile ߠ for ݊ ൌ ݉ ൌ ݌ ൌ ݍ beginning with ݍ ൌ ͳ. If ߚ௤כሺߠሻ is significant, but 
ߚ௤כାଵሺߠሻ is not significant, then the optimal lag order is set equal to ݍכ. For all trader categories 
and all commodity markets, the optimal lag number ݍכ is constant across quantiles and is equal 
to one. 
Two types of standard errors are used in estimations based on Eq. (8). Based on a Monte Carlo 
study, Buchinsky (1995) recommends the use of the pairs- (or design) bootstrapped standard 
errors for relatively small sample sizes. Moreover, the bootstrapped standard errors are valid 
under very general assumptions: They do not require either an identical sampling or 
independence between regressors and error terms. In addition, I report inference under the 
assumption that residuals are independent and identically distributed. 
Robustness checks 
Whereas scaling trader positions by open interest reflects the idea that it is the magnitude of 
positions relative to the total open interest that matters, the absolute magnitude of positions is 
also a common proxy for the trading activity (Grosche, 2014). Therefore, as a robustness check, 
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changes in net long positions scaled by open interest are substituted by unscaled changes in net 
long positions in Eq. (7) and (8). Unscaled net long positions are computed as the difference 
between long and short positions (in 100 thousands). 
As an additional robustness check, Granger-causal effects of the lagged changes in scaled net 
long positions of index traders, money managers and other reportables are jointly estimated in 
the same regression specification both in the context of Granger causality in mean and Granger 
causality at the level of individual quantiles: 
ܴ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߛଵ כ ܴ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵூ் כ ܫ ௧ܶିଵ ൅ ߚଵெெ כ ܯܯ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵைோ כ ܱܴ௧ିଵ ൅ ߜଵ஼௏ כ ܥ ௧ܸିଵ ൅ ߝ௧       (9), 
ܴ௧ ൌ ߙሺߠሻ ൅ ߛଵሺߠሻ כ ܴ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵூ்ሺߠሻ כ ܫ ௧ܶିଵ ൅ ߚଵெெሺߠሻ כ ܯܯ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵைோሺߠሻ כ ܱܴ௧ିଵ ൅
൅ߜଵ஼௏ሺߠሻ כ ܥ ௧ܸିଵ ൅ ߝ௧                                                                                                              (10). 
ܫ ௧ܶିଵ, ܯܯ௧ିଵ and ܱܴ௧ିଵ denote the last week’s changes in net long positions of index traders, 
money managers and other reportables, respectively. Net long positions are scaled by open 
interest. For reasons of simplicity, the lag structure is set to one for both trader categories and 
control variables ܥܸ. Control variables are weekly changes in the USD index spot rate, the S&P 
500 index, the MSCI emerging markets index and the spot oil price.  
Table 3 reports the correlations between ܫ ௧ܶ, ܯܯ௧ and ܱܴ௧ in each of the twelve examined 
commodity markets. In most markets, the correlations of changes in net long positions of index 
traders with changes in net long positions of speculators (money managers and other 
reportables) are very low such that multicollinearity should not be an issue. Correlations 
between weekly changes in net long positions of money managers and other reportables are 
considerably higher. The results for coffee and SRW wheat markets should be treated with 
caution since the correlation between changes in net long positions of money managers and 
other reportables is relatively high (it amounts to -0.48).  
Importantly, Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) are not contaminated by a potential cointegration between 
trader positions. Cointegration applies only to non-stationary series and there is no evidence that 
net long positions of all three trader categories (index traders, money managers and other 
reportables) are non-stationary in any market (Table 1).  
Hedging pressure is an important determinant of futures returns (De Roon et al., 2000). In this 
case, disregarding changes in hedgers’ positions may result in an omitted variable bias. 
However, correlations between net long positions of money managers and net short positions of 
hedgers ܪܲ (producers/merchants/processors/users) are very high (Table 3). Therefore, it is not 
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possible to include both trader categories in the same regression specification.6 For other 
reportables and index traders, the following regression models are estimated: 
ܴ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߛଵ כ ܴ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵூ் כ ܫ ௧ܶିଵ ൅ ߚଵைோ כ ܱܴ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵு௉ כ ܪ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ߜଵ஼௏ כ ܥ ௧ܸିଵ ൅ ߝ௧        (11), 
ܴ௧ ൌ ߙሺߠሻ ൅ ߛଵሺߠሻ כ ܴ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵூ்ሺߠሻ כ ܫ ௧ܶିଵ ൅ ߚଵைோሺߠሻ כ ܱܴ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵு௉ሺߠሻ כ ܪ ௧ܲିଵ ൅
൅ߜଵ஼௏ሺߠሻ כ ܥ ௧ܸିଵ ൅ ߝ௧                                                                                                              (12). 
5 Results and Discussion 
5.1 Granger Causality in Mean versus Granger Causality at Individual Quantiles 
Table 5 reports the results for the Granger causality in mean, i.e. the coefficient estimates on the 
lagged changes in net long positions of traders. Tables 6-9 summarize the estimation results at 
individual quantiles for index traders, money managers and other reportables. Panel A reports 
the estimation results for the base model, i.e. Eq. (7) and (8) for changes in positions that are 
scaled by open interest. In Panel B, changes in unscaled net long positions are considered. Panel 
C shows the coefficient estimates on lagged position changes based on Eq. (9) and (10) where 
all three trader categories are included in the same regression specification. The coefficient 
estimates on lagged changes in net long positions of index traders and other reportables for Eq. 
(11) and (12) where the hedging pressure is included as an additional control variable can be 
found in Panel D. 
For index traders, the null hypothesis of no Granger causality in mean from positions to 
subsequent futures returns can be rejected at five percent significance level only in the cocoa 
market (Table 5, Panels A, C and D). Significant Granger-causal effects from past changes in 
index traders’ positions to cocoa returns can be observed in the upper part of the conditional 
return distribution at ߠ ൌ ͲǤͻ for scaled position changes (Table 6, Panels A, C and D) and for 
changes in unscaled positions in the lower part of the return distribution at ߠ ൌ ͲǤͳ (Table 6, 
Panel B). For corn, negative Granger-causal effects manifest themselves both in low and upper 
part of the conditional return distribution. In soybeans and sugar markets, there is also evidence 
of a negative and significant Granger causality from lagged index traders’ positions to returns, 
but only when unscaled positions are considered (Table 6, Panel B).  
Swap dealers are a trader category that is frequently used as a proxy for the activity of index 
traders in the existing research on agricultural futures markets (e.g. Brunetti and Buyuksahin, 
2009; Irwin and Sanders, 2012b). Indeed, the correlations between changes in net long positions 
                                                          
6 Otherwise, multicollinearity would arise. 
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of index traders and swap dealers are very high (Table 3). Table 7 reports the estimation results 
for swap dealers.7 As has been confirmed for the positions of index traders, significant and 
robust Granger-causal effects from swap dealers’ positions to returns exist at individual 
quantiles of the conditional return distribution in the corn market. Additionally, positive 
Granger-causal effects can be observed at ߠ ൌ ͲǤͻͷ in the coffee market. 
Significant and robust Granger causality in mean between returns and past growth in positions 
of money managers is detected for live cattle (Table 5, Panels A-C). Granger-causal 
relationships at individual quantiles corroborate the results of the Granger causality in mean: A 
significant relationship between changes in net long positions of money managers and 
subsequent returns arises in the upper part of the conditional return distribution in the live cattle 
market (Table 8). For coffee, there is robust evidence of negative Granger causality in mean, but 
this evidence is predominantly only marginally significant (Table 5). However, when individual 
quantiles are considered, significant Granger-causal effects from money managers’ positions to 
returns can be observed at tail quantiles ሺߠ ൌ ͲǤͻͷሻ and in the lower part of the return 
distribution (ߠ ൌ ͲǤʹͷ) in the coffee market. In addition, significant Granger-causal effects of 
money managers on returns arise at individual quantiles in cocoa, feeder cattle, sugar and SRW 
wheat markets (Table 8).  
For other reportables, significant Granger causality in mean can be observed only for lean hogs 
where significant Granger-causal effects also exist at individual quantiles (Tables 5 and 9). 
Robust Granger-causal effects from lagged positions of other reportables to returns arise in 
markets for coffee, SRW wheat and soybeans (only marginally significant) in the upper part of 
the conditional return distribution (Table 9). 
In general, there is some evidence that the relationship between trader positions and returns is 
non-linear in different parts of the conditional return distribution in the sense that the sign of the 
slope coefficient ߚଵሺߠሻ changes across different quantiles (e.g. soybeans in case of index 
traders, cocoa in case of money managers and SRW wheat in case of other reportables). In these 
cases, non-linearity may be one of the reasons why the null hypothesis of no Granger causality 
in mean cannot be rejected, but significant Granger-causal relationships exist at individual 
quantiles. Positive and negative ߚଵሺߠሻ in different parts of the distribution may cancel each 
other out when the total distribution is considered. In general, in those cases where there is 
robust evidence of Granger causality in mean (e.g. the live cattle market for money managers 
and the lean hogs market for other reportables), almost no non-linearity at individual quantiles 
can be observed: The relationship between positions of traders and subsequent returns is 
                                                          
7 Descriptive statistics on the net long positions of swap dealers can be found in Table 1. 
108 
 
negative almost at all quantiles considered, i.e. the sign on ߚଵሺߠሻ does not change across 
quantiles in these markets. 
As far as speculators are concerned, the results indicate that it makes sense to differentiate 
between money managers and other reportables instead of considering the non-commercial 
traders on an aggregate level. The existence of Granger-causal effects and the direction of 
Granger causality differ across markets. Only in the coffee market, both trader types appear to 
have a negative and significant Granger-causal effect on returns. By contrast, Granger-causal 
effects from past changes in net long positions to cocoa (SRW wheat) returns are negative 
(positive) for money managers and positive (negative) for other reportables.8 Returns in the live 
cattle and sugar markets appear to be sensitive to positions of money managers, but not other 
reportables. The differences related to the potential price impact of other reportables and money 
managers are not surprising. As shown in Section 3, money managers and other reportables 
pursue different investment strategies, which may explain the divergent direction of Granger-
causal effects of the two trader categories. 
Importantly, the results on money managers are potentially contaminated by the omitted 
variable bias. Given the high correlation between positions of money managers and hedgers, it 
has not been possible to include the hedging pressure as one of the control variables. Table 10 
summarizes the estimation results for Eq. (11) and (12) on the relationship between changes in 
net short positions of producers/merchants/producers/users and subsequent futures returns. The 
results are very similar to those on money managers: Significant Granger causality in mean 
arises in coffee and live cattle markets, whereas additional Granger-causal effects at individual 
quantiles are observed in markets for cocoa and sugar. The SRW wheat is the only market 
where there are significant Granger-causal effects at individual quantiles for money managers, 
but not for hedgers. Since it is not possible to infer which trader type (money managers or 
hedgers) triggers significant Granger-causal effects in the remaining markets, the results for 
money managers should be treated with caution. 
5.2 Direction of Granger causality 
Not only does the direction of Granger causality vary with trader categories, but also with 
markets within a single trader category. For instance, changes in net long positions of money 
                                                          
8 Given the high negative correlation between positions of money managers and other reportables in the 
SRW wheat market (Table 3), it may be the case that only one trader category (either money managers or 
other reportables) forecasts the SRW wheat returns and that a significant coefficient estimate on changes 
in net long positions of another trader category (either money managers or other reportables) simply 
reflects this Granger causality. The estimation results shown in Panel C in Tables 8 and 9 where both 
trader categories are included may imply that it is the other reportables (and not money managers) that 
Granger-cause SRW wheat returns. 
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managers are associated with higher subsequent returns in sugar and SRW wheat markets, but 
appear to be related to lower subsequent returns in cocoa, coffee and live cattle markets. The 
impact of positions of other reportables on subsequent returns is, if significant, also 
heterogeneous across markets: It is positive for cocoa and corn and negative for coffee, lean 
hogs and SRW wheat. For index traders, the detected Granger causality from positions to 
returns is positive in the cocoa market and negative in the corn futures market. Whereas the 
positive slope coefficient on lagged changes in net long positions of traders is consistent with 
the notion that rising demand drives up prices, a negative coefficient should not be interpreted 
as a soothing impact on prices. Following Gebka and Wohar (2013), positive and negative slope 
coefficients ߚଵ and ߚଵሺߠሻ can be interpreted in the context of fundamentally oriented trades and 
non-informational buying and selling. 
In case of non-informational trades, prices may temporarily adjust to accommodate increases or 
decreases in net long positions of traders, but would quickly bounce back once market 
participants realize that non-informational trades are not related to the fundamental value of a 
commodity (e.g. Llorente et al., 2002; Gebka and Wohar, 2013). In this case, rising net long 
positions (ܵ௧ିଵ ՛ሻ result in higher contemporaneous returns (ܴ௧ିଵ ՛), but prices in the following 
period ݐ decline ሺܴ௧ ՝) as the non-informational content of past changes in net long positions is 
recognized. Similarly, declining net long positions (ܵ௧ିଵ ՝ሻ in ݐ െ ͳ may trigger negative 
contemporaneous returns (ܴ௧ିଵ ՝) and rising subsequent returns in ݐ (ܴ௧ ՛) when prices revert 
to their fundamental values. In this case, a negative causality between changes in net long 
positions and subsequent futures returns is expected both at low and high quantiles of the 
conditional return distribution. The negative direction of Granger causality from trading activity 
to returns does not necessarily imply that trader positions trigger lower prices in the subsequent 
week, but indicates that increases in net long positions of index traders and speculators are 
associated with contemporaneous price increases that are reversed until the next Tuesday. 
The case of non-informational trades is most likely to apply to index traders who typically do 
not take a view on individual commodities and adjust their positions for hedging and 
diversification purposes. Mayer (2009) argues that trading strategy of some money managers is 
based not on fundamentals, but on technical tools such as trend identification algorithms and 
investment rules that may include signals from other asset markets. In this case, money 
managers can be considered as noise traders whose activity is only partially related to 
fundamentals on commodity markets. Hence, some of the trades of money managers will be, at 
least partially, non-informational. Trading activity of other reportables may become non-
informational, e.g. if they "copy" the trades of professional speculators such as money 
managers.  
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Rising net long positions that reflect positive private information about the fundamental value of 
a commodity in ݐ െ ͳ (ܵ௧ିଵ ՛ሻ may result in higher contemporaneous returns (ܴ௧ିଵ ՛) and in 
rising subsequent futures returns (ܴ௧ ՛) as positive information disseminates in the market (e.g. 
Llorente et al., 2002; Gebka and Wohar, 2013). By contrast, a decline in net long positions in 
response to negative private information (ܵ௧ିଵ ՝ሻ may trigger negative returns at time ݐ െ ͳ 
(ܴ௧ିଵ ՝) that are followed by further price declines at time ݐ (ܴ௧ ՝) as negative information is 
absorbed by the market (Gebka and Wohar, 2013). Thus, in case of informational trades, a 
positive relationship between net long positions ܵ௧ିଵ and returns ܴ௧ is expected both at high and 
low quantiles that are associated with positive and negative returns, respectively. This case is 
more likely to apply to money managers who, as professional speculators, are most likely to 
conduct research on individual commodities and trade on discovered information.  
Importantly, the direction of the serial return correlation, i.e. the relationship between the 
consecutive returns ܴ௧ and ܴ௧ିଵ in regression specifications that include a single trader category 
(Eq. 8), may also provide valuable insight into the information content of trading: Non-
informational trades should be associated with subsequent price reversals, whereas return 
continuations are expected in case of informational trades (Llorente et al., 2002). A negative 
sign of the serial return correlation and of the Granger-causal relationship between lagged 
changes in net long positions and returns may indicate the non-informational content of trades 
and that the associated price effects are only temporary and are followed by price reversals. By 
contrast, a positive direction of both the serial return correlation and the Granger-causal 
relationship between lagged changes in net long positions and returns may imply that price 
effects associated with a certain trader category may become persistent, i.e. prevail until the 
next Tuesday. In most cases, my results are consistent with these predictions: Trading activity-
return causality and the return autocorrelation have the same sign in those cases where 
significant Granger causality from lagged changes in positions to returns is detected. Only for 
money managers in cocoa and feeder cattle markets, other reportables in the coffee market and 
index traders in the cocoa market, I obtain opposite signs of the coefficient estimates on the 
lagged return and position variables. However, the coefficient estimates on the lagged return 
variables are insignificant.9 
An important limitation of the framework presented above is the weekly frequency of the data.10 
It is unlikely that liquid markets take one week to re-adjust to non-informational trades. In this 
case, it may be misleading to expect rising/declining subsequent returns over a period of one 
                                                          
9 The results on the coefficient estimates on the lagged return variables are available on demand. 
10 The CFTC publishes the data on trader positions only at weekly frequency. Daily data are not publicly 
available. 
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week as a result of informed trades on positive/negative fundamentals in liquid markets. 
Accounting for non-informational and informational changes in positions of traders that trigger 
price effects that persist for a week or longer may reconcile the framework of Gebka and Wohar 
(2013) to the weekly temporal aggregation of the data.  
Non-informational trades may be misinterpreted as valuable private information by other market 
participants (e.g. noise traders, less informed traders) who imitate these trades and, thus, further 
exacerbate the price effects. Similarly, fundamentally based trades of speculators may be copied 
by less informed investors such that the initial price effects will be amplified. Alternatively, 
rational speculators may purposely destabilize the price mechanism in order to trigger positive 
feedback trading (Tokic, 2012).11 If the triggered positive feedback trading is sufficiently strong, 
rational arbitrageurs may not be able to quickly correct the mispricing that arises as a 
consequence of non-informational trades. Therefore, it may take one week or more to re-adjust 
to non-informational trades and bring prices back to their fundamental values. If the triggered 
positive feedback trading of other market participants is not strong enough and the re-
adjustment takes place within a week, we should expect a negative Granger causality from 
position changes in ݐ െ ͳ to returns in ݐ. If the price effects triggered by trades of speculators 
become persistent,12 a positive causality between ܵ௧ିଵ and ܴ௧ would result. 
In the scenario described above, a lot of emphasis is laid on the assumption that trades of index 
traders and speculators (money managers and other reportables) are either imitated by less 
informed traders or have the potential to trigger positive feedback trading. In this respect, 
Jickling and Austin (2011) argue that money managers are perceived as especially capable of 
achieving superior performance and identifying new information. In this case, their trades may 
be most likely to be copied by other short-term traders such that the propagation of private 
information inherent in the trades of money managers may become persistent. It is, however, 
arguable whether speculators purposely destabilize prices by initiating trades in the hope of 
triggering positive feedback trading and, then, selling their initial positions at profit as suggested 
by Tokic (2012). Table 2 shows that money managers are positive feedback traders in all 
examined markets: They increase their demand in response to rising prices. By contrast, there is 
evidence of a negative feedback trading in several markets for other reportables. 
                                                          
11 By buying an asset, rational speculators may hope to create an artificial trend of rising prices that would 
attract positive feedback of other traders who reinforce the trend and further inflate futures prices (Tokic, 
2012). Then, an investor makes profits by selling his initial position (Tokic, 2012). 
12 De Long et al. (1990) show that prices may persistently deviate from their fundamental values in the 
presence of noise traders who impose a limit to arbitrage. Given the unpredictability of the noise traders’ 
behavior, risk-averse rational investors are less likely to engage in arbitrage: If noise traders continue to 
trade on their beliefs and e.g. imitate the trades of speculators, mispricing may become even more 
extreme and arbitrageurs would incur losses when they liquidate their investment in a mispriced asset (De 
Long et al., 1990). 
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One should be cautious while drawing conclusions about the information content of trades 
based on the sign of the observed Granger-causal relationship on a weekly basis. For instance, a 
positive sign may indicate both fundamentally based and non-informational trades that trigger a 
sufficiently strong positive feedback trading of other market participants such that the price 
effects are not arbitraged away within a week. Whereas a positive sign of the Granger-causal 
relationship from trading activity to returns may be an indication that rising net long positions of 
a particular trader category have the potential to increase prices over a period of the next seven 
days, a negative sign implies that rising net long positions may have triggered contemporaneous 
price increases and perhaps also rising prices in the next few days that, however, disappear until 
the next Tuesday. 
Most significant Granger-causal effects are observed in the upper part of the conditional return 
distribution (e.g. coffee, SRW wheat and soybeans for other reportables; feeder cattle, SRW 
wheat and sugar for money managers; cocoa for index traders). In this case, a positive sign may 
indicate that increases in net long positions are associated with rising prices within the next 
days. By contrast, a negative slope coefficient observed at upper quantiles of the return 
distribution may imply that price reversals are linked to falling net long positions: Tuesday’s 
decreases in net long positions may trigger contemporaneous price declines and falling prices in 
the next few days, but the next Tuesday’s prices increase as the non-informational content of the 
position changes is realized. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper examines the information content of trading activity of speculators and commodity 
index traders in agricultural futures markets. Whereas the existing research on the price impact 
of these trader categories predominantly relies on Granger causality in mean, this study resorts 
to quantile regressions in order to examine Granger causality in different parts of the return 
distribution. Quantile regressions allow accounting for non-linearity in the relationship between 
positions of traders and futures returns. This study shows that there are significant Granger-
causal effects from positions to returns that would not have been unveiled while using the 
traditional OLS approach. There is robust evidence of Granger causality in mean from positions 
to returns for money managers in coffee and live cattle markets, for other reportables in the lean 
hogs market and for index traders in the cocoa market. Quantile regressions uncover significant 
Granger-causal effects from positions to returns at individual quantiles even in those markets 
where no Granger causality in mean is detected. This is the case for index traders in the corn 
market, for money managers in the cocoa, feeder cattle, sugar and SRW wheat markets as well 
as for other reportables in coffee, cocoa, SRW wheat and soybeans markets. 
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In terms of policy implications, one should be cautious while interpreting the detected Granger-
causal effects as price impact. Whereas significant coefficients on past changes in net positions 
of speculators and index traders indicate that trader positions are useful in forecasting futures 
returns, they cannot be interpreted as prima facie causal evidence of a price impact (Grosche, 
2014). To deal with the omitted variable bias, control variables have been introduced that ensure 
that the significance of coefficient estimates does not arise as a result of omitted relevant 
macroeconomic or financial variables. However, it has not been possible to include important 
fundamentals such as inventory and storage costs since these data are not available on a weekly 
basis. Hedging pressure is an important determinant of futures returns (De Roon et al., 2000). 
This effect has been accounted for in estimations related to index traders and other reportables. 
However, given that changes in net positions of hedgers and money managers display very high 
correlations with each other, including positions of both trader groups in the same regression 
specification has not been possible due to multicollinearity. Therefore, while interpreting the 
results, it should be borne in mind that e.g. a significant coefficient estimate on the lagged 
change in net long positions of money managers may simply reflect significant Granger-causal 
effects of hedgers’ positions on returns.  
This study relies on a comparatively low frequency (weekly) data. Therefore, the absence of 
significant Granger-causal effects either in mean or at individual quantiles in markets such as 
cotton, HRW wheat and soybean oil should not be interpreted as evidence that trader positions 
do not have any price impact in these markets. According to both the market microstructure 
theory and the "efficient markets" hypothesis, an impact of lagged position changes on the next 
week’s returns is unlikely to manifest itself (Gilbert and Pfuderer, 2014). Moreover, the CFTC 
data are highly aggregated across heterogeneous traders within a single trader category and 
different contract maturities. Combining the quantile analysis with (not publicly available) daily 
data may yield more convincing results with respect to the potential of speculators and index 
traders to influence the price mechanism in commodity markets.  
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Appendix 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Index traders and swap dealers 
 Index traders Swap dealers 
 
Mean 
(level) 
Std/ 
mean 
(level) 
ADF 
(level) 
ADF 
(change) 
Mean 
(level) 
Std/ 
mean 
(level) 
ADF 
(level) 
ADF 
(change) 
Cocoa 0.15 0.26 -3.46*** -15.76*** 0.06 0.47 -2.87** -18.31*** 
Coffee 0.25 0.20 -3.13** -5.14*** 0.25 0.21 -2.99** -15.86*** 
Corn 0.22 0.18 -3.01** -4.97*** 0.24 0.23 -2.42 -14.67*** 
Cotton 0.28 0.24 -3.83*** -16.72*** 0.31 0.27 -3.07** -12.07*** 
Feeder cattle 0.21 0.27 -3.05** -17.60*** 0.13 0.29 -3.73*** -15.82*** 
Live cattle 0.34 0.17 -1.85 -5.78*** 0.32 0.16 -1.69 -17.89*** 
Lean hogs 0.37 0.19 -1.73 -20.49*** 0.33 0.20 -1.65 -19.13*** 
Sugar 0.24 0.24 -2.73* -17.48*** 0.15 0.64 -1.92 -15.35*** 
SRW wheat 0.36 0.14 -4.45*** -18.24*** 0.35 0.16 -2.36 -15.82*** 
HRW wheat 0.24 0.25 -2.59* -18.12*** 0.19 0.27 -2.55 -17.11*** 
Soybeans 0.22 0.23 -1.88 -5.08*** 0.22 0.32 -1.45 -13.24*** 
Soybean oil 0.24 0.16 -4.29*** -14.08*** 0.24 0.17 -3.38** -17.65*** 
 
Panel B: Money managers and other reportables (traditional speculators) 
 Money managers Other reportables 
 
Mean 
(level) 
Std/ 
mean 
(level) 
ADF 
(level) 
ADF 
(change) 
Mean 
(level) 
Std/ 
mean 
(level) 
ADF 
(level) 
ADF 
(change) 
Cocoa 0.15 0.88 -3.01** -13.21***  0.01 1.66 -3.77*** -13.21*** 
Coffee 0.04 3.07 -3.57*** -13.81***  0.04 0.81 -3.80*** -13.81*** 
Corn 0.12 0.65 -2.93** -15.11***  0.04 0.75 -2.23 -15.11*** 
Cotton 0.10 1.25 -3.41*** -12.43***  0.01 5.91 -3.56*** -12.43*** 
Feeder cattle 0.18 0.73 -3.80*** -13.63*** -0.05 1.25 -3.41** -13.63*** 
Live cattle 0.15 0.59 -2.47 -13.82*** -0.04 0.94 -3.37** -13.82*** 
Lean hogs 0.09 1.18 -3.01** -14.04*** -0.02 2.22 -2.86* -14.04*** 
Sugar 0.10 0.81 -2.97** -14.48***  0.03 0.90 -3.18** -14.48*** 
SRW wheat 0.01 7.22 -3.60*** -15.81*** -0.03 0.85 -3.69*** -15.81*** 
HRW wheat 0.15 0.62 -3.81*** -13.45***  0.05 0.80 -2.96** -13.45*** 
Soybeans 0.16 0.53 -4.08*** -15.65***  0.03 1.29 -2.85* -15.65*** 
Soybean oil 0.06 1.87 -3.59*** -14.22***  0.01 3.04 -4.35*** -14.22*** 
   
Panel C: Futures returns 
 Mean Std ADF 
Cocoa 0.0004 0.04 -20.23*** 
Coffee -0.0019 0.04 -20.65*** 
Corn 0.0005 0.05 -21.37*** 
Cotton -0.0006 0.04 -19.17*** 
Feeder cattle -0.0007 0.02 -20.44*** 
Live cattle -0.0013 0.02 -22.41*** 
Lean hogs -0.0031 0.03 -21.14*** 
Sugar -0.0011 0.05 -21.32*** 
SRW wheat -0.0016 0.05 -20.46*** 
HRW wheat -0.0006 0.04 -20.20*** 
Soybeans 0.0019 0.04 -20.25*** 
Soybean oil 0.0000 0.04 -20.01*** 
Note: Table 1 reports the mean, standardized standard deviation (standard deviation scaled by mean) and the test 
statistic of the Augmented Dickey Fuller test on unit root for levels and changes in net long positions (scaled by open 
interest) of index traders, swap dealers, money managers and other reportables. Panel C reports the mean, standard 
deviation and the test statistic of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for returns in the examined commodity futures 
markets. The estimations are based on the period from January 10, 2006 to December 31, 2013 (June 20, 2006 to 
December 31, 2013) for positions of index traders and returns (for positions of other reportables and money 
managers).  
***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis of the Augmented Dickey Fuller test on unit root at one, 
five and ten percent, respectively. 
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Abstract 
Existing research finds little evidence that speculative activity in futures markets has any 
impact on precious metals’ spot prices. We examine whether speculators’ positions predict returns 
and return volatility in precious metals futures markets. We use two proxies for speculative 
activity: non-commercial traders and money managers. Money managers are a subcategory of 
non-commercial traders that is associated with professional speculators. Our analysis 
distinguishes between short- and long-term dynamics. Whereas we cannot confirm any short-
term impact of speculators on returns and conditional volatility in the period after 2006, the 
weekly changes in non-commercial traders’ positions appear to have a destabilizing impact on 
subsequent conditional volatility in gold, silver and palladium futures markets in the period prior to 
June 2006. Moreover, we cannot rule out a long-term, potentially destabilizing, impact on returns 
when accumulated positions of speculators over monthly horizons are considered. 
JEL Classification: Q02, G12, G13, D84 
Keywords: precious metals futures markets, speculation, Granger causality 
130 
Information Content of Trading Activity in Precious Metals Futures Markets 
Published in Journal of Futures Markets, 36, 421-456 (DOI: 10.1002/fut.21755). 
Elina Pradkhan 
Humboldt University of Berlin 
Institute of Finance 
elina.pradkhan@hu-berlin.de 
Abstract 
This study examines the predictive power of trading activity for returns in precious metals 
futures markets. Based on a Markov switching model, two market regimes are distinguished: 
"bull" markets that are characterized by rising prices and a low return volatility and "bear" 
markets that are associated with negative mean returns and a high return variability. There is 
robust evidence of significant Granger-causal effects from trading activity to returns in "bull" 
and "bear" markets that are not detected by models without regime switching. Moreover, the 
relationship between trading activity and subsequent returns is often asymmetric in different 
market regimes.  
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